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Chapter 1
Financial Integration in the European Union:
An Introduction
1.1 Introduction
The degree of financial integration achieved by capital flows remains a matter of debate. Despite
rapid increases in the size of capital flows, the stock of cross-border holdings still is a small
fraction of total financial assets and liabilities outstanding.' This is the conclusion of two recent
studies of international diversification by French and Poterba (1991) and Tesar and Werner
(1992).Z Investors in each country have a"home bias", which in most cases limits investment
in foreign markets to less than 10 percent of their financial assets. Despite the growth in cross-
border capital flows, international diversiiication appears to be limited. Individual portfolios
aze more specialized in domestic securities. This is true even for institutional investors with
long-term horizons such as life insurance companies and pension funds. Furthermore, when
financial markets are deregulated and when restrictions on cross-border capital flows are
liberalized, returns in domestic and foreign markets should be equalized. Yet, real returns on
bonds and equities are hardly equalized. Also studies ofFeldstein and Horioka (1980) analyzing
saving-investment correlations and Obstfeld (1986) analyzing consumption correlations find
financial integration to be low. These stylized facts underline the importance of our study. So,
it remains to be seen how well integrated financial markets have become.
Tables 1.1 and 1.2 provide own estimates of the growing internationalization of financial
markets in the European Union (EU hereafter).' The internationalization ratio measured in
terms of flows is the ratio of flows of extemal assets or liabilities to total flows of financial
assets or liabilities. The internationalization ratio measured in terms of stocks is the ratio of
outstanding external assets or liabilities to total financial assets or liabilities. Data on outstanding
stocks and flows of assets or liabilities are limited. Therefore, we are not able to provide
internationalization ratios for all EU countries. Table 1.1 shows that the external sector -- when
measured in ternts of flows -- has become increasingly important for the financing of the
economy.'
' Flow variables aze measured over some time interval, stock variables are measured at a parucular point in time.
2 See also the evidence in Bisignano (1994) and Marston (1995).
' See the OECD (1996) for historical data on issues of international bonds (euro and foreign bonds) and syndicated
bank loans. See also ttie report of the Crroup of Ten (1993).
` Of course, financial integration is not the only important structural change affecting European financial markets.
Besides, internationalization, Lemmen and Eijffinger (1995b) also analyze other structural changes (disinterrr~diation,
securitization etcJ. See also Sijben (1994, pp. 353-379) and the other chapters in Fair and Raymond (1994).
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Table 1.1 -)Htinancial internationalization ratio (flows, period averages in olo)
Financial internationalization ratio - outstanding eaxernal assets or liabilities
total financial assets or liabilities
1974-1978 1979-1983 1984-1988 1989-1993
Country Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic Foreign Domestic
Belgium 15.5 15.4 25.1 19.6 27.6 28.8 -
Finland 12.0 6.0 12.5 8.6 14.7 11.2 24.5 I1.5
France - 9.6 8.2 8.8 9.1 16.9 16.5
Germany 8.4 12.8 9.7 8.5 I1.8 23.7 ]6.9 20.1
Italy - - - - 7.0 5.3 15.9 13.3
Netherlands - - 14.6 23.2 18.5 25.7
Spain 8.1 3.1 7.5 3.5 5.4 7.2 17.5 12.5
Sweden - - 9.0 6.9 17.1 21.1
United
Kingdom
- - - - 21.2 20.6 273 21.7
Foreign - foreign claims on domestic sectors
Domestic - domestic claims on the rest of [he world
- - no data available
Note: Data for other EU countries were not available.
Source: OECD, Financial Accounts of OECD Countries, Part II, data diskettes.
In the 1980s, capital flows have increased tremendously due to financia] deregulation, modern
communication technology and innovation of financial instruments. The degree of
internationalization is greatest in Belgium and the United Kingdom among the EU countries
depicted. Cross-border acquisition of Belgium and British financial assets by nonresidents are
27.6 (1984-1988) and 27.3 (1989-1993) per cent of total financial flows, respectively. Cross-
border acquisition of Belgium and Dutch residents of foreign liabilities are 28.8 ( 1984-1988)
and 25.7 ( 1989-1993) per cent of total financial flows. The degree of internationalization is
smallest in Italy and Spain. As seen in Table 1.1, the internationalization of financial markets
has been rapid -- when measured in terms of flows. But, Table 1.2 shows that the growth of
the external sector -- when measured in tetms of stocks -- is rather modest. Foreign asset and
liability positions are about 10 percent of total assets and liabilities.s
5 ~he Financial Accounts of OECD Countries have the following sectoring (1) financial institutions, (2) general
government, (3) non-financial enterprises, (4) households, and (5) rest of the world. Domesuc non-financial sectors
are (2), (3), and (4).
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Table 1.2 - F~nancial internationalization ratio (stocks, period averages in ~o)
Financial internationalization ratio - outstanding ezternal assets or liabilities
total fnancial assets or liabilities
Finland 1974-1978 1979-I 983 1984-1988 1989-1993
Domes[ic financial sector A - 65.1 58.2 57.3
L - 58.2 42.0 39.0
Domestic non-financial sector A - 22.1 29.1 31.8
L - 16.6 40.5 43.6
Foreign sector A - 12.8 12.7 10.9
L - 25.2 17.5 17.4
France 1974-1978 1979-1983 1984-1988 1989-1993
Domes[ic financial sec[or A - 44.3 42.7 38.4
L - 40.7 43.5 40.1
Domestic non-financial sector A - 44.9 47.4 51.9
L - 41.6 46.8 49.5
Foreign sector A - 10.8 9.8 9.7
L - 17.7 9.7 10.4
German 1974-1978 1979-1983 1984-1988 I 989-1993
Domestic financial sector A 43.9 45.3 44.3 44.7
L 40.7 42.3 48.8 50.8
Domestic non-financíal sector A 47.0 45.3 44.6 42.3
L 53.1 50.0 41.3 37.9
Foreign sector A 9.1 9.3 ]l.] 13.1
L 6.2 7.7 9.9 11.2
Ital 1974-1978 1979-1983 1984-1988 1989-1993
Domestic financial sector A - 43.0 37.0 36.7
L - 40.6 34.8 35.7
Domestic non-financial sector A 48.2 55.6 55.1
L - 51.7 57.6 54.7
Foreign sector A - 8.8 7.4 8.2
L - 7.7 7.6 9.6
S ain 1974-1978 1979-1983 1984-1988 1989-1993
Domestic financial sector A 52.9 44.9 44.9 45.8
L 49.4 33.6 42.6 42.3
Domestic non-financial sector A 42.6 49.5 49.3 47.1
L 42.9 59.8 50.1 47.9
Foreign sector A 4.6 5.6 5.8 7.2
L 7.6 6.6 7.4 9.7
Sweden 1974-1978 1979-1983 1984-1988 1989-1993
Domestic financial sector A - 43.1 44.9 47.2
L - 34.7 36.3 37.0
Domestic non-financial sector A - 35.5 37.1 35.4
L - 56.1 53.9 50.1
Foreign sector A - 5.3 5.3 6.2
L - 9.2 9.8 12.8
A - assets
L - liabilities
- - no data available
Notes: Figures may not add up to 100qa due to rounding. Data for other EU countries were not available.
Source: OECD, Financial Accounts of OECD Countries, Part II, data diskettes.
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This study primarily concentrates on the progress made in integrating the financial markets
in the EU. There aze several reasons for employing European fínancial markets as the principal
object of study. First, and most importantly, the EU financial markets aze in the process of
institutional integration. The institutional structures of financial markets in the EU have evolved
around important directives of the European Commission. Most legal barriers to cross-border
capital flows have been either removed or are scheduled to be removed. The process of legal
integration is neazly complete. Furthermore, the EU has adopted a stronger form ofhatmonization
for its financial services, a policy of mutual recognition whereby member states within the EU
have agreed to allow financial intermediaries from other states to operate under home country
rules and supervision. Second, the EU financial markets are fairly well established compared
to the financial markets of developing countries. Third, whether the EU financial mazkets aze
integrated is still unclear from an empirical standpoint, despite the institutional process being
almost complete. As will be demonstrated in subsequent chapters, integration across national
borders is still uneven. Fourth, data on many European financial markets are readily available.
Finally, we hold that integration attempts across the world are more of a geographical nature.
Although, the liberalization of capital movements in industrial countries has been the goal of
the OECD's Code of Liberalisation of Capital Movements since 1961, the most important among
the geographical integration attempts have been the European Union (EU), the European Free
Trade Association (EFTA) and the North American Free Trade Association (NAFTA). Alongside
the free movement of goods, persons and services, the free movement of capital within the
European Community (EC) is one of the basic freedoms laid down by the Treaty establishing
the European Economic Community (EEC). Hence, the EU financial mazkets can serve as an
excellent sample to test for financial integration.
We shall briefly highlight the important steps taken to liberalize capital flows in the EU.
There was relatively little capital mobility between the EC member states at the start of the
1980s compared to the considerable progress which had been made on intra-EC trade and the
spectacular development of international financial relations through the Euro mazkets. Many
European countries continued to maintain controls on capital flows. In fact, some European
countries even strengthened their controls.b It was only in the middle of the 1980s that the
liberalization ofEuropean capital movements became a major goal. The 1985 White Paper sought
complete liberalization of capital movements, including those of a purely monetary nature not
linked to commercial transactions.' Subsequently, the Single European Act adopted in February
1986, amending the Treaties establishing the EEC, set a target date of December 31, 1992 for
the EC to create an area without internal frontiers in which free movement of goods, persons,
6 Rogoff (1985) concludes that the presence of capital controls may explain why Italy and France were able to
reduce fluctuations in their exchange rates against the DM without reducing fluctuations in real interest differentials.
' The Commission of tiie European Communities (1989) summarizes the relevant extracts of the EEC Treaties
and Community Directives which govern capital movements within the EC.
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services and capital would be guaranteed. The Single European Act sets in motion a two-phasing
program for the creation of a unified European financial market. In June 1988, the European
Commission adopted a directive to liberalize all intra-EC capital flows as from July 1, 1990
(with a brief delay for Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain until December 31, 1992). This
directive has been instrumental in promoting the liberalization of capital controls by EC member
states. By July 1, 1990, cross-border capital transactions are virtual free.
The liberalization of capital movements by EC member states has been an essential part
of the Delors Report (1989) which put forward a three-stage plan preparing for the Economic
and Monetary Union (EMU). The first stage should accomplish the liberalization of financial
markets, the enlargement of the membership in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the
European Monetary System (EMS), and a change in the mandate of the Committee of Central
Bank Governors of the EC central banks to promote the co-ordination of monetary policies.
The second stage establishes the European Monetary Institute (EMI), which would initially
operate alongside the national monetary authorities. One of the main tasks of the central banks
will be the harmonization of the monetary instruments and targets. In addition, steps will be
taken to ensure full central bank independence from other national authorities. The third stage
should accomplish the irrevocable fixing of exchange rates among national currencies eligible
to join the third stage. Eligibility is based upon the Maastricht convergence criteria that EC
countries have to meet. Convergence criteria have been formulated with respect to inflation
differentials, exchange rate stability, long-term interest rate differentials, fiscal deficits and
government debt. The European Central Bank (ECB) and the European System of Central Banks
(ESCB) will be responsible for the monetary policy in the participating member states (see
Committee of Governors of the Central Banks of the Member States of the European Economic
Community, 1992).R
The study is divided into two parts. The first part consists of a review of the literature on
measuring capital mobility and carries out various tests to assess the degree of financial
integration in the EU, covering the period 1979 to 1993 in paRicular.9 We apply the three
principal methods of ineasuring the degree of capital mobility: 1) interest rate parity conditions,
2) saving-investment correlations, and 3) consumption correlations. The second part will be
primarily concemed with the determination of financial integration. First, we document on the
fundamental determinants of financial integration in the EU. Second, we analyze remaining
factors which influence the movement of capital within the EU. Particularly, we analyze the
incidence of nonresident interest withholding taxation in the government debt markets.
The rest of the introductory chapter is organized as follows. In Section 1.2, we define the
e Eijffinger (1996) addresses the design of future European monetary policy.
' Note that the existence of international financial markets can be traced back to the eighteenth and nineteenth
century (Neal, 1987, 1991).
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concept of financial integration. We discuss two aspects of financial integration which are of
central importance: capita] mobility and asset substitutability. Section 1.3 presents a framework
for analysis where the various measures of capital mobility are introduced. Section 1.4 deals
with six distinct factors which determine the degree of capital mobility and asset substitutability.
Finally, Section 1.5 further elaborates on the plan and organization of the study.
1.2 The Definition of Financial Integration
There is no unambiguous definition of financial integration in the literature. We should therefore
stress that in this study, perfect financial integration means that there are no barriers (i.e. no
capital controls and other institutional barriers) that prevent investors from changing their
portfolios instantaneously. Financial integration, when defined as a state, refers to the extreme
cases of perfect (absence of barriers) and no integration (presence of barriers). Financial
integration, when defined as a process, refers to the gradual dismantling of capital controls
and other institutional barriers affecting the degree of financial integration (see Balassa, 1962).
In our view, financial integration is a matter of degree, and the extreme cases (perfect and no
integration) are only of theoretical interest. The best approach is to measure the degree of
financial integration.
In the context of a definition of financial integration, the terms capital mobility and asset
substitutability are of central importance. Therefore, a brief discussion of these terms is useful
(see Booth, Clinton, Cóté and Longworth, 1985, Caramazza, Clinton, Cóté and Longworth,
1986, Akhtar and Weiller, 1987, and Reinhart and Weiller, 1987). Table 1.3 shows how the
two terms are related (G~rtner, 1993, p. 12). Contrary to G~rtner (1993), we also indicate possible
factors which determine the degree of capital mobility and asset substitutability. Section 1.4
will examine these determinants in more detail. The rows of Table 1.3 distinguish between
perfect and imperfect capital mobility. The columns of Table 1.3 distinguish between perfect
and imperfect asset substitutability among assets denominated in different currencies. The links
between financial assets are described by the well-known interest rate parity conditions. Table
1.3 shows how capital mobility and asset substitutability bear on two important interest parity
conditions: covered interest parity (CIP) and ex ante uncovered interest parity (UIP). Of the
four alternatives which are logically possible, alternative III has to be excluded since perfect
capital mobility is a necessary condition for perfect asset substitutability. A foreign asset can
never be a perfect substitute for some domestic asset unless tied-up funds can be repatriated.
Capital can only be considered perfectly mobile if it can be moved into the preferred form of
investment any time without delay and in the desired amount. In alternatives I and II portfolio
adjustments are instantaneous. Finally, alternative IV arises if portfolio adjustments are slow
and assets are imperfect substitutes.
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Perfect I: i-i't(Es-s) II: i-i't(F,s-s)tARfPRtER
Capital
mobility
Imperfect III: Impossible IV: i-i't(Es-s)tARtCCtPRtER
Notes: Here i is the nominal return in the home country and i' t( f-s ) is the expected and realized nominal
return in the foreign country denominated in the currency of the home country, i' t ( Es - s) is the expected nominal
return in the foreign country denominated in the currency of the home country, AR indicates asset specific types
of risks, CC índicates capital controls and other institutional barriers, PR indicates political risks and ER indicates
exchange risks. Table 1.3 abstracts from the role of transaction costs (see Section 1.4).
Source: G~rtner (1993, p. 12) and own extension.
Dornbusch (1980, p. 176) defines perfect capital mobility as the combination of perfect
substitutability of domestic and foreign bonds and the instantaneous adjustment of actual to
desired portfolio holdings (alternative I). However, it is certainly possible that capital is perfectly
mobile, while foreign and domestic assets are imperfect substitutes (alternaáve II). Thus,
alternatives I and II conform to our definition of perfect financial integration in the sense of
that there are no capital controls and other institutional barriers (CC) that prevent investors
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from changing their portfolios instantaneously. Financial assets denominated in domestic currency
may not be perfect substitutes for financial assets denominated in foreign currency because
of exchange risks (ER). In addition, asset specific types of risks (AR) and political risks (PR)
make domestic and foreign assets less substitutable. Risk-averse mazket participants are only
willing to hold foreign currency denominated assets if they receive compensation for AR, PR
and ER in the form of a risk premium. Whether asset stocks actually change depends on the
abiliry of investors to adjust their portfolios.~o To test for the degree of financial integration,
it is normally assumed that asset-specific types of risks are minimal. Assets are alike in all
respects except for their currency of denomination. Thus, financial integration is associated
with the equalization of returns of similar financial assets across markets so that the law of
one price holds. Next, Section 1.3 discusses some measurement issues. We argue that financial
integration need not be measured solely in terms of interest returns.
1.3 The Measurement of Ftinancial Integration
One of the difficulties with the measurement of financial integration lies in the fact that no
single approach to the measurement of financial integration has become widely accepted. The
operational framework in this study is drawn from the three most influential methods to measure
the degree of financial integration:
1. Interest parity conditions
2. Saving-investment conelations
3. Consumption cotrelations
Consequently, an eclectic approach to the topic of financial integration is made. The purpose
of this section is to examine the different criteria for measuring the degree of capital mobility.
To this end, we use a slightly modified version of a model presented in Dooley, Frankel and
Mathieson (1987). Dooley et al. (1987) examine the financial and real links between and within
two countries' financial markets. VikOren (1994) extends the model of Dooley et al. (1987)
by assuming that there exists a Euro mazket for bonds denominated in the currency of the home
country (E). We further increase the relevance of the model by assuming that there also exists
a Euro market for bonds denominated in the currency of the foreign country (E'). The financial
assets in both countries consist of money, bonds and claims on physical capital (equity claims).
So, the assets available to the residents of the home country are domestic base money (M),
'o Akhtaz and Weiller (1987, p. 19) argue: "In practice, components of rates of return, e.g. exchange rates, may
adjust quickly without actua! movements of capital, that is capital mobility may just be incipient."
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domestic bonds (B), bonds denominated in the currency of the home country but traded abroad
(E), bonds denominated in the currency of the foreign country but traded abroad (E'), foreign
bonds (B'), and domestic equity claims i.e. claims on physical capital ( C)." We assume that
(Euro) bonds are internationally traded securities while money and equity claims are non-traded
securities.'Z Money and (Euro) bonds are imperfect substitutes for equity claims. We neglect
the distinction between nominal and real balances, since for the moment prices are assumed
to be given and constant.
Now, we write down a standard four-asset portfolio-balance model." The demand for each
asset is assumed to be a function of output Y, total financial wealth W, and relative asset retums
i,iEu'o i`t(f-s),i't(Es-s),i'EWOt(f-s) i'E"'ot(Es-s) andi`.Thehomedemandfor
these assets can be specified as follows:
Me-Ma~i iE~ro,i't(.f-s'),i't(Es-s),i'Eurot(.f-s'),i"E,.rot(Es-s),i`,Y,W] (1)
M.~O, M;,.,.~0, M;.,ct-si~~, M;.,cei-~~~0, N1;.~.A.ct-s~~~~ M~.~.,.,tE,-,~~0, M;.~O, M~O, M~0
Be- Bd ~i iE„ro i~t(f-s),i't(Es-s),i'Eurot(f-s),i'Eurot(Es-s),i`,Y,W~ (2)
B~O, B;a.,,~0, B;..ct-s~~~~ B~.,c~-~~~0, B;~.A,u-~~~~~ B~.~,..cEs-s~~0, B;.~O, BY~O, B~0
Ee-Ee~i iEu,o i~t(.Í~-s),i't(Es-s),i'Euro~(.f-s'),i.E„rot(Es-s),i`,Y,W] (3)
E.cO, E;a.,.10, E;.,ct-s~~~, E;.,tE,-,~c0, E;.~...ct-5~~0, E;.a,.,cE,-5~~0, E;.~O, EY~O, E~0
SB'e-B'a~i lEuro,i~f(.Í~-s),i't(Es-s),i'~rot(f-s'),i'Euro}(Es-s),i`,Y,W~ (4)
B;'~0, B;~,.~0, B;:,ct-,~~0, B,~.cE,-s~~0, B;~..,ct-5~~0, B;~r.,,,ce,-5~~0, B;'~0, B,'~0, BW~O
SE'd- E'e ~i iE~ro,i'}(f-s'),i't(Es-s),i'E„rot(.f-s'),i'Euro}(Es-s),i`,Y,W~ (5)
E;'~0, E;;,,,.~0, E;~,ct-5~~0, E;',cEs-s~~0, E;:~.n.ct-s~~0, E;~.,,,tEs-Si~O, E;'~0, EY ~0, EW~O
Ce- Ce~i iEuro i~t(f-S),1'f(ES-S),i~Eurat(J-s),i'Eurot(ES-S'),i`,Y,W~ (6)
C~O, C;6..~0, C;.,v-.~i~0, C;.,~~-5~~0, C;.~..,u-~~~~~ C;.~.~,cer-~~~0. C;~O, C,,~O, C~0
where i is the interest rate on domestic bonds, i E"'o is the interest rate on bonds denominated
in the currency of the home country but traded abroad, i' Euro is the interest rate on bonds
denominated in the currency of the foreign country but traded abroad, i' is the interest rate
on foreign bonds, i` is the yield on domestic equity claims equal to the marginal product of
the capital stock, f is the forward exchange rate in logarithm, s is the spot exchange rate in
logarithm, f-s is the forward premium (discount) on the foreign currency in logarithms and Es-s
" Bonds are interest eazning assets and are distinguished from money by the fact that they do beaz interest.
'Z ln terms of the literature, we aze thus assuming "perfect capital mobility" with respect to bonds but not with
respect to equity claims. Furthermore, we abstract from currency substitution.
"~his model closely corresponds to a schematic overview of financial relationships in the EU that we have suggested
elsewhere (Lemmen and Eijffinger, 1993).
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is the expected change in the log of the spot exchange rate. Exchanges rate are defined according
to the continental definition of the exchange rate (i.e. domestic currency units per unit of foreign
currency). The signs of the partial derivatives are given below the demand equations. Domestic
wealth will be allocated among the six assets:
W- Mdt Bdt Edt Cet SB''t SE'd (7)
Equations (1)-(7) are generally used to represent financial markets in a portfolio-balance model.
These equations assume that as output increases the demand for domestic bonds, Euro bonds,
foreign bonds and domestic equity claims decreases and the demand for domestic money
increases. If financia] wealth increases, the increase is allocated among the six assets in fixed
proportion. If the domestic interest rate increase the demand for domestic bonds increases at
the expense of domestic money, Euro bonds denominated in the currency of the home and foreign
country and domestic equity claims. If domestic and foreign (Euro) bonds are imperfect
substitutes internationally, the partial derivatives Bi, BiF.,,, Bi.,(~-t), Bi.,(Et-t), Bi~~,cl-t), Bi,a,~,(ES-t),
Ei, F~is..o, Ei~.(l-t)' Ei'.(Es-s)' Ei.s.A.(f-s)' Ei.c...,(Et-s), Bi., Bi.s.T, Bi'.(i-s)' Bi'.(Es-s)' Bi~`'íÍ-t)' Bi.a...,(Es-s)
and E;', E,;~,,, Ei',(J-t), E;',(Et-t), E;'r.p,(f-t), E; ~.~,(Et-t) are finite. That is, the return on domestic and
foreign (Euro) bonds differ by a risk premium. Ifdomestic and foreign (Euro) bonds are perfect
substitutes all partial derivatives are infinite. This implies that all expected returns across financial
markets are equalized.
The links between the financial and real sector within each country are as follows (Dooley
et al., 1987, p. 525). Real investment is defined as transforming current output into a capital
good that has an"own" rate of return in terms of future output (Dooley et al., 1987, p. 525
and Vik~ren, 1994, p. 5). The return on equity claims is equal to the marginal revenue product
of the capital stock. Note that the cost of capital (i `) need not be equal to the domestic interest
rate (i) as savers may demand an interest rate different from the cost of capital to willingly
hold bonds and claims on the capital stock. Investment (~ will be positive when the present
value of expected future output exceeds the cost of capital:
1- I(i `,W) (8)
where `i' is a shift parameter. Saving (S) in each country is assumed to be a function of the
different rates of return and a shift parameter ~:
S- S ~i LEuro i't (f-s),i'} (Es-s),i .Euro~ (.f-s'),i 'Euro.f ( Es-s),i`,~~ (9)
Note that (9) is a non-standard saving function, since it is more common to assume that saving
depends only on i and ~. The real sector links between countries are derived from the above
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conditions and the balance ofpayments consuaint. That is, the net excess demand for the traded
securities (domestic and foreign bonds and Euro bonds denominated in the currency of the home
and foreign country) should be equal to the difference between saving and investment.
Within the framework above, we are able to examine and compare the different measures
of capital mobility that are applied in this study: 1) interest rate parity conditions 2) saving-
investment correlations and 3) consumption correlations. Now, we turn to a discussion of these
three measures. Traditionally, interest rate parity has been used to describe the financial and
real linkages between countries. Equations (1)-(7) and Table 1.4 summarize the financial and
real linkages between countries."
Table 1.4 - The pyramid of financial and real linkages
Domestic market Euro markets Foreign market
1 iEuro-i~Euro~( f-S,)
J2 i Euro - i~ Euro ,F, ( ES- S' )




























Source: Author's own summary of the literature.
When financial markets are deregulated and when restrictions on cross-border capital flows
are eliminated, interest rate returns in national and international markets in the same currency
are equalized. In the model above, this corresponds to examining the relationship between the
interest rate on domestic bonds, i, and the interest rate on bonds denominated in domestic
currency but traded abroad, i~'o, that is closed interest parity. The closed interest parity condition
can be written as, 1- i Euro for the home country (see row 3 of Table 1.4). The returns are
" See Kneeshaw and Van den Bergh (1985) for an eazly conuibution.
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denominated in the currency of the home country. A similar condition can be derived for the
foreign country (row 3). Now, retums are denominated in the currency of the foreign country.
Chapter 5 will address closed interest parity for short-term bonds while Chapter 6 will, among
others, address closed interest parity for long-term bonds. Alternatively, in rows 4 and 5 we
calculate synthetic approximations of closed interest differentials. For the home country we
arrive at the following condition i- i'E"'o t(f- s) or i- l'Euro t( Es - s). Chapter 5 will use
this result to measure the intensity of capital controls. Chapter 2 also examines the degree of
financial integration in terms of interest rate retums. In the model above, this corresponds to
examining the relationship between the return on domestic bonds, i, and the returns on foreign
bonds i' t(f- s) and i'}( Es - s). Covered interest parity (CIP) can be written as i- i' t( f- s)
(row 6), while ex ante uncovered interest parity (UIP) can be written as i- i ' t( Es - s)(row
7). Note that only domestic distortions impair closed interest parity, while domestic and foreign
distortions impair CIP. If CIP does not hold, this suggests there are unexploited profit
opportunities from interest arbitrage. If ex ante UIP does not hold this suggests that either CIP
does not hold andlor that exchange risks exist. Subsequently, if we relax the assumption of
constant prices in our model above and assume that the expected change in the exchange rate,
Es - s, just offsets the expected intlation differential in both countries, (Ep -p)-(Ep '-p'),
we arrive at the ex ante real interest parity condition (RIP) r- r'(row 9).15 Chapter 2 also
examines the ex ante RIP condition. If the expected change in the exchange rate differs from
the expected inflation differential, then, ex ante real UIP emerges r- r' t(Es - s) (row 8).
Finally, CIP and UIP between Euro interest rates (rows 1 and 2) do not really constitute a test
of financial integration in the sense of cross-bordercapital flows between countries (see Lemmen
and Eijffinger, 1993, p. 189). Therefore, the integration of Euro markets is not discussed any
further.
Chapter 3 is devoted to the study of the correlation of saving and investment in the EU.
Saving-investment correlations were first examined by Feldstein and Horioka (1980). The
motivation for examining the correlation between saving and investment is that only short run
saving-investment correlations may be used as an indication of the degree of capital mobility.
We fotmulate an error-correction model of saving-investment correlations to distinguish between
short run and long run saving-investment correlations. Theoretically, long run saving-investment
correlations should be close to one (as was found by Feldstein-Horioka, 1980), while short run
correlations may differ from one. A country may run a current account deficit for a short period
of time but current account imbalances must accumulate to zero over a long period of time
unless the country defaults on its foreign debt.
Chapter 4 is devoted to the study of consumption correlations in the EU. The motivation
15 Studies of ex ante real interest parity include Cumby and Obstfeld (1984), Mishkin (1984) and Frankel and
MacArthur (1988). Other references are given in the followíng chapters.
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for examining consumption correlations is that cross-border capital flows can increase welfare
by enabling countries to smooth out consumption over time (referring to the Euler equation
test of financial integration by Obstfeld, 1986). A high correlation between domestic and foreign
consumption might indicate a high degree of capital mobility. Financial integration probably
has reduced constraints on consumption expenditure.
1.4 The Determination of Financial Integration
Next, we comment on six distinct factors which influence capital mobility and asset
substitutability (see Kasman and Pigott, 1988). Capital mobility essentially depends on transaction
costs (b) and capital controls (c). Asset substitutability essentially depends on asset-specific
types of risks (a) political risks (d), exchange risks (e) and purchasing power risks (f).
(a) Asset-specifie types of risks
The assets being considered may differ in default risks, market liquidity, acceptability, etc.
Govemment assets, for example, are generally regarded to be less subject to default risks than
private assets.1ó Assets may also differ in tax status, eligibility for discounting at the central
bank, compulsory reserve requirement ratios as well as other characteristics."
Moreover, in many of the national financial markets, there were often large differentials between
bank loan rates charged to firms (i~) and unregulated money market rates (either inter-bank
domestic deposit or Euro deposit rates) (id). Without distortions, one would normally expect
bank lending rates to be slightly higher than unregulated money market rates, reflecting higher
risks, fees and commissions for financial services. By contrast, a low or negative difference
between the two interest rates gives an indication of distortions from interest rate controls and
market conventions maintained within each banking system.'a Thus a low or negative difference
gives an indication of the extent to which projects with a low market rate of return, but with
preferred access to credit, can obtain financing because of regulation (Edey and Hviding, 1995,
p. 19). Edey and Hviding document on the impact of these distortions. They calculate average
loanldeposit rate spreads in national financial markets denominated in the same currency. Table
1.5 reports their results. By the end of 1990, direct interest rate regulation and regulation-driven
credit rationing had virtually disappeared from the EU countries. Remaining loan~deposit rate
spreads can be explained by fees and commissions for financial services which, unlike interest
rates, have usually not been subject to the intervention by govemments but are determined by
16 Foreign asset positions also matter for default risk.
" Chapter 6 will analyze the incidence of nonresident interest withholding taxation.
" The OECD (1992) reviews the developments in several national banking systems.
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market forces. In the analysis of interest parity conditions in Chapters 2, 5 and 6, we will attempt
to confine comparisons to assets with equal asset-specific types of risks, although this is not
entirely possible due to lack of data. The estimated degree of capital mobility may be highly
sensitive to which series of domestic interest rates is used to depict "the" domestic interest rate.
This problem is circumvented by choosing interest rates of representative segments of the money
market, that are most freely determined and are least subject to domestic regulation and other
distortions. That is, the deregulation of the national financial markets (the freeing of markets
from either direct interest rate regulation and regulation-driven credit rationing) is assumed
to be completed.
Table 1.5 - National loanldeposit rate spreads (i,-ia)
1960-1969 1970-1974 1975-1979 1980-1984 1985-1989 1990-1994
Belgium 1.8 2.1 1.7 2.8 2.4 3.6
Germany 3.6 4.6 4.0 3.8 4.0 4.3
Finland - -0.9 - 1.6 -3.6 -2.1 -0.1
France - - 3.0 -1.0 -3.0 0.8 0.6
Italy - 2.l 4.1 1.7 2.3 2.2
Netherlands 2.0 2.7 2.7 2.2 1.7 1.0
Spain -1.7 0.7 2.6 2.8
United Kingdom -2.1 -1.3 -0.9 0.1 0.8 1.2
Belgium: Overdrafts with commercial banks less 3-month tender rate on treasury certificates.
Germany: Interest rate on short-term bank credit less 3-month Euro deposit rate.
Finland: Commercial banks' lending rate less 3-month interbank rate.
France: Prime rate less 3-month interbank rate.
Italy: Overdrafts with commercial banks less 3-month interbank rate.
Netherlands: Mortgage loan rate less 3-month interbank rate.
Spain: Credit rate less 3-month interbank rate.
United Kingdom: Building society mortgage rate less 3-month interbank rate.
Source: Edey and Hviding (1995, p. 19).
Furthermore, we usually confine our comparisons to short-term assets (bonds and deposits).
It would also be interesting to compare yields on long-term bonds and equities in the same
currency. However, it is difficult to find long-term bonds with equivalent maturities and levels
of asset-specific types of risks. Furthetmore, unavailability and thinness of forward exchange
markets for longer maturities also complicates comparisons. Therefore, Chapters 2 and 5 will
compare yields on representative short-term securities. Chapter 6, however, will be concerned
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with closed interest parity of long-term govemment bonds calculated with the help of interest
rate swaps. It is also rather difficult to comply with the comparability assumption with respect
to the integration ofequity markets. Cross-country differences in asset-specific risks of equities
are considerably. The diverse share price indices are less comparable.19
By providing a setting in which the assumption of similar risk instruments is satisfied, the
Euro markets have given us the cleanest test of the important closed interest parity arbitrage
relationship. Because the Euro market is so competitive, the Euro loan rates are only slightly
above the Euro deposit rate for prime customers. Asset specific types of risks in Euro markets
are minimal.
(b) Transaction costs
Transaction costs depend on the differential costs of trading across different currencies and
include not only brokerage costs but also information and time costs. Brokerage costs are
expected to vary with the volume of transactions, while information costs depend on the number
of outlets searched and the marginal benefit from searching (Otani and Tiwari, 1981, p. 797).
The time costs will vary with the wagelshadow wage rate or the marginal disutility of work.
Investors may simply have less information about foreign markets. Language barriers and
financial reporting differences may hinder foreign investment. Using bidlask spreads to measure
transaction costs associated with covered interest rate transactions, Clinton (1988) estimated
that Euro market transactions costs ranged from 0.025 percent per annum for the German Mark
to 0.039 percent per annum for the French Franc over the period November 1985 to May 1986.Zo
Transaction costs create specific bands around closed and covered interest parity. It is reasonable
to assume that these bands are narrow and that movements within the bands are random. Hence,
significant and systematic divergences between two interest rate retums can only be interpreted
as the result of capital controls, not by transaction costs.
(c) Capital controls
Existing capital controls reduce the mobility of capital between two financial markets leading
to closed interest differentials.Z' This differential may be positive or negative, depending on
how the controls were designed.22 Capital controls basically come in two varieties. Closed
" Therefore, we only briefly address the integration of European equity markets in Chapter 4. We refer to Jorion
and Schwartz ( 1986) and Akdogan ( 1995) who examine equity mazket integration with the help of asset-pricing
models. In the framework of the Capital Asset Pricíng Model (CAPM), integration imposes restrictions on the
pricing of assets, by ruling out relationships between expected returns and purely national factors. With complete
segmentation only national factors should enter the pricing of assets.
Zo See also Frenkel and Levich (1975, 1977).
Z' Previous studies of capital controls include Otani and Tiwazi ( 1981), Dooley and Isard ( 1980) and Ito (1986).
ZZ Note that the Euro markets operate free of any capital controls and other institutional barriers.
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interest differentials are negative (positive) when capital export (import) restrictions exist.
Govemments may restrict resident purchases of foreign assets (and sometimes nonresident
outfiows as well). Such outwardcontrols, which are usually designed to support a weak currency,
lead to a closed interest rate differential favoring the foreign market. Alternatively, governments
may restrict nonresident purchases of domestic assets to reduce pressures toward an appreciation
of the domestic currency. Such inward controls may lead to an interest differential favoring
the domestic market. Only a few countries like Germany, Switzerland and Japan have resorted
to such inward controls. Capital controls can also take the form of a tax on interest earnings.
Then, arbitrage keeps the after-tax interest on the taxed security tied to the tax-free interest
on the untaxed security (see Chapter 6).
(d) Political risks
Even if no capital controls separate the markets, investors may perceive political or sovereign
risks involving future restrictions (Aliber, 1973). Political or sovereign risks arise because of
concem that the national authorities of one country might impose capital controls, taxes, or
other regulatory measures on foreign investments in their market or on their residents' investments
in other markets. Political risks may also reflect the political costs of interest rate decisions
designed to defend exchange rate parities. Political risks are perceived to be of negligible
importance in the Euro market.
(e) Exchange risks
Importantly, financial transactions involve uncertainty about the denomination of financial
transactions. When forward rates are biased predictors of future spot rates and if market
participants expect exchange rate variability to be high, uncovered holdings of foreign cunency
denominated assets become risky. Risk-averse investors will demand compensation for the
exchange risks they take. Ex ante UIP is the hypothesis that the exchange risk premium is equal
to zero. Of course, the characteristics of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) of the European
Monetary System (EMS) where currencies are allowed to fluctuate within small margins are
of crucial importance for the size of the exchange risk premium. Expectations of exchange rate
stability increases substitutability between assets denominated in different currencies.
In principle, exchange risk of any given foreign cunency may well be uncorrelated with
other risks faced by investors. This nonsystematic risk can be diversified away, and therefore
will not affect foreign investment decisions. However, the systematic risk of an appreciation
of the home currency relative to all others would be a risk common to all foreign investors
and cannot be diversified away. Nonetheless, as long as risk-averse investors get a fair reward
for the exchange risk they bear, they still may want to hold foreign assets in their portfolio.
So, our definition of financial integration should account for this point (see Chapter 4).
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(fl Purchasingpower risks
The final factor causing return differentials between two countries are expected differences
between domestic and foreign inflation rates. Inflation differentials may also influence asset
substitutability. Monetary policies were used intensively to fight inflation in most of the EU
countries leading to lower purchasing power risks. To some extent, a divergence in short-term
interest rates can help promote convergence in inflation and thus long-term interest rates. It
makes it hard to distinguish the effect on short-term interest rates of financial integration from
the effect of monetary policy convergence. High nominal short-term interest differentials may
be explained by the use of the nominal short-term interest rate as a policy instrument to maintain
the exchange rates in the allowed fluctuation margins of the ERM.
1.5 Plan and Organization of the Study
This study includes two main parts, all having the EU countries as their principal objects of
research. Part I entitled "The Measurement of Financial Integration" is taken up in Chapters
2, 3 and 4. Part II entitled "The Determination of Financial Integration" is taken up in Chapters
5, 6 and 7. The chapters are self-contained, and the reader may, without reference to other
chapters, follow the analysis presented. The main objective of the first part of the study is to
examine theoretically and empirically the degree of financial integration within the EU. This
is pursued by applying and critically discussing the three most influential methods for measuring
the degree of financial integration. Chapter 2 presents empirical evidence on the degree of
financial integration as measured with interest parity conditions. We examine the effects of
capital controls, exchange risks and deviations from purchasing power parity on interest parity
between EU countries and Germany. Furthermore, we assess how far the integration of financial
markets has progressed. Subsequently, Chapter 3 applies saving-investment correlations to assess
the degree of financial integration in the EU, and Chapter 4 applies consumption correlations
to assess the degree of financial integration in the EU.
The objective of the second part of the study is threefold. First, Chapter 5 documents on
the fundamental determinants of financial integration in the EU. As a starting point for
considering the determinants of financial integration, we discuss relevant measures of the intensity
of capital controls. Subsequently, Chapter 5 will go into the underlying determinants of the
intensity of capital controls. Second, we analyze remaining factors which are likely to influence
the movement of capital within the EU. Particularly, Chapter 6 is concerned with the incidence
of nonresident interest withholding taxes in the international3-month Treasury bill market and
the international 5-year government debt market. Finally, Chapter 7 summarizes the evidence
on the measurement and determination of financial integration in the EU and concludes with
some suggestions for future research.
PART I
THE MEASUREMENT OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
Chapter 2
The Price Approach to Financial Integration:
Decomposing European Money Market Interest Differentials
2.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with a theoretical and empirical analysis of money market integration in
the European Community (EC) since the start of the European Monetary System (EMS) in March
1979.` The key question is whether the step-by-step liberalization of short-term capital
movements in the EC, in preparing for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), has brought
about a higher degree of money market integration in the EC. The analysis intends to shed some
light on the changes in the degree and speed of money market integration over time.2 Although,
short-term capital mobility between European countries may seriously hinder the process of
monetary unification in Europe, the degree and speed of money market integration in Europe
are seldomly estimated.' We examine money market integration by comparing covered,
uncovered and real interest differentials.' This chapter is also relevant for international portfolio
management and corporate treasury management. For example, for an investor who wants to
invest in foreign assets, the question whether covered or uncovered interest parity hold has direct
implications for the question whether or not he should hedge his foreign investment.
Chapter 2 is organized as follows. Section 2.2 specifies an ascending order of three alternative
criteria for short-tetm capital mobility i.e. covered nominal interest parity (CIP), ex ante
uncovered nominal interest parity (UIP) and ex ante real interest parity (RIP). Subsequently,
we introduce the decomposition method of Frankel and MacArthur (1988) to identify the main
components in preventing above interest parity conditions to hold. Section 2.3 describes the
data and sets out the empirical methodology. Section 2.4 estimates the size and variability of
mean (absolute) deviations from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post RIP of ten European countries
' Up to the time of writing, the European Community (EC) consisted of twelve member states. Nowadays, the
EC is known as the European Union (EU). The EU consists of fifteen member states. See Lemmen and Eijffinger
(1995d) for the analysis of money market integration with respect to the three new member states (Austria, Finland
and Sweden).
2 Discussion of policy implications of financial integration is beyond the scope of this chapter. See, for example,
Lamfalussy (1990), The Economist (1992), De Groof and Van Tuijl (1993), Eijffinger and Gerazds (1993), Gruíjters
(1995) and Chapter 5 of this study.
' See Commission of the European Communities (1990, pp. 160-161) for a first assessment of money market
integration in Europe based upon Frankel (1989). See Frankel, Phillips and Chinn (1993, pp. 270-279) for a more
recent assessment of money mazket integration in Europe.
' Van Gemeri and Gruijters (1994) study in[erest rate differentials after the breakdown of the Bretton Woods system
of fixed exchange rates using historical data of OECD countries.
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vis-à-vis Germany to assess the degree of money market integration. The total sample period
March 1979-August 1992 is split with the Basle-Nyborg agreement of September 1987. Section
2.5 estimates a time trend in mean absolute deviations from above interest parity conditions
to asses the speed of money market integration. Subsequently, Section 2.6 documents on the
trade-off between the degree and speed of money market integration in Europe. Finally, Section
2.7 concludes.
2.2 Three Alternative Criteria for Short-Term Capital Mobility
Quantifying the degree of money market integration implies measuring the degree in which
short-term capital flows equalize expected and realized returns on comparable money market
assets denominated in different currencies. Essentially, the criteria for short-term capital mobility
are nothing more than a re-interpretation of the familiar interest parity conditions. Following
Frankel and MacArthur (1988), Table 2.1 summarizes an ascending order of three alternative
criteria for short-term capital mobility according to their cumulative assumptions. The criteria
for capital mobility rely on the dispersion ofprices (i.e. short-term interest rates) of comparable
European money market assets. Hence, they fit into the ptice approach to financial integration
(see Feldman, 1986).5 According to Frankel (1989) and Lemmen and Eijffinger (1993) the
interest parity conditions in Table 2.1 measure three different types of perfect capital mobility.
The first criterion -- covered nominal interest parity (CIP) -- examines perfect capital mobility
of type I. CIP holds if the forward premium (discount) [f;}k-s~] equals the difference between
the domestic and foreign nominal interest rate [i~~,k i;`,tk] at the appropriate maturity:
{ t~k
tt,fik-ttaak -Jt -S~ (1)
A forward premium (discount) on foreign currency means that the forward price of foreign
currency delivered and paid for some time in the future expressed in domestic currency is higher
(lower) than the current spot price. If the domestic nominal interest rate is higher (lower) than
the foreign nominal interest, the lower (higher) foreign nominal interest rate is compensated
by a forward premium (discount) on foreign currency. Investors will buy (sell) foreign currency
spot to sell (buy) it forward. A premium (díscount) on the foreign currency corresponds with
an expected future rise (fall) in the spot exchange rate.
5 Interest parity conditions aze not the only valid tests for the degree of financial integration. For example, Feldstein
and Horioka (1980) apply saving-investment correlations to assess the degree of financial integration. We will
apply saving-investment correlations to assess the degree of financial integration in Chapter 3. Alternatively, Obstfeld
(1986) proposes another test based upon the Eulerequation for intertemporal consumption behavior. We will apply
Euler equation-based tests of financial integration in Chapter 4. Goldstein and Mussa (1993) and Obstfeld (1994a)
provide excellent surveys of the exis[ing literature.
The Price Approach to Financial Integration
Table 2.1 - Interest parity conditions and their cumulative assumptionsa
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i, ,.k - domestic nominal rate of ínterest at time t on a k-period bond held between ume t and ttk
f,"k - forwazd exchange rate at time t for the delivery of foreign currency at ume ttk
s, - spot exchange rate at time t(i.e. domesuc currency units per unit of foreign currency)
p, - domestic price level at time t
r, ,.k - domestic real rate of interest at time t on a k-period bond held between time t and ttk
E, - conditional expectations operator based upon the information available at time t, i.e. E(. ~I,)
k - holding period of the underlying financial inswment
~ - denotes a foreign vaziable
Table 2.1 is framed according to the terminology introduced by Frankel and MacArthur (1988). All variables
except the interest rates are expressed in natural logarithms. Lower-case variables represent natural logarithms.
For example, the exact expression of CIP is: F,'rIS,-(lti,.,,~)I(lti!`.,,k). We obtain the logazithmic approximation,
i.e. y.,,k i~ „kf,'k-s„ by taking natural logazithms of both sides and applying the approximation that ln(ltx)-x
for small x where s,-1n(S,), f;'k-1n(F;'`), i,,,,,-1n(Iti,,,,r) and i~,,k-1n(lti!`,,k).
Sources: Frankel and MacArthur ( 1988) and Frankel (1989).
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Perfect capital mobility of type I implies a zero covered nominal interest differential or in other
words a zero country premium [i,,,ki;` ~tk(fi'k-s~-0]. Deviations from CIP reflect barriers to
the integration of financia] markets across national boundaries such as transaction costs, capital
controls, information costs, tax laws that discriminate by country of residence, default risk and
risk of future capital controls (Frankel, 1992, pp. 2(x)-201).
The second criterion -- ex ante uncovered nominal interest parity (UIP) -- examines perfect
capital mobility of type II. Replacement of the forward exchange rate [f;'k] by the expected
future spot exchange rate [E,(s,tk)] yields UIP. This replacement is allowed if exchange rate
expectations are held with certainty or if investors are risk-neutral.b Note however that certainty
with respect to exchange rate expectations and risk neutrality are sufficient conditions but not
necessary conditions for UIP. There are other conditions for having a zero risk premium, e.g.
if all exchange risk is nonsystematic risk in the world of the Capita] Asset Pricing Model (i.e.
p~,,,Tg,~,-0). UIP holds if the expected nominal exchange rate change [E,(s,t~s~] equals the nominal
interest differential [i~,tki~`,~,] at the appropriate maturity:
~~ ~.k-lf~~~k - E~(S~~.k-S~t) (2)
Investors expect an exchange rate depreciation when the domestic nominal interest rate exceeds
the foreign nomínal interest rate. The second criterion can be framed in terms of the
decomposition method of Frankel and MacArthur (1988). Frankel and MacArthur decompose
ex ante uncovered nominal interest differentials as follows:
~r.t.k-1~~~~k-E~(Sr.k-St) - [lt.r.k-~f,t.k-(Jt~.k-S,r)J}L(Jt~.k-S,t)-E!`S,~,k-S~!)1 (3)
Ex ante UIP requires a zero country premium [i,.~,k i;`,,,k(fi'k-s~)-0] and a zero exchange risk
premium [(f,'~-s~-E,(s,t,; s~-0].
CIP and ex ante UIP measure two important aspects of financial integration: capital mobility
and substitutability among assets denominated in different currencies. CIP is an arbitrage
condition with covered positions and therefore a riskless operation with respect to exchange
rate risk.' The degree of substitutability between domestic and foreign bonds based on exchange
rate risk and the degree of risk-aversion of the investors are therefore completely irrelevant.
Since the absence of CIP suggests that there exist arbitrage opportunities, CIP indeed should
hold in integrated markets. Frankel (1992, p. 197) argues that CIP is an unalloyed criterion
6 Or in other words, the forward exchange rate is an unbiased predic[or of the expected future spot exchange rate
(MacDonald and Taylor, 1992, p. 38). Goodhart, McMahon and Lawan Ngama (1992), however, reject the forwazd
exchange rate unbiasedness hypothesis. Ex ante UIP also assumes that foreign ezchange mazkets operate efficiently.
' The term "arbitragé' should be confined to riskless operations rather than to the risky positions required to ensure
that ex ante UIP holds.
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for capital mobility in the sense of the degree of financial market integration across national
boundaries. The absence of UIP, however, implies the existence of a risk premium in the
exchange rate and as long as this is a fair reward for the risk that investors have to bear with
respect to the currency, the absence of UIP does not necessarily imply a form of capital
immobility.8 Only, exchange risk that is not priced hampers capital mobility across national
borders. The CIP condition is a more appropriate criterion for geographical money market
segmentation across countries while the ex ante UIP condition is a more appropriate criterion
for the overall analysis of integration between short-term financial markets i.e. money and foreign
exchange markets (Haldane and Pradhan, 1992b, p. 5). Contrary to the CIP condition, the UIP
condition can only give an indirect indication of money market integration. In fact, perfect capital
mobility of type I is compatible with both, zero and nonzero exchange risk premia. Booth,
Clinton, Cóté and Longworth. (1985, p. 16) denote CIP with perfect capital mobility and ex
ante UIP with perfect capital substitutability. We denote CIP with perfect capital mobility of
type I and ex ante UIP with perfect capital mobility of type II.
The third criterion -- ex ante real interest parity (RIP) -- examines perfect capital mobility
of type III or in other words perfect financial and non-financial capital mobility (see e.g. Haldane
and Pradhan, 1992b, p. 5). Non-financial capital mobility refers to the mobility of goods and
services and the mobility of the production factors labor and physical capital (technology). Goods,
services, labor and physical capital cannot be costlessly transferred from one country to another.
Branson (1988, p. 1120), however, notes that perfect goods market integration may be a sufficient
condition for ex ante RIP to hold because of factor price equalization. Ex ante RIP means that
the expected domestic real interest rate E,(r~,,k) and the expected foreign real interest rate E,(r;`,,tk)
are equal. In fact, ex ante RIP assumes that ex ante relative purchasing power paríty (PPP)
holds continuously. Substitution of ex ante relative PPP [E,(s,tk-s,)-E,(p„k p~-E,(p;`,kp;`)] for
the expected exchange rate change in equation (2) leads to ex ante RIP:
Er(rr.r.,t) - E~(rr~r.k) (4)
The third criterion can also be framed in terms of the decomposidon method of Frankel and
MacArthur. By adding and subtracung the forward premium (discount) and the expected
depreciation (appreciation), we obtain an expression of the ex ante real interest differential:
Et(rr.t.k-r~,i'k) - ~tt.t.k-tt.~,k-(Jlrik-S~t)]}L(ff~.k-S,t)-Er(S~r.k-St)]t
[E~(Sr.k-S~)-E,(P~.k-P~)}E~(P~.k-Pr )] (5)
e The azgument assumes that CIP holds contínuously. Moreover, note that deviations from ex post UIP do not
necessarily imply an exchange risk premium. Deviations from ex post UIP might also reflect expectational ettors.
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The last two components together constitute the currency premium, because they pertain to
differences in assets according to the currency in which they are denominated ( i.e. currency
factors), rather than the political j urisdiction in which they are issued ( i.e. country factors).9
Consequently, the RIP condition can only give an indirect indication of money market integration.
Perfect capital mobility of type III requires a zero country premium, a zero exchange risk
premium and a zero expected real exchange rate change or in other words a zero deviation
from ex ante relative PPP [E,(s„ks,)-E~(p,tk p~)}E~(p;`tk-p;`)~l.
2.3 Data and Methodology
We calculate mean deviations and mean absolute deviations from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post
RIP of ten European countries vis-à-vis Germany.'o The European countries considered are
Belgium, Denmark, France, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain and the United
Kingdom." The data used are monthly observations of three-month domestic money market
interest rates, spot exchange rates vis-à-vis the Deutsche Mark (DM), forward exchange rates
vis-à-vis the DM of the same three-month maturity and consumer price indices (CPI) (see
Appendix 2.A at the end of this chapter).1z Of course, this does not rule out possible
imperfections in the data. As is evident in the following analysis, it is difficult to obtain consistent
interest rate, exchange rate and price level data.
Since direct DM forward and spot exchange rates are not available for all EC countries
considered andlor over a sufficiently long period, we calculate cross-rate exchange rates.
Concerning these cross-rate calculations, we already presume in the investigation design perfect
capital mobility of type I. However, this is only possible on the basis of the assumption of perfect
arbitrage between markets of foreign exchange. Due to transactíons costs in triangular arbitrage
cross-rate calculations may not exactly correspond to direct quotations (Frenkel and Levich,
1975). Therefore, all results in this chapter should be interpreted with caution. In constructing
DM forward and spot exchange rates, US dollar cross-rate calculations are preferred because
of the reserve currency status of the dollar, the role of the dollar as the world's major intervention
9 If ex ante UIP holds, ex ante RIP between two counvies reflects differences in inflationary expectations.
'o Most German resvictions on capital export were lifted in 1973 and ]974. Since the beginning of the 1980s,
there have been no resvictions on capital import either. So capital flows to and from German financial markets
were unresvicted for most of the sample period. The German convols are described in Dooley and Isard (1980)
and Deutsche Bundesbank (1985).
" Luxemburg is excluded from the analysis because Luxemburg and Belgium form a monetary union, i.e. they
share the same short-term interest rate and exchange rate. The exchange rate of the Pound Sterling has been inverted
to conform with the continental definition of the exchange rate.
'2 Note that the spot and forward exchange rate aze defined as the EC member state's external value vis-à-vis
the DM to conform with the continen[al definition of the exchange rate.
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currency and the scale and efficiency of the US financial markets. At least with US dollar cross-
rate calculations, the transactions costs involved in triangular arbitrage are minimized.
Another difficulty with respect to the measurement of money market integration results from
the fact that financial assets are heterogeneous. Measuring money market integration with parity
conditions boils down to tinding similar assets in terms of default risk, size, depth and term
to maturity. We obtained representative three-month domestic money market interest rates from
Eurostat (see Appendix 2.A). Furthermore, for tests of interest parity condi[ions it is important
that the timing of the interest rate data corresponds with the timing of the exchange rate data."
We agree with Haldane and Pradhan (1992b, p. 8) that domestic money market interest rates
are to be preferred to pick up the effect of capital controls between EC countries in a way
potentially overlooked if Euro currency interest rates are used."
An even more serious problem concerns the modelling of exchange rate and price
expectations.15 Because exchange rate and price expectations cannot be observed one generally
formulates an assumption on how expectations are formed. We proxy exchange rate and price
expectations by their observed values on the basis of rational expectations. Of course, there
are other methods to model exchange rate and price expectations e.g. from an ARIMA model
(see Barro and Sala-I-Martin, 1990, p. 17), survey data (see Haldane and Pradhan, 1992b) or
regression analysis.1ó However, these methods also do not rule out systematic forecast etrors."
When exchange rate expectations are assumed to be rational ex ante UIP changes into ex post
UIP. Rational expectations imply that the realized exchange rate change is used as a proxy for
the expected exchange rate change. The underlying assumption of rationality means that the
forecast errors of exchange rates [E(rl,tk~I~-E,(st,k)-sl,k-0] have mean zero and are uncorrelated.
Hence, the ex ante spot exchange rate at time ttk conditional on available information at time
t equals the ex post spot exchange rate at time ttk, i.e. E~(s„~-s~~k. Deviations from ex post
UIP may therefore be caused by the lack of capital mobility of type II and or expectational
errors.18 Similarly, ex ante RIP is difficult to calculate since expected inflation rates are not
" Concerning the data, the use of average rnonthly data may raise problems. However, since we are interested
in the longer-term trends, average monthly data are in order.
" Euro markets aze almost free of capital controls (Fukao and Hanazaki, 1987, p. 48).
15 Lemmen and Eijffinger (1993) note that money market interest rates are more policy determined than capital
market interest rates.
16 The use of survey data suffers from the methodological problem that brokers in foreign exchange markets do
not reveal their real interests. Survey data may not be an accurate measure of market participants true expectations
or people do not act on the expectations they express (Boughton, 1988, p. 13).
" We agree with Tease, Dean, Elsmekov and Hoeller (1991, p. 119) who azgue that: "The precise choice of the
method to measure inflationary expectations is unlikely to alter the longer-term trends in the data although it may
affect the timing and turning points."
18 Thus, exchange rate forecast ercors must be added to deviations from ex post UIP (see Obstfeld, 1994a, pp.
4-S). li.,.k-~,.,.k-(S,.k-Sr) - ~~r.t.k-~~.r.t-(fr~.k-S
)I t~(Jt'.k-St)-E,(s',-k-Sr)I t~E,(S,.k-St)~(St.t-Sr)1
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observable. The calculadon of ex post real interest rate differentials implicitly assumes that
expectations are rational. The ex post real interest rate is defined as the nominal interest rate
minus the realized rate of inflation: r~~tr-i,,,tr(p,trpJ for the domestic country and
r;`.,t,,-i;`,,tk(P;`,kp;`) for the foreign country. The forecast errors of inflation equal the forecast
errors of real interest rates: ~„k-E,(r~,,tr)-rl.,,k-E,(p„r pJ-(p,tkpJ and e;`,k-E~(r~`,,,r)-r;`,,~r-
E,(p;`,rp~`)-(p;`t~-p;`). The forecast errors of inflation and real interest rates E(ar,tr~IJ-O and
E(E~`,r ~ h)-0 have mean zero and are uncorrelated. The equality of real interest rates across
countries than implies (Mishkin, 1984, p. 1347): E~(r„~k)-E,(r;` ~t,J-r~,,k-r~ „k.
Following Gaab, Granziol and Horner (1986, p. 693), we express deviations from CIP, ex
post UIP and ex post RIP in percentages per year.19 Deviations from CIP are defined as
[ln(1 fit,t3)-ln(1 ti ~` „3)-(1213)(f;`'-sJ]x 100 where i,,,, and i;` ,,, are representative domestic and
foreign money market interest rates over the three-month holding period expressed in percentages
per year and [(1213)(f;"-sJ]x100 is the three-month forward premium (discount) vis-à-vis the
DM expressed in percentages per year. Returns are measured in the domestic currency.Zo
Similarly, deviations from ex post UIP are defined as [ln(1tIttt3)-ln(1fI;`~„)-(1213)(s,~3 sJ]
x100 where [(1213)(s,,; sJ]x100 is the realized rate of depreciation (appreciation) vis-à-vis
the DM over the three-month holding period expressed in percentages per year.21 Deviations
fromexpostRIParedefïnedas{[ln(lfi~,,3)-(12J3)(p,t3 pJ]-Lln(Iti;`,,,3)-(1213)(p;`t3-p;`)]}x100
where [(1213)(p~t;pJ]x100 is the change in natural logarithms of domestic consumer price indices
over the three-month holding period in percentages per year. The ex post exchange risk premium
is defined as the difference between the forward premium (discount) and the realized spot
exchange rate change [(1213)(f;''-sJ-(1213)(s,,,-s,)]x100 expressed in percentages per year.
Deviations from ex post PPP are defined as [(1213)(s,,,-sJ-(1213)(pt3 pJf (1213)(p;`43 p~`)]x100.
Finally, the ex post currency premium is defined as{[(1213)(fi"-sJ]-(1213)(si3 sJ]f[(1213)
(s,f3sJ-(1213)(p,t; p,)t(1213)(p~`,,-p~`)]}x100. We calculate CPI based real interest rates for
three reasons. First, its monthly availability (except for Ireland whose CPI indices are only
quarterly available), second, the EMU-criterion for inflation is framed in terms of changes in
the CPI and third, the basket of goods contains traded and non-traded goods and thus is a better
19 Throughout this study, all interest parity conditions will be expressed in percentages per yeaz.
20 The equation ]n(lti,,,,)-]n(lti~,,,)-(1213)(f,''-s,)]x100 may be interpreted alternatively as measuring returns
in DM. In that case the realízed return on domestic bonds measured in DM, defined as [ln(lti,,,,)-(1213)(t;''-s,)]
x100 is equal to the certain return on German bonds ln(]ti!`,,3), where spot and forward exchange rates are defined
in accordance with the continental definition of the exchange rate. But as pointed out by Siegel (1972), if covered
interest differentials are equal when expressed in domestic currency, then because of Jensen's inequality covered
interest differentials cannot be equal when re-expressed in DM. McCulloch (1975) azgues that the discrepancy
between returns due to Jensens's ínequality is empirically insignificant.
Z' Again, the equation In(]ti,,,,3)-In(lti~,,,)-(1213)(s;''-s,)]x]00 may be interpreted alternatively as measuring
returns in DM. In that case the expected return on domestic bonds measured in DM, defined as [ln(lti,.,,,)-(1213)
(s;''-s,)]x100 is equal to the certain return on German bonds In(lti;`.,,,), where spot and forward exchange rates
are defined conform the continental definition of the exchange rate.
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measure of purchasing power than when the basket only contained traded goods (see Italianer,
1993, p. 24).
The sample period March 1979-August 1992 is split into two subperiods: March 1979-
September 1987 and October 1987-August 1992. The break is formed by the Basle-Nyborg
agreement of September 1987 when the Committee of Govemors agreed on a nttmber of ineasures
to change the operating mechanisms of the EMS to promote exchange rate stability. Table 2.2
summarizes the Basle-Nyborg agreement and the four stages of the transmission mechanism
of monetary policy i.e. monetary instruments, monetary indicators, monetary targets and policy
goals. The Basle-Nyborg agreement particularly opted for a more active and concerted use of
available instruments (exchange rate movements within the band, interest rate changes and foreign
exchange market interventions) to promote exchange rate stability in the Exchange Rate
Mechanism (ERM). Improved coordination of interest rate policies to keep the exchange rates
within the band and a more flexible use of existing fluctuation margins helped to prevent
speculative attacks on the ERM central rates. Furthermore, the break coincides with a relatively
calm period with less frequent and sizeable exchange rate realignments (devaluations). After
January 1987 no major realignment occurred for more than five years until the EMS exchange
crisis of September 1992. In addition, a number of EC countries entered the ERM of the EMS.
Table 2.2 - The Basle-Nyborg agreement and the transmission mechanism of monetary
policy
Transmission mechanism Basle-Nyborg agreement
Monetary instruments More coordinated management of official rates.
Improvement of practices and conditions for intervention at or within the mar-
gins:
a Extension of the duration of very short-term financíng to finance interven-
tion in EMS currencies from two-and-a-half to three-and-a-half months.
Doubling of the ceiling applied to automauc renewal for three months of
these financing operations from 100~1o to 200~10 of the central banks's
debtor quota in the short-term monetary support.
b Availability of very short-term financing, on certain conditions, for intra-
marginal interventions.
c Change of the acceptance limit on official ECU settlements of outstanding
claims in the very short-term financing in excess of their obligations
(500l0) up to 100010.
More flexible use of authorized tluctuation margins.
Realignments.
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Monetary indicators Interbank money market rates.
Monetary targets Main tazget Germany: gowth of M3.
Additional target Germany: real DMIS exchange rate.
Main target other European counvies: relative position own cunency within the
ERM band andlor the nominal exchange rate of own currency vis-à-vis the
DMIS
Additional target other European counvies: growth of M1, M2 or M3.
Policy goals Domestic price level.
Sources: Committee o[ Governors of the Cenval Banks of the Member States of the European Economic Community
(1987), Press Communiyué of Septemher 18th and Eijffinger (1993, p. 134).
Table 2.3 reports the developments in the freyuency and magnitude of exchange rate realignments
within the ERM of the EMS.
Table 2.3 - Dates and sizes of EMS realignmentsa
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Symbols: BeUl.ux - Belgium~Luxemburg Franc Net - Dutch Florin
Den - Danish Krona Ire - Irish Pound
Ger - German Mark Ita - Italían Lira
Por - Portuguese Escudo Spa - Spanish Peseta
Fra - French Franc UK - British Puund Sterling
- - devaluation t - revaluation
' Core-EMS countries which participate in the ERM of the EMS from March 13, 1979 onwards are: Belgium,
Denmark, Germany, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands and Luxemburg. Non-core-EMS countries are Spain
which pazticipates in the ERM as of June 16, 1989, the United Kingdom (as of October 8, 1990) and Portugal
(as of Apri16, 1992) and Greece which does not participate in Ihe ERM at a1L Belgium, Denmark, Germany,
France, Ireland, Netherlands and Luxemburg have a fluctuation margin of t 2.25oIo, Italy has a fluctuation
margin of t 6qo and as of January 8, ]990 t 2.25qo, Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom have a
fluctuation margin of t 6010. On August 1, 1993, ERM bands were widened to t 15qo except for the band
between the Netherlands and Germany which remained unchanged at t 2.25010.
b Adjustment of the theoretical central rates of the pound sterling based on the market rates of May 13, 1983.
` The realignment dates of September 14 and 17, 1992 reflect the fust EMS exchange crisis.
d The United Kingdom and Italy left the ERM on September l7, 1992.
Source: Eurostat (1993, p. 99).
In the first subperiod March 1979-September 1987 the exchange rate of high inflation countries
usually devalued immediately during periods of exchange rate tensions to maintain
competitiveness.ZZ As a result the EMS behaved more or less as a"crawling peg" system.
The second subperiod October 1987-August 1992 was characterized by a widespread consensus
to follow stability-oriented policies, an increasing convergence in inflation rates, and by long
periods without realignments (Ungerer, 1990). Nevertheless, concerns arose about the
"asymmetry" in the EMS where Germany focuses on price stability and other ERM-countries
focus on maintaining their currency's exchange rates vis-à-vis the DM. We choose Germany
as the reference country, because of its anchor function in the EMS. The second subperiod also
coincides with important capital liberalization directives. The sample period runs until the first
EMS exchange crisis of September 1992. Italy and the United Kingdom left the ERM and floated
their currencies. Ireland, Portugal and Spain adjusted their central parity.
2.4 The Degree of Money Market Integration
This section examines the size and variability of inean deviations and mean absolute deviations
from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post RIP to assess the degree of money market integration in
ZZ Of course, the forwazd premium (discount) and the expected devaluation (revaluation) incorporate market
particípants' expectations about the differences between domestic and German inflation rates.
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Europe. First, we calculate monthly (absolute) deviations from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post
RIP along the lines set out in Section 2.4. We regress those monthly (absolute) deviations (yt
and ~yt~) against a constant term over the relevant period:
y, -(3o t et and ~ yr I - po t er (6)
If equation (6) is estimated with ordinary least squares the coefficient po is simply the mean
(absolute) deviation:
(30 - T-' ET ~ yr and ~ po ~ - T-t ~T t ~ Yt ~ (7)
Table 2.4 reports mean (absolute) deviations from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post RIP of ten
European countries vis-à-vis Germany over the periods March 1979-September 1987, October
1987-August 1992 and March 1979-August 1992. Moreover, Table 2.4 decomposes mean
deviations from ex post UIP and ex post RIP into their components. Deviations from ex post
UIP are decomposed into a country premium and an ex post exchange risk premium. Deviations
from ex post RIP are decomposed into a country premium, an ex post exchange risk premium
and a deviation from ex post PPP. Each of these components should be zero for a particular
type of capital mobility to hold.23 Of course, we cannot decompose mean absolute deviations
into their components.
Although the calculations in Table 2.4 have been confined to the bilateral relationships between
ten EC member states and Germany, Table 2.4 also determines those deviations between any
two EC countries. For example, if inean deviations from ex post RIP between France and
Germany and between the United Kingdom and Germany are known, we are able to calculate
mean deviations from ex post RIP between France and the United Kingdom as follows:
rUx t,PRA -rUK rGER (rFRA rGBR ~e same holds of course for the buildin blocks oft,tt3 t,tt3- t,tt3- t,tt3 t,tt3- t,[t3)~ g
ex post RIP, that is, the country premium, the ex post exchange risk premium and the deviation
from ex post PPP.
The use of inean deviations as a basis for the judgement of capital mobility may be misleading.
Suppose all deviations are white noíse. Under this condition the expected deviation is zero but
in any individual period large deviations may occur. Large outliers may bias mean deviations
while all other observations are (close to) zero. Then, mean deviations signal perfect capital
mobility despite the fact that capital is immobile internationally. The analysis may suggest that
CIP holds on average over the period, while in fact it did not hold at any instant during the
period. In so far, the calculations in Table 2.4 are to be interpreted with care. However, since
in Figure 2.1 of Appendix 2.C the underlying charts are provided this criticism is of limited
Z' Note that it is possible that (some of) these components may add up to zero while in fact they differ from zero.
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importance. Furthermore, we also report mean absolute deviations.
It is important to note that the error term e, in equation (6) will follow a moving-average
process of order two (MA(2)) because of what is known as the overlapping samples problem
(Hansen and Hodrick, 1980). The data frequency (one month) exceeds the length of the holding
period (three-months). With monthly da[a, any innovation occurring in month t will affect the
value of instruments maturing in months t, tf 1 and tt2. This suggests correlation between the
error terms one and two months apart, but zero correlation between error terms further apart
(see Appendix 2.B). Therefore, Table 2.4 also reports Newey-West (1987) standard errors to
account for possible heteroskedasticity and autoconelation resulting from overlapping data.~
(1) Deviations from CIP
The CIP condition is the least stringent criterion for money market integration. Deviations from
CIP, i.e. country premia, measure the ability to move money market assets across national
borders. The country premium reflects the existence of transaction costs, capital controls (existing
or expected), ínformation costs, discriminatory tax laws, default risk andlor imperfections in
the data.25 A negative country premium is indicative ofcapital export restrictions, the domestic
return is artificially low to the German return and capital export restrictions exist. On the other
hand, a positive country premium is indicative of capital import restrictions (Commission of
the European Communities, 1990, p. 160).
According to Table 2.4, the size and variability ofcountry premia declined significantly after
the Basle-Nyborg agreement as indicated by the size and variability of inean deviations and
mean absolute deviations from CIP. Belgium, Denmark, France, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands,
Spain and the United Kingdom have average country premia in percentage per year of not more
than 50 basis points in absolute value over the period October 1987-August 1992, probably
only reflecting transaction costs.2ó
Portugal and Greece are the only countries with average country premia of more than SO
basis points in absolute value over the period October 1987-August 1992. Investment in
Portuguese Escudo gave an annual excess return of O.SSoIo while investment in the Greek
Drachma gave an annual loss of 3.41 qo.
~ We have not explicitly performed t-tests in Table 2.4. Though, it is relatively easy to perform t-tests for both
mean and mean absolute deviations applying Newey-West (1987) standard errors (see Appendix 2,B).
25 Interested readers can find an excellent overview of recent regulatory and institutional developments which have
produced financial integration in Grilli (1989), Shepherd (1994), Gruijters (1995), Herring and Litan (1995) and
Mazston (1995).
~ Contrary to De Haan, Pilat and Zelhorst (1991), we find significant mean (absolute) deviations from CIP with
respect to the Netherlands. Using direct DM-Guilder spot and forwazd exchange rates, De Haan et al. find
insignificant deviations from CIP over the period October 1979-June 1989. The use of indirect DM calculations
of spot and forwazd exchange rates in Table 2.4 may have caused aztificially high mean (absolute) deviations from
CIP due to the influence of transaction costs in triangulaz arbitrage.
Table 2.4 - Mean (absolute) deviations from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post RIP and their components in percentages per year
















Belgium -0.96 (0.23) 1.11 (0.22) 1.69 (1.12) 4.88 (0.80) 0.73 (1.18) 4.42 (0.85) 1.12 (L16) 4.15 (0.93) 2.81 (0.49) 3.39 (0.37) 1.85 (0.40) 2.65 (Q27)
Denmark -0.94 (0.26) 1.63 (0.22) 2.21 (1.02) 5.82 (0.61) 1.26 (1.07) 5.82 (0.59) -0.16 (1.05) 5.77 (0.61) 2.05 (0.62) 3.54 (0.44) 1.11 (0.60) 3.55 (0.34)
France -2.68 (0.47) 2.76 (0.47) 2.24 (1.05) 6.60 (0.72) -0.44 (1.09) 5.10 (0.68) -0.29 (1.20) 5.63 (0.74) 1.96 (0.74) 3.55 (0.51) -0.72 (0.54) 2.57 (0.29)
Greece' - - - - -7.64 (3.24) 14.55 (2.60) 2.75 (3.14) 14.94 (2.26) - - -4.89 (1.12) 8.00 (0.74)
Ireland -0.75 (0.12) 0.98 (0.13) 3.49 (1.26) 6.63 (0.83) 2.74 (1.25) 6.14 (0.85) -2.76 (1.48) 6.68 (0.99) 0.73 (0.82) 3.82 (0.43) -0.02 (0.86) 3.86 (0.47)
Italy -2.34 (0.58) 2.66 (0.52) 4.73 (1.05) 7.84 (0.66) 2.39 (1.0]) 6.39 (0.52) -2.56 (1.16) 6.65 (0.71) 2 17 (0.73) 4.15 (0.43) -0.17 (0.84) 3.55 (0.50)
Netherlands -0.32 (0.06) 0.54 (0.09) 0.40 (0.55) 2.78 (0.36) 0.08 (0.54) 2.69 (0.36) 0.32 (0.64) 3.54 (0.35) 0.73 (0.36) 2.56 (0.22) 0.41 (0.37) 2.43 (0.22)
Portugal -7.62 (1.13) 7.72 (1.12) 3.73 (2.07) 12.03 (1.41) -3.89 (2.21) ]0.51 (1.44) 0.62 (2.42) 11.99 (1.46) 435 (1.43) 7.42 (0.93) -3.27 (1.12) 6.49 (0.61)
Spain -3.27 (0.50) 3.78 (0.49) 3.89 (2.19) 11.43 (1.32) 0.62 (2.36) 11.24 (1.42) -0.26 (2.22) 10.5] (1.36) 3.63 (0.83) 4.87 (0.65) 0.36 (0.80) 3.81 (0.44)
United
Kingdom
















Belgium 0.06 (0.03) 0.12 (0.01) 1.31 (0.43) 1.56 (0.38) ].37 (0.42) 1.59 (0.38) 0.04 (0.51) 2.00 (0.24) 1.34 (0.45) 2.11 (0.29) 1.40 (0.44) 2.12 (0.27)
Denmazk -0.12 (0.07) 0.24 (0.05) 2.16 (0.77) 3.14 (0.55) 2.04 (0.73) 3.05 (0.51) -0.34 (0.70) 2.96 (0.26) 1.83 (0.43) 2.38 (0.35) 1.71 (0.44) 2.32 (0.35)
France -0.10 (0.06) 0.17 (0.05) 1.68 (0.58) 2.84 (0.30) 1.58 (0.56) 2.78 (0.29) 0.02 (0.56) 2.49 (0.27) 1.70 (0.58) 1.97 (0.32) 1.60 (0.36) 1.89 (0.29)
Geece -3.41 (0.66) 3.96 (0.53) 4.04 (1.28) 6.20 (0.69) 0.63 (1.36) 5.36 (0.61) -1.39 (1.49) 6.34 (0.87) 2.65 (].06) 6.46 (0.51) -0.76 (1.09) 5.87 (0.50)
Ireland 0.32 (0.08) 0.44 (0.05) 1.93 (0.52) 2.36 (0.42) 2.25 (0.52) 2.49 (0.47) -0.24 (0.43) 1.93 (0.19) 1.69 (0.37) 2.08 (0.26) 2.01 (0.38) 2.29 (0.29)
Italy 0.02 (0.08) 0.30 (0.05) 3.47 (1.00) 4.79 (0.66) 3.50 (0.97) 4.72 (Q66) -1.93 (0.92) 3.93 (0.56) 1.54 (0.46) 2.01 (0.35) 1.57 (0.42) 1.92 (0.34)
Netherlands 0.07 (0.02) 0.11 (0.02) 0.19 (0.17) 0.67 (0.11) 0.26 (0.17) 0.65 (0.11) 0.45 (0.51) 2.35 (0.31) 0.64 (0.56) 2.37 (0.34) 0.71 (0.55) 2.34 (0.34)
Portugal 0.55 (0.45) 1.60 (0.24) 5.33 (1.10) 7.02 (0.74) 5.88 (1.31) 7.72 (0.88) -5.95 (1.44) 8.39 (0.89) -0.62 (0.67) 3.08 (0.28) -O.U7 (0.74) 2.92 (0.41)
Spain 0.13 (0.10) 0.34 (0.09) 6.84 (1.69) 8.20 (1.43) 6.97 (1.74) 8.38 (1.48) -4.22 (1.58) 7.49 (1.02) 2.62 (0.58) 3.58 (0.35) 2.75 (0.61) 3.70 (0.38)
United
Kingdom

















Belgium -0.59 (0.17) 0.75 (0.16) 1.55 (0.73) 3.67 (0.58) 0.96 (0.77) 3.39 (0.59) 0.73 (0.76) 3.37 (0.62) 2.28 (0.37) 2.93 (0.28) 1.69 (0.30) 2.46 (0.20)
Denmark -0.64 (0.18) 1.13 (0.1~ 2.19 (0.70) 4.85 (0.48) 1.55 (0.73) 4.81 (0.47) -0.22 (0.71) 4.75 (0.45) 1.97 (0.42) 3.12 (0.31) 1.33 (0.42) 3.10 (0.27)
France -1.74 (0.36) 1.82 (0.36) 2.04 (0.70) 5.23 (0.55) 0.30 (0.74) 4.25 (0.48) -0.17 (0.79) 4.48 (0.54) 1.86 (0.49) 2.98 (0.36) 0.12 (0.41) 2.32 (0.22)
Greecé -2.35 (1.05) 5.13 (0.55) -1.07 (3.16) 10.27 (2.46) -3.42 (2.58) 8.62 (2.12) 1.55 (2.31) 9.39 (1.74) 0.48 (1.53) 7.57 (0.81) -1.87 (0.93) 6.20 (OS2)
Ireland -0.36 (0.12) 0.78 (0.09) 2.92 (0.83) 5.08 (0.63) 2.56 (0.81) 4.81 (0.63) -1.84 (0.97) 4.95 (0.73) 1.08 (0.54) 3.18 (0.32) 0.72 (0.58) 3.29 (0. ~4)
Italy -1.48 (0.41) 1.80 (0.38) 4.27 (0.77) 6.72 (0.53) 2.80 (0.74) 5.78 (0.43) -2.33 (0.81) 5.66 (0.53) 1.94 (0.49) 3.37 (0.34) 0.46 (0.57) 2.95 (0.3f~)
Netherlands -0.18 (0.05) 0.38 (0.07) 0.32 (0.36) 2.01 (0.28) 0.15 (0.35) 1.95 (0.28) 0.37 (0.45) 3.10 (0.26) 0.69 (0.30) 2.49 (0.19) 0.52 (0.31) 2.40 (0.19)
Portugal -4.64 (0.96) 5.49 (0.85) 4.31 (1.38) 10.21 (1.01) -0.33 (1.66) 9.49 (0.99) -1.77 (1.70) 10.68 (1.03) 2.54 (1.00) 5.84 (0.68) -2.11 (0.80) 5.19 (0.49)
Spain -2.03 (0.41) 2.53 (0.41) 4.97 (1.56) 10.26 (1.02) 2.94 (1.72) 10.20 (1.08) -1.70 (1.57) 9.41 (0.97) 3.26 (0.57) 4.40 (0.44) 1.23 (0.58) 3.77 (0.31)
United
Kingdom
-0.29 (0.10) 0.62 (0.08) 2.87 (2.42) 14.95 (1.44) 2.57 (2.39) 14.80 (1.42) -].97 (2.59) 15.56 (1.57) 0.90 (0.47) 3.31 (0.27) 0.61 (0.50) 3.29 (0.30)
' Calculated over the period May 1980-September 1987.
" Calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992.
Newey-West (1987) standard errors of inean (absolute) deviations are indicated in parentheses.
Source: See Appendix 2.A.
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An important explanation for above results was the directive of 24 June 1988, when the European
Commission stated that as from July 1, 1990 all short-term and long-tetYn capital movemenis
in Europe are to be free of restrictions. However, Greece, Ireland, Portugal and Spain do not
have to fulfil this directive until December 31, 1992. Moreover, Portugal and Greece have the
possibility to postpone implementation of this directive till December 31, 1995. In practice this
meant that especially restrictions on short-term capital movements had to disappear (many
restrictions on long-term capital movements were already lifted earlier).
With respect to the size of inean CIP deviations [1] over the period March 1979-August
1992 -- measured as the positive or negative difference from zero in absolute value -- we may
list the countries in ascending order of estimated degree of CIP integration as follows: Portugal,
Greece (calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992), Spain, France, Italy, Denmark,
Belgium, Ireland, United Kingdom and the Netherlands. With respect to the size of inean absolute
deviations from CIP [ ~ 1 ~] over the period March 1979-August 1992, we may list the countries
in ascending order of estimated degree of CIP integration as follows: Portugal, Greece (calculated
over the period September 1984-August 1992), Spain, France, Italy, Denmark, Ireland, Belgium,
United Kingdom and the Netherlands. The order of estimated degree of CIP integration as
measured by mean deviations and mean absolute deviations appears to be almost equivalent.
Thus, Portugal, Greece and Spain show the lowest degree of CIP integration vis-à-vis Germany
and maintained many capital controls during the period March 1979-August 1992. The
Netherlands and the United Kingdom show the highest degree of CIP integration. The results
in Table 2.4 confirm the findings of a previous study of inean deviations from CIP relative
to Germany over the period September 1982 to April 1988 (see Commission of the European
Communities, 1990, pp. 160-161). The Commission of the European Communities basically
transformed Frankel's (1989) calculations of money market interest rate differentials with respect
to the United States in the following way: rUx rceR -rux rus -(rceR rus ) z,t,tf3 t,tt3- t,tt3 t,ti3 t,tt3- t,tt3 -
(2) Ex post exchange risk premia
Table 2.4 also reports the ex post exchange risk premium. The ex post exchange risk premium
is the difference between the forward premium (discount) and the realized spot exchange rate
change. It is difficult to know the exact sign and magnitude of the exchange risk premium
because the expected exchange rate ís not directly observable, so ex post devaluation in stead
of ex ante devaluation has to be used. A positive (negative) ex post exchange risk premium
arises when the ex post devaluation is lower (higher) than the forward premium.
With respect to the size of inean ex post exchange risk premia [2] over the period March
1979-August 1992 -- measured as the positive or negative difference from zero in absolute value
n Lemmen and Eijffinger (1993) reproduce the calculations of the Commission of the European Communities
(1990).
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-- we may list the countries in ascending order as follows: Netherlands, Greece (calculated over
the period September 1984-August 1992), Belgium, France, Denmark, United Kingdom, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal and Spain. With respect to the size of inean absolute ex post exchange risk premia
[ I2I] over the period March 1979-August 1992, we may list the countries in ascending order
as follows: Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Ireland, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Greece
(calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992) and the United Kingdom. Notice
the difference between the ascending orders of [2] and ( ~ 2 ~]. Large outliers bias mean ex post
exchange risk premia. Forecast errors in predicting future spot exchange rates are quite sizeable;
so differences in expected and realized returns can also be quite sizeable in any period. Only,
with respect to the Netherlands an insignificant mean exchange risk premium seems plausible
due to a relative stable nominal Guilder-Deutsche Mazk exchange rate.
Although the ex post exchange risk premium declined in the core-EMS countries after
September 1987, it remained rather persistent despite relatively lazge intra-European exchange
rate stability (compare the subperiods Mazch 1979-September 1987 and October 1987-August
1992). The Netherlands is the only country with a relative small exchange risk premium vis-à-vis
Germany in all (sub)periods. Furthermore, note that mean (absolute) country premia are smaller
and less variable than mean (absolute) exchange risk premia.
Moreover, non-core-EMS countries show higher exchange risk premia than core-EMS
countries. Although some exchange rates of EMS countries are within a small band, the
possibility of an exchange rate realignment in the EMS, always influences nominal exchange
rate expectations which cause short-term (and long-term) nominal interest rate divergences.
Exchange rate volatility makes domestic money market instruments and Gennan money market
instruments less than perfect substitutes. German investors are only willing to hold the domestic
assets if they obtain compensation in the form of an exchange risk premium. This azgument
assumes that CIP holds continuously and the ex post exchange risk premium is a good measure
of the willingness to hold foreign assets. If exchange risk is just priced risk, investors will be
perfectly willing to invest abroad since the exchange risk premium is just a fair reward for the
exchange risk they bear. Of course, capital was far from immobile during the EMS exchange
crisis of September 1992. Consequently, large exchange risk premia do not always mean that
capital is immobile. Exchange risk that is not priced hampers capital mobility.
(3) Deviations from ex post UIP
A stronger criterion for money market integration is the UIP condition. UIP measures the ability
and willingness to move money market assets across national borders. A positive deviation
from ex post UIP means that the market requires a higher return from domestic investments
than from German investments. With respect to the size of inean deviations from ex post UIP
[3] over the period March 1979-August 1992 -- measured as the positive or negative difference
from zero in absolute value -- we may list the countries in ascending order of estimated degree
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ofUIP integration as follows: Greece (calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992),
Spain, Italy, United Kingdom, Ireland, Denmark, Belgium, Portugal, France and the Netherlands.
With respect to the size of inean absolute deviations from ex post UIP [ ~3 ~] over the period
Mazch 1979-August 1992, we may list the countries in ascending order of estimated degree
of UIP integration as follows: United Kingdom, Spain, Portugal, Greece (calculated (over the
period September 1984-August 1992), Italy, Ireland, Denmark, France, Belgium and the
Netherlands. According to Table 2.4, the smallest mean (absolute) deviation from ex post UIP
relative to Germany over all (sub)periods is that of the Netherlands.
Next, we briefly discuss some critical measurement issues. Clearly, large outliers bias the
results with respect to mean deviations from ex post UIP. Ontliers are caused by large nominal
exchange rate variability. The money market of the United Kingdom is not very well integrated
with the money market of Germany according to the UIP condition in contrast with the
integration according to the CIP condiáon. German investors who invest in the United Kingdom
apparently demand an exchange risk premium before they are willing to invest in the United
Kingdom. German investors are risk-averse and demand compensation in the form of an(possibly
time-varying) exchange risk premium to hold the more risky assets of other EC countries. In
general, the relative strengths of risk-aversion in the two countries will play a key role in
determining the exchange risk premium. Another factor will be the relative size of asset positions.
More risk-averse German investors will only hold those assets of EC countries with less frequent
and sizeable realignments (i.e. devaluations) or will demand a higher exchange risk premium.
The additional assumption required for UIP (i.e. zero exchange risk premium) dilutes the
inference from the UIP condition with respect to the degree of money market integration. The
interpretation of ex post UIP deviations remains unclear because it entails a joint test of two
underlying hypotheses. Deviations from ex post UIP may reflect a lack of short-term capital
mobility of type II andlor expectational errors. Consequently, inference of the degree of money
mazket integration based upon ex post UIP differentials must be done with caution.
Note also that inference of the degree of money market integration based upon one segment
of the domestic and foreign money markets corresponding with two compazable money market
assets is not always wise. Segmentation within the domestic financial market may affect the
representative money market interest rate (Obstfeld, 1994a, p. 19). Assets may differ considerably
in terms of quality of debtor, size, depth and segmentation of markets.
Moreover, in the EMS short-term nominal interest rates aze used as policy instruments to
keep exchange rates within the allowed fluctuation margin. Fukao and Hanazaki (1987, p. 75)
azgue: "Under an actual adjustable peg system such as the EMS, the nominal interest rates are
not equalized in the short run. This divergence of interest rates is due to the allowed margin
of movements in the exchange rates and possible future changes in the parity rates." When
financial markets expect an exchange rate devaluation, high short-term nominal interest rate
differentials with respect to Germany are needed to maintain the exchange rate in the allowed
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fluctuation margins of the EMS. Short-term nominal interest rates not only fluctuate in response
to market forces but to policy forces as well. Therefore, it is hard to isolate the market induced
effect of money market integration tYom the policy induced effect of money market integration.zR
Consequently, declining ex post UIP (and CIP and ex post RIP) differentials may also be
attributed to convergence in the implementation and performance of monetary policies of EMS
countries as measured by the development of four key variables: inflation rates, real exchange
rates, real short-term interest rates (money market rates) and real long-term interest rates (capital
market rates) (Eijffinger, 1993, p. 182). Eijffinger (1994, pp. 10-13) argues that the integration
of financial markets also makes high demands on institutiona] convergence, that is the
convergence of fenancial market structure and monetary responsibilities. Financial market
structure is related to, among others, the maturities, techniques and volumes of the national
money and capital markets and the organization of financial transacdons and operations. Monetary
responsibilities apply to e.g. the final authority in monetary policy making, the presence of
statutory requirements concerning monetary stability and the relationship between the central
bank and the government in the fotmulation of monetary policy.
Furthermore, European money market interest rates are not only influenced by intra-EMS
capital mobility, but also by extra-EMS capital mobility in accordance with international interest
arbitrage relationships. Capital mobility between Europe and the rest of the world may confuse
the issue of ineasurement of capital mobility within Europe. Changing demand for short-term
capital in Europe may change the supply of capital from abroad.
In addition, note that even under the rational expectation assumption, exchange rate forecast
errors can have a sample average different from zero for a long time as a consequence of the
existence of a peso problem in foreign exchange markets where jumps in exchange rates are
expected but not realized in a particular sample period (Krasker, 1980). Peso problems can
be found in fixed exchange rate periods when parity changes are expected.29 Market participants
may systematically over- or underestimate changes in exchange rates until the exchange rate
change occurs.30 Peso problems are particularly relevant for exchange rates of currencies
belonging to the ERM in which realignments do not occur very frequently. Consider the evidence
on uncovered interest differenuals in Table 2.4. The third column measures the excess uncovered
return on ten currencies relative to the Deutsche Mark. Table 2.4 shows high positive deviations
from UIP for the Irish Pound, the Italian Lira, the Portuguese Escudo, the Spanish Peseta and
the Pound Sterling over the period September 1987 (the period after the Basle-Nyborg agreement)
and August 1992 (the period prior to the first EMS exchange crisis). Interestingly, those are
~ We agree with Pigott (1993, pp. 31-32) that the interaction of changes in capital controls, the exchange rate
regime and the coordination of monetary policies considerably affected money market integration in Europe.
~' Peso problems may also occtu in flexible exchange rate periods if major shifts in policy regimes are expected.
'o See also Gártner (1993, p. 221).
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the currencies that suffered from important depreciations since September 1992 as a consequence
of ERM realignments (or abandonments of the ERM). Interest rate differentials could have been
discounting these unusual events, that is, a peso problem, rather than an exchange risk premium
arises. For example, the excess retum on the Lira conforms closely to the peso model. Prior
to dropping out of the ERM, a Lira deposit earns 3.Sqo more than a mark deposit both measured
in Italian Lira. The higher return on Lira deposits compensated the DM based investor for the
expected capital loss due to the devaluation of the Lira. With the exchange crisis of September
1992 these excess returns are eliminated.
An important issue is the question what will happen with ex post UIP deviations if the system
of fixed but adjustable exchange rates changes into a system with irrevocably fixed exchange
rates? That is, European countries adopt a single currency and form a monetary union. The
Delors Report (1989, p. ]0) outlines three necessary conditions for a monetary union: (1) the
assurance of total and irreversible convertibility of currencies; (2) the complete liberalization
of capital transactions and full integration of banking and other financial markets; and (3) the
elimination of margins of fluctuations and the irrevocable locking of exchange rate parities.
In the terminology ofTable 2.1 perfect monetary integration implies short-term nominal interest
parity. Short-term interest rate differentials carry important information about the extent of
monetary integration and integration of foreign exchange markets." Perfect monetary integration
may be seen as a special case of UIP.32 If exchange rate parities are irrevocably fixed and
fluctuation margins are eliminated perfect monetary integration implies short-tem~ nominal interest
rate parity:
tt.t.k - tt,tak (8)
Consequently, the expected exchange rate change equals the realized exchange rate change and
is zero by definition [(s„~ s~)-E,(S„k 5~-0]." That is, investors have perfect foresight.
Subsequently, we may decompose short-term nominal interest parity as follows:
~~.t.k-t~.t.k - [tt.tak-~t,t.k-(frt.k-S )~t[(ft~.k-S~)-Et(Sr.k-St)~}E~(st,k-Si) (9)
" Knot and De Haan (1995) analyze interest rate differentials of Austria, Belgium and the Netherlands vis-à-vis
Germany. Interest differentials consist of three parts: expected exchange rate movements within the band, expected
changes of the central rates and a risk premium.
32 Gruijters (1995, pp. 10-11) calls monetary integration perfect if capital controls have been abolished and mazket
participants no longer expect the bilateral exchange rate to change at all. Observe -- as was noted by Gruijters
(1995) -- the subtle difference between perfect capital mobility of type II and perfect monetary integration. With
perfect capital mobility of type II the exchange risk premium drops out because investors are assumed to be risk-
neutral. With perfect monetary integration the exchange risk premium drops out because exchange rate expectations
are held with certainty.
" See also Goodhart (1992, p. 121).
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However, as Table 2.4 indicates exchange risk premia are far from zero. Fixed nominal exchange
rates are not feasible (yet).
(4) Deviations from ex post relative PPP
T'he ex post relative PPP condition holds if the ex post real exchange rate between two countries
remains constant. This means that the domestic currency depreciates at a rate equal to the ex
post inflation differential. It also means that in the absence of relative price changes the nominal
exchange rate change equals the real exchange rate change. Branson ( 1988, p. 1119) links the
failure of PPP to the failure of goods market integration. Observe that movements in real
exchange rates in the short run tend to be dominated by nominal exchange rate changes rather
than by relative price level changes. Mean deviations from UIP and mean deviations from ex
post relative PPP often have opposite signs and partly cancel out. Exchange rates adjust much
faster than interest rates and prices.
The failure of ex post relative PPP in the short run is evident from Table 2.4 for most of
the European countries. Short-term ex post PPP may be an unrealistic assumption with respect
to money market integration, because as was argued by Boughton ( 1988, p. 18) it has "(...)
little or no bearing on short- or medium-term developments." That is, relative prices of domestic
and foreign goods may be sticky in the short run. In the short run the real exchange rate may
fluctuate around its equilibrium value while in the long run we have mean reversion of the
real exchange rate. However, the size and variability of inean ( absolute) deviations from ex
post PPP declined after the Basle-Nyborg agreemen[.
With respect to the size of inean deviations from ex post PPP [4] over the period March
1979-August 1992 -- measured as the positive or negative difference from zero in absolute value
-- we may list the countries in ascending order as follows: France, Denmark, Netherlands,
Belgium, Greece ( calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992), Spain, Portugal,
Ireland, United Kingdom and Italy. With respect to the size of inean absolute deviations from
ex post PPP [ ~4 ~] over the period March 1979-August 1992, we may list the countries in
ascending order as follows: Netherlands, Belgium, France, Denmark, Ireland, Italy, Greece
(calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992), Spain, Portugal and the United
Kingdom. Again, outliers may bias the results with respect to mean ex post PPP deviations.
Moreover, ontliers may not only be caused by large nominal exchange rate variability but by
large inflation rate variability as well. The calculations of ex post PPP require approximation
of expected exchange rate changes and also approximation of expected relative price changes
(Commission of the European Communities, 1990, p. 160). In addition, deviations from ex post
PPP may be due to relative price changes of tradeable and non-tradeables in the consumption
basket.
Countries such as Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom show highly negative
ex post deviations from PPP. As it is well known, during the EMS period these countries were
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depreciating their currency at a rate lower than their inflation differential with Germany. However,
this is more a feature of the EMS of fixed but adjustable exchange rates than a measure of
financial integration. Table 2.3 illustrated that the size and frequency of realignments has
decreased until the exchange crisis of September 1992. Given divergent inflation rates, these
realignments have been necessary to preserve real exchange rate equilibrium within the EMS
(Collins, 1988, p. 112). Theoretical work on the credibility of monetary policy suggests that,
if countries with higher inflation rates are to gain anti-inflation credibility through EMS
membership in order to reduce their inflation rates to Getman levels, they need a real appreciating
exchange rate with Gertnany. This is because full adjustment of exchange rates would amount
to accommodation of domestic inflationary pressures, whereas less than full ad.justment of
exchange rates would involve an element of punishment for excess domestic inflation by
squeezing profits margins of producers of tradeable goods (Bleany, 1992, p. 66). Under a fixed
but adjustable exchange rate regime such as the EMS relative high inflation rates are expected
to translate into a worsening in competitiveness (real appreciation), which in turn dampens prices
and hence promotes inflation convergence (see also Kool and Koedijk, 1992). Giavazzi and
Pagano (1988, p. 1055) argue: "First, between successive realignments, excess inflation
(combining with the fixity of the nominal exchange rate) results in one-for-one appreciation
of the real exchange rate. Second, at realignment dates, excess inflation countries obtain
devaluations which are generally insufficient to make up for the real appreciation experienced
since the previous realignment. The first factor introduces real exchange rate fluctuation between
realignments while the second factor introduces a trend of real appreciation in the exchange
rates of high inflation countries."
Table 2.4 illustrates that nominal exchange rates did not fully adjust to compensate for inflation
differentials. Mean deviations from ex post PPP over the October 1987-August 1992 were
negative for almost all European countries. The depreciation of the domestic currency is smaller
than needed to maintain competitiveness which was lost due to the higher inflation relative
to German inflation." Therefore, the real exchange rate appreciates (where the domestic inflation
exceeds the Getman inflation and the nominal exchange rate depreciation is relatively small).
This implies that a country imports deflation. The relative small depreciation may be explained
by the stabilization of nominal exchange rates to enhance credibility and achieve monetary
convergence.
Unfortunately, the efforts following the EMS exchange crisis of September 1992 to defend
the exchange rates within pre-specified bands by manipulation ofnominal money market interest
rates and exchange market intervention lacked credibility (see also Figure 2.1 in Appendix
2.C).35 On August 1, 1993, ERM bands were widened to t 15~I~ except for the band between
'" Of course, competitive real depreciations may have negative spill-over effects to other EC countries.
35 Van Aarle, Eijffinger and Lemmen (1995) found evidence for a decline in credibility just before the exchange
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the Netherlands and Germany which remained unchanged at t 2.25~10. Now all currencies, except
the Dutch Guilder, are effectively freely floating against the DM.
(5) Ex post currency premia
It is expected that financial markets translate monetary uncertainties into higher currency premia,
consisting of exchange risk premia and deviations from PPP. With respect to the size of inean
ex post currency premia [5] over the period March 1979-August 1992 -- measured as the positive
or negative difference from zero in absolute value -- we may list the countries in ascending
order as follows: Greece (calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992), Netherlands,
United Kingdom, Ireland, France, Italy, Denmark, Belgium, Portugal and Spain. With respect
to the size of inean absolute ex post currency premia [ ~5 ~] over the period March 1979-August
1992, we may list the countries in ascending order as follows: Netherlands, Belgium, France,
Denmark, Ireland, United Kingdom, Ita1y, Spain, Portugal and Greece (calculated over the period
September 1984-August 1992). Notice the difference in the ascending orders. Notable declines
in currency premia occurred for Spain, Portugal and the United Kingdom when they entered
the ERM of the EMS (comparing the subperiod March 1979-September 1987 with the subperiod
October 1987-August 1992). EMS discipline may have helped to limit previous nominal
devaluation tendencies. However, the overall result is that currency premia remain rather
persistent. Since country premia are almost zero, cunency premia, i.e. deviations from ex post
PPP and ex post exchange risk premia are the main sources of real interest differentials.
(6) Deviations from ex post RIP
The RIP condition is the strongest criterion for money market integration. In fact, the RIP
condition not only measures financial integration but non-fmancial integration as well (see Section
2.2). Deviations from ex post RIP are due to country and currency factors. Table 2.4 shows
that currency factors dominate country factors in explaining real interest rate differentials with
respect to Germany. With respect to the size of inean deviations from ex post RIP [6] over
the period March 1979-August 1992 -- measured as the positive or negative difference from
zero in absolute value -- we may list the countries in ascending order of estimated degree of
RIP integration as follows: Portugal, Greece (calculated over the period September 1984-August
1992), Belgium, Denmark, Spain, Ireland, United Kingdom, Netherlands, Italy and France. With
respect to the size of inean absolute deviations from ex post RIP [ ~ 6 ~] over the period March
1979-August 1992, we may list the countries in ascending order of estimated degree of RIP
integration as follows: Greece (calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992), Portugal,
Spain, Ireland, United Kingdom, Denmark, Italy, Belgium, Netherlands and France. The worse
crisis of September 1992. For Ireland, Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, expected exchange rate
movements within the band were positively correlated with expected changes of the central rate. Or in other words,
"divorcement" effects dominated "honeymoon" effects.
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record of inflation and concomitant devaluation tendencies required countries like Greece, Ireland,
Italy, Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom to keep their money market interest rates above
those in Germany, causing large real interest differentials.3ó
Declining real interest rate differentials may point to monetary convergence and to increased
cross-border trade in goods and services in Europe. Real interest convergence may be explained
by the Single Market project to complete an internal market for persons, goods, services and
capital in Europe by the end of 1992. In general, Table 2.4 shows that ex post RIP has been
violated because the components of ex post RIP i.e. ex post UIP and ex post PPP have been
violated. Real interest differentials remain rather persistent.37 There is no clear pattern of lower
real interest differentials vis-à-vis Germany in one country or another. The interpretation of
the RIP condition is even more complicated than the interpretation of the UIP condition. The
Economist (1992, p. 23) argues: "(...) the criterion of real interest parity is much more demanding
than it seems to be. Exchange rate volatility undermines it in two ways: first by adding a risk
premium to the cost of cover in the foreign exchange market [so UIP does not hold], and second
by breaking the link between exchange rates and differences in inflation rates [so PPP does
not hold]".
2.5 The Speed of Money Market Integration38
In Table 2.4 we analyzed the degree of money market integration by regressing mean (absolute)
deviations from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post RIP against a constant. It also may be worthwhile
to examine the speed ofmoney market integration by regressing absolute deviations from CIP,
ex post UIP and ex post RIP over the period March 1979-August 1992 against a constant (coeffi-
cient (~o) and a time trend (coefficient (3,) (see Frankel, 1990, p. 22 and Frankel, Phillips and
Chinn, 1993, pp. 274-275):
ly~l - Ro}a,xt}E~ (lo)
Table 2.5 reports the coefficient estimates and corresponding Newey-West (1987) standard errors
of equation (l0).
36 The history of high inflation has made these countries more dependent on short-term financing than Germany,
and thus more sensitive to shifts in short-term nominal interest rates.
37 Future research should investigate if the size and variability of real interest differentials are sensitive to the choice
of the price index.
3s This section is based on Lemmen and Eijffinger (1994) and Eijffinger and Lemmen (1995).
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Table 2.5 - Time trends in mean absolute deviations from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post
RIP over the period March 1979-August 1992 (in percentages per year)
( Ordinary Least Squares estimation of ~Y~ ~ -(30. (3 ~ x t t e~ )
Constant Trend RZ
Belgium CIP 1.793 (0.381)" -0.013 (0.003)" 0.224
UIP 6.048 (1.421)" -0.033 (0.011)" 0.094
RIP 3.406 (0.435)" -0.012 (0.004)" 0.084
Denmark CIP 2.760 (0.220)" -0.020 (0.002)" 0.445
UIP 8.006 (0.854)" -0.039 (0.008)" 0.247
RIP 3.959 (0.466)" -0.010 (0.005)" 0.032
France CIP 4.082 (0.761)" -0.028 (0.006)" 0.228
UIP 5.721 (1.162)" -0.018 (0.010)' 0.033
RIP 3.280 (0.509)" -0.012 (0.005)" 0.088
Greece' CIP 7.648 (0.947)" -0.052 (0.013)" 0.167
UIP 15.522 (5.856)" -0.142 (0.083)' 0.087
RIP 6.720 (1.240)" -0.011 (0.018) -0.055
Ireland CIP 1.496 (0.162)" -0.009 (0.001)" 0.259
UIP 7.403 (1.055)" -0.032 (0.009)" 0.077
RIP 4.667 (0.791)" -0.017 (0.007)" 0.089
Italy CIP 4.628 (0.771)" -0.035 (0.007)" 0.329
UIP 7.747 (0.814)" -0.024 (0.008)" 0.067
RIP 4.885 (0.946)" -0.024 (0.009)" 0.147
Netherlands CIP 0.938 (0.125)" -0.007 (0.001)" 0.350
UIP 4.175 (0.495)" -0.027 (0.004)" 0.331
RIP 2.467 (0.314)" -0.001 (0.004) -0.006
Portugal CIP 9.335 (1.832)" -0.047 (0.014)" 0.124
UIP 12.599 (2.292)" -0.038 (0.020)` 0.031
RIP 8.051 (1.092)" -0.035 (0.010)" 0.146
Spain CIP 6.075 (0.722)" -0.043 (0.006)" 0.419
UIP 13.961 (2.191)" -0.046 (0.021)" 0.049
RIP 3.599 (0.483)" -0.002 (0.005) -0.005
United Kingdom CIP 1.100 (0.122)" -0.006 (0.001)" 0.149
UIP 22.527 (2.391)" -0.095 (0.021)" 0.124
RIP 3.708 (0.763)" -0.005 (0.007) 0.002
' Calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992.
` Coefficient differs significantly from zero at the 95~10 level of confidence (one-tailed test)
" Coefficient differs significantly from zero at the 99qo level of confidence (one-tailed test)
Newey-West (1987) standard errors are indicated in parentheses.
Source: See Appendix 2.A.
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The speed of money market integration is captured by the magnitude of the negative uend
coefficient.39 The more negative the trend coefficient the larger the downwazd trend in mean
absolute deviations from CIP, ex post UIP or ex post RIP. Or in other words, the trend coefficient
(31 captures the monthly change in the degree of money market integration. For example, the
monthly decline of absolute CIP differentials with respect to Belgium amounts to 0.013 per
cent per year over the peáod Mazch 1979-August 1992. We call this the catching up with respect
to CIP integration.
The picture of estimated speed of integration is as follows. All ten European countáes show
significant negative trend coefficients with respect to absolute deviations from CIP at either
95oIo or 99qo level of confidence. The same holds for the negative trend coefficient of absolute
deviations from ex post UIP. Notice that the speed of UIP integration generally exceeds the
speed of CIP and RIP integration. With respect to absolute deviations from CIP, we may list
the countries in ascending order of estimated speed of CIP integration over the peáod March
1979-August 1992: United Kingdom, Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy,
Spain, Portugal and Greece (calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992). The
relatively low speed of CIP integration of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom may be
explained by the already high degree of CIP integration in the beginning of the sample period.
Greece, Portugal and Spain had a lot to catch up with respect to the reference country Germany
in terms of CIP integration.
With respect to absolute deviations from UIP over the peáod March 1979-August 1992,
we may list the countries in ascending order of estimated speed of UIP integration as follows:
France, Italy, Netherlands, Ireland, Belgium, Portugal, Denmark, Spain, United Kingdom and
Greece (calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992). With respect to absolute
deviations from RIP over the peáod March 1979-August 1992 we may list the countáes in
39 Non-linear specifcations which overcome the problem that absolute deviations may become negative as time
increases ( ~y, ~~ 0 if t~~) did not perform better in terms of R2 and level of significance than the lineaz
specification. We estimated the following non-linear specifications ( where ~y, ~? 0 if t~~):
~Y~~ ' poti~,x 1 tE,
Jt
ly,l - Ro}R,x t }E,
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ascending order of estimated speed of RIP integration as follows: Netherlands, Spain, United
Kingdom, Denmark, Greece (calculated over the period September 1984-August 1992), Belgium,
France, Ireland, Italy and Portugal.
2.6 The Trade-Off between the Degree and Speed of Money Market Integration
This section combines the two previous sections on the degree and speed of money market
integration in Europe. A negative trade-off between the degree and speed of CIP integration
exists. Countries with a relatively low degree of CIP integration show a relatively high speed
of CIP integration, and vice versa. That is, the higher the speed of integration, the lower the
degree of integration and vice versa. The trade-off may be motivated by the political will to
fonn an Economic and Monetary Union in Europe. We infer the degree of money market
integration from Table 2.4 and the speed of money market integration from Table 2.5.
Figure 2.2 illustrates the trade-off between the degree and speed of CIP, UIP and RIP
integration in Europe over the period March 1979-August 1992. Greece is excluded from figure
2.2 because of the lack of comparability of the sample period. The speed of integration is graphed
on the vertical axis and the degree of integration is graphed on the horizontal axis. The degree
of integration is measured as coefficient (io in the regression of inean absolute deviations against
a constant term (see Section 2.4). The speed of integration is measured as coefficient (3, in the
regression of inean absolute deviations against a constant and a time trend (see Section 2.5).
The degree of integration declines if the coefficient values on the horizontal axis increase. The
speed of integration increases if the coefficient values on the vertical axis become more negative.
Figure 2.2 for the CIP trade-off shows that countries like France, Italy, Spain, Portugal and
Greece starting from a lower degree of CIP integration in the beginning of the sample period
rapidly eliminated capital controls during the remainder of the sample period. The United
Kingdom and the Netherlands already showed small absolute deviations from CIP in the
beginning of the sample period. Consequently, the speed of CIP integration -- or in other words
the catching up with respect to CIP integration -- for those countries is low. Equivalently, the
catching up with respect to UIP integration is large for Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom.
The catching up with respect to RIP is particularly large for Portugal.
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Figure 2.2 - The trade-off between the degree and speed of CIP, UIP and RIP integration
over the period March 1979-August 1992 ( excluding Greece)
( Degree of integration measured as coefficient (30 of ~Yr ~- (iof e~ )


































































Table 2.6 assesses the strength of the CIP, UIP and RIP trade-off by regressing the speed of
integration against a constant term and the degree of integration.'o The larger the RZ and the
more negative coefficient ~,, the stronger the trade-off.
Table 2.6 - The strength of the trade-off between the degree and speed of integration over
the period March 1979-August 1992 (excluding Greece)
( Ordinary Least Squares estimation of Speed - 7~o t?L~ x Degree t v~ )
S eed of inte ration Constant De ree of inte ration DW RZ
CIP -0.008 0.004)' -0.009 (0.002)" 2.45 0.71
UIP -0.008 0.008 -0.005 (0.001 " 2.80 0.69
RIP 0.010 (0.012) -0.007 (0.004) 2.18 0.25
' Coefficient differs significantly from zero at the 95~10 level of confidence (one-tailed test)
" Coefficient differs significantly from zero at the 99qo level of confidence (one-tailed test)
OLS standard errors are indicated in parentheses. DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic for first-order serial
correlation and RZ is the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom.
'o The significance of i~,t in Table 2.6 may depend on the outliers which show up in Figure 2.2, i.e. Portugal
for CIP and RIP and the United Kingdom for UIP. The regressions in Table 2.6 are meant as a simple illustration
of the negative trade-off. For the sake of comparability and the akeady few observations used in the regressions
no further observations are omitted.
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Since both the dependent and the independent variable are truncated (absolute deviations are
always non-negative), we apply a one-tailed t-test to determine the strength of the trade-off.
The results indicate a significant negative CIP and UIP trade-off. The CIP and UIP trade-off
are strongest. The capital liberalization directive of 24 June, 1988 has certainly enhanced the
CIP trade-off. The ERM has stabilized nominal exchange rates within Europe. The RIP trade-off
is only marginally signifïcant at the 95~Io level of confidence. The stringent assumptions required
for RIP undoubtedly have contributed to this result. The weak RIP trade-off may be explained
by the Single Market project to complete an internal market for persons, goods, services and
capital in Europe. Goods market integration lags financial market integration. First liberalizing
capital movements (by 1990), then goods and labor movements (by 1992) may create large
rea! exchange rate movements, if financial integration is far ahead of goods and labor market
integration.
2.7 Conclusions
This chapter analyzed money market integration between ten European countries and Germany.
We defined three interest parity conditions, that is CIP, ex ante UIP and ex ante RIP, to assess
the degree of money market integration in Europe. Subsequently, we introduced the decomposition
method of Frankel and MacArthur (1988) to identify the main components in preventing above
interest parity conditions to hold. The evidence in this chapter allows us to draw a few
conclusions about money market integration in Europe.
1. Average ex post real interest differentials can be decomposed into ex post uncovered
nominal interest differentials and deviations from ex post relative PPP. Ex post uncovered
nominal interest differentials can be decomposed in covered interest differentials and ex
post exchange risk premia.
2. We find strong support for an increasing degree of geographical money market integradon
in Europe as measured by the CIP condition. Empirical results indicate that the size and
variability of inean (absolute) country premia declined significantly after the Basle-Nyborg
agreement of September 1987. Perfect capital mobility of type I can be said to exist
between eight European countries and Germany. Portugal and Greece are the exceptions
to the rule and are not (yet) completely integrated with Germany. The initial low degree
of CIP integration urged countries like Greece, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain to catch
up with the rest of the European countries during the 1980s. Finally, CIP deviations are
much smaller than ex post UIP and ex post RIP deviations.
3. Deviations from ex post UIP when compared to those deviations from CIP are highly
variable when devaluations (are expected to) take place. Countries like Greece, Italy,
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Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom, with initial low degrees of UIP integration
definitely showed larger speed of UIP integration. Ex post UIP deviations have declined
due to the exchange rate stabilization influence of the ERM.
4. CIP, ex post UIP and ex post RIP deviations of core-EMS countries generally are more
stable than those deviations of non-core-EMS countries. Throughout the sample period,
deviations from ex post RIP and ex post UIP are more volatile than deviations from CIP.
5. Although the Basle-Nyborg agreement limited the scope for realignments, ex post exchange
risk premia remain rather persistent, and so remain ex post UIP deviations.
6. Short-term ex post PPP may be an unrealistic assumption with respect to money market
integration. That is, relative prices of domestic and foreign goods may be sticky in the
short run. Especially, in the short run the real exchange rate may fluctuate around its
equilibrium value while in the long run we have mean reversion of the real exchange
rate. In addition, movements in real exchange rates tend to be dominated by nominal
exchange rate changes rather than by relative price level changes.
7. Deviations from ex post UIP and ex post PPP are negatively correlated. This evidence
is consistent with there being a common factor, exchange rate changes, driving both
differentials. Exchange rates adjust much faster than interest rates and prices.
8. Despite the fact that the size and variability of inean (absolute) deviations from ex post
RIP have declined after the Basle-Nyborg agreement, real interest differentials remain
rather persistent. In addition, there is no clear pattern of lower real interest differentials
vis-à-vis Germany. Real interest differentials are not comparable across countries because
they are denominated in their own national currency. Consequently, they do not offer
profit opportunities for an individual investor or borrower since no single agent compares
real interest rates across countries. Furthermore, lack of goods markets integration imply
the violation of PPP (and therefore RIP), even when financial markets are perfectly
integrated.
9. Contrary to the CIP condition, the UIP and the RIP conditions can only give an indirect
indication of money market integration in Europe. In fact, perfect capital mobility of type
I is compatible with both, zero and nonzero exchange risk premia andlor zero and nonzero
deviations from PPP.
10. Since the present chapter tends to reject UIP an RIP it offers fairly strong conclusions
about the inappropriateness of various exchange rate models.
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Countries Period Description Source
Germany, France, Belgium, Mazch 1979-June 1993 Three-month money market Eurostat
Netherlands, United Kingdom, interest rates in percentages
Denmark, Spain, Portugal, Italy per year, monthly average,
and Ireland monthly series
Greece May 1980-June 1993 Three-month money market Eurostat
interest rates in percentages
per year, monthly average,
mr,nthl~~ serieti
Consumer price indices
Countries Period Description Source
Germany, France, Belgium, March 1979-June 1993 Consumer price indices, Eurostat
Netherlands, United Kingdom, general index (1985-100),
Denmark, Spain, Portugal and Italy monthly series
Ireland Mazch 1979-June 1993 Consumer price indices, Datastream,
general index (1985-100), [ivlF
quarterly series. Monthly
Irish consumer price indices
were arrived at by 3-month
centered moving-average of
the quarterly series
Greece May 1980-June 1993 Consumer price indices, Eurostat
general index, monthly
series (1985-100)
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Forward exchange rates
53
Countries Period Description Source
Germany, France, Belgium, March 1979-June 1983 Own cross-rate calculations Datastream,
Netherlands, United Kíngdom, of forward exchange rates Bank of
Denmark, [taly and Ireland vis-à-vis the DM based upon England
three-month forward ex-
change rates to f 1 sterling,
middle rate, mon[hly series
Spain and Portugal March 1979-February Own cross-rate calculations Datastream,
1986 of forward exchange rates Bank of
vis-à-vis the DM based upon England
three-month forward ex-
change rates to f 1 sterling,
middle rate, monthly series
Germany, France, Belgium, July 1983-June 1993 Own cross-rate calculations Eurostat,
Netherlands, United Kingdom, of forward exchange rates BIS
Denmark, Italy and Ireland vis-à-vis the DM based upon,
monthly average, monthly
series
Greece September 1984-June Own cross-rate calculations Eurostat,
1993 of forward exchange rates BIS
vis-à-vis the DM based upon
three-month forward ex-
change rates vis-à-vis the US
~, monthly average, monthly
series
Spain and Portugal March 1986-June 1993 Own cross-rate calculations Eurostat,
of forward exchange rates BIS
vis-à-vis the DM based upon
three-month forward ex-
change rates vis-à-vis the US





Counvies Period Description Source
France, Belgium, Netherlands, March 1979-June 1983 Own cross-rate calculations Datastream,
United Kingdom, Denmark, Italy of spot exchange rates vis-à- Bank of
and Ireland vis the DM based upon spot England
exchange rates to f 1 ster-
ling, middle rate, monthly
series
Greece May 1980-August 1984 Own cross-rate calculations Datastream,
of spot exchange rates vis-à- Bank of
vis the DM based upon spot England
exchange rates to f 1 ster-
ling, middle rate, monthly
series
Spain and Portugal March 1979-February Own cross-rate calculations Datastream,
1986 of spot exchange rates vis-à- Bank of
vis the DM based upon spot England
exchange rates to f 1 ster-
ling, middle rate, monthly
series
France, Belgium, Netherlands, July 1983-June 1993 Own cross-rate calculations Eurostat
United Kingdom, Denmark, Italy of spot exchange rates vis-à-
and Ireland vis the DM based upon spot
exchange rate vis-à-vis the
US á, monthly average,
monthly series
Greece September 1984-June Own cross-rate calculations Eurostat
1993 of spot exchange rates vis-à-
vis the DM based upon spot
exchange rate vis-à-vis the
US á, monthly average,
monthly series
Spain and Portugal Mazch 1986-June 1993 Own cross-rate calculations Eurostat
of spot exchange rates vis-à-
visthe DM based upon spot
exchange rate vis-à-vis the
US S, monthly average,
monthly series
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Appendix 2.B
Newey-West (1987) standard errors
The use of overlapping monthly observations of three-month holding period retums introduces
a moving-average term of order two to the residuals (Hansen and Hodrick, 1980). The standard
errors reported in Tables 2.4 and 2.5 have been adjusted for serial correlation as well as
heteroskedasticity. For example, in order to be able to apply t-tests in case of heteroskedasticity
and autocorrelation in the error term e~ in equation (6), the variance-covariance matrix of the
ordinary least squares estimator has to be defined as
SNewey-West
-(T-K) ~(~t-1 xtxt, ) 1~I~-k W~ ~~ I e,et, I X~Xt, 1(~~ 1 x,xr, )~ (1)
with Bartlett weights w! defined as
w, - 1 - k~ l ~1 (2)t
The Bartlett weights wi ensure that the middle part of equation (1) is positive definite in finite
samples. The middle part allows for autocorrelation up to lag length ~1~. The errors e, and e,-!
are correlated [E(e,e,-,)~0] if ~1~~3 and uncorrelated [E(e~e,.i)-0] if ~l~?3. Because the
autocorrelations are zero for lag lengths larger than three ~l~?3, we choose ~1~-3 as the
maximum lag length. The choice of ~l~ is a reflection of how far back in time one must go
to consider the autocorrelation negligible. The use of such a set of weights is clearly compatible
with the idea that the impact of the autocorrelations diminishes with ~l ~. With only a constant
term (30, x, is simply the unit vector and we have T-1 degrees of freedom (K-1). Standard errors
that are computed in this way are knows as Newey-West (1987) standard errors. Table 2.4 reports
Newey-West (1987) standard errors for ~io. Similarly, Table 2.5 reports Newey-West (1987)
standard errors for (3o and (i,.
We have not explicitly performed t-tests in Table 2.4. Though, it is relatively easy to perform
t-tests for both mean and mean absolute deviations applying Newey-West (1987) standard errors.
It can be shown that if the OLS standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroskedas-
ticity as proposed by Newey and West, all the usual results (t, F-tests etc.) would hold true
in large samples. For example, let (3) be the mean deviation
1 r.r
Y - T ~~.i Y~ (3)
with variance-covariance matrix as indicated in (1). Then, the t-statistic for the mean deviations
is defined as(see Krasker, 1980, pp. 270-271):
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,
t - ~ - ~l - y T t-tT.,-distribution
SNewey-West l Y' S Newey-Wes~
(4)
As indicated in footnote 22 of Popper (1993), the statistical significance of the mean absolute
deviations should be tested with a t-statistic that is modified slightly to reflect the use of absolute
values. For a standard random variable x, with a symmetric distribution and a mean of zero
(as under the null hypothesis here) the density of x- ~y ~ is twice that of x. The t-statistics are
given by dividing the mean absolute deviations by the sample standard deviations. The standard
probability values must be doubled.
The Price Approach to Financial Integration 57
Appendix 2.C
Figure 2.1 - Deviations from CIP, ex post UIP and ex post R1P of ten EC member states
relative to Germany ( in percentages per year)
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France - Germany
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Ireland - Germany
March 1979 - June 1993
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Netherlands - Germany
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Chapter 3
The Quantity Approach to Financial Integration:
The Feldstein-Horioka Criterion Revisited
3.1 Introduction
This chapter deals with the theoretical and empirical analysis of the extent of financial integration
in the European Union (EU). The measurement of financial integration relies on the Feldstein-
Horioka (hereafter F-H) criterion which originated in 1980 when Feldstein and Horioka asserted
that one could deduce from the national accounting framework the degree of financial integration.
By examining the correlation between national savings and domestic investment, F-H were
able to quantify the degree of financial integration. F-H hypothesize that changes in gross national
savings andlor gross domestic investment generate changes in the current account balance, thus
exploiting the definition that the current account is equal to national savings minus domestic
investment (see Appendix 3.A at the end of this chapter).' In a perfectly integrated financial
market, a current account deficit (surplus) will be balanced by a corresponding capital inflow
(outflow) and a country's savings decisions will be separated from its investment decisions.
It is this criterion for financial integration that we will address in this chapter. This chapter
develops additional evidence on the integration ofEuropean financial markets. Contrary to what
is usually found for world financial markets, savings-investment correlations in the EU are
relatively small. Although, the F-H criterion is controversial it may provide evidence of an
increasing degree of financial integration in the EU.
Chapter 3 is organized as follows. In Section 3.2 we repeat the three alternative criteria for
financial integration which were discussed in Chapter 2, i.e. covered, uncovered and real interest
parity. Subsequently, we establish a link between these interest parity conditions and the F-H
criterion. Section 3.3 further elaborates on the interpretation of the F-H criterion for financial
integration. We evaluate the F-H criterion for financial integration on the basis of its underlying
assumptions. Section 3.4 applies the F-H criterion for fmancial integration to three cross-sectional
samples of EU countries. In Section 3.5 we employ the concept of cointegration to ascertain
the existence of a long run equilibrium relationship between savings and investment ratios of
individual EU countries. We formulate an error-correction model of saving-investment correlations
to distinguish between short and long run saving-investment correlations. Finally, Section 3.6
concludes.
' Because any international transaction automatically gives rise to two offsetting entries in the balance of payments,
the current account balance and the capital account balance automaucally add up to zero.
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3.2 The Link Between Interest Parity Conditions and the Feldstein-Horioka Criterion
Following Dooley, Frankel and Mathieson (1987, pp. 505-506), we set out the link between
interest parity conditions and the F-H criterion. The F-H criterion is closely related to three
interest parity conditions that correspond to three different criteria for financial integration that
have been put forwazd in the literature. Table 3.1 summarizes algebraically the three different
interest parity conditions and the F-H criterion. In addition, Table 3.1 sets out the cumulative
assumptions to be fulfilled for each condition to hold. Note that the first three criteria in Table
3.1 rely on the co-movement of domestic and foreign prices and fit into the price approach.
Criterion N, however, relies on the co-movement ofdomestic quantities and fits into the quantity
approach (see Feldman, 1986).
The first criterion -- covered nominal interest rate parity (CIP) -- examines perfect capital
mobility of type I. If CIP holds the forward premium~discount [f~}k-s,] equals the difference
between the domestic and foreign nominal interest rate at the appropriate maturity [i~ i]`].
Investors cover themselves against exchange risk in the forwazd exchange market. The first
criterion can be framed in terms of the decomposition method of Frankel and MacArthur (1988).
Perfect capital mobility of type I requires a zero covered nominal interest differential or in other
words a zero country premium [i; it-(i~k-s~].
The second criterion -- ex ante uncovered nominal interest parity (UIP) -- examines perfect
capital mobility of type II. We replace the forward exchange rate by the expected spot exchange
rate [E~SLtk-fl}`]. The expected nominal exchange rate change [F,~s~,rs,] equals the nominal interest
differential at the appropriate maturity [it-i;`]. The second criterion can also be framed in terms
of the decomposition method of Frankel and MacArthur. Frankel and MacArthur decompose
the UIP differential in the following way: ir-i~-[F,~(s~~~ s~]-[i~i;`-(f~'ks~]f[(f;'r-s~-E,(sttr s~]~.
Perfect capital mobility of type II requires a zero country premium and a zero exchange risk
premium [(fl}~-s~-E,(s,trs~].
The third criterion -- ex ante real interest parity (RIP) -- examines perfect capital mobility
of type III or in other words perfect financial and non-financial capital mobility. Non-financial
capital mobility refers to the mobility of goods and services and the mobility of the production
factors labor and physical capital. Ex ante RIP holds if the domestic and foreign real interest
rate are equal [E~r,tk-E~r;,r]. Ex ante RIP not only requires a zero country premium and a zero
exchange risk premium but a zero expected real exchange rate change [E,(s,tr s~-
E,(p~t,~ p~ tF,~(p ~`~rp~`)] as well. This follows from the decomposition of the ex ante real interest
differential: ~(r~tk r~t~-[i~ i ~`.~f~(fi.r-~]t[(f~fe-s~-(~(~tr ~lt[~(s~trF,(P~.rP~f~(P"~r P~`)].
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Table 3.1 - Four criteria for perfect capital mobility and their cumulative assumptions'
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domestic nominal rate of interest at time t on a k-period bond held between time t and ttk
forward exchange rate at time t for the delivery of foreign currency at time ttk
spot exchange rate at time t(i.e. domestic currency units per unit of foreign currency)
domestic price level at time t
expected domestic real rate of interest at time t on a k-period bond held between time t and
tfk
conditional expectations operator based upon the information available at time t, i.e. E(. ~I,)
holding period of the underlying financial instrument
denotes a foreign variable
a stochastic error term that captures all other determinants of the investment ratio






' Table 3.1 is framed according to the terminology introduced by Frankel and MacArthur. All variables except
the interest rates are expressed in natural logarithms. Lower-case variables represen[ natural logarithms. For
example, the exact expression of CIP is: I''rIS,-(iti,,,k)I(lfi~`,,,~). We obtain the logazithmic approximation,
i.e. i,.,,ki~`,,,k-f,'~-s„ by taking natural logarithms of both sides and applying the approximation that In(ltx)-x
for small x where s,-ln(S,), f,'~-1n(1"'~), i,,,rln(lti,,,r) and i~„r ln(lti~„r).
' For convenience, we apply the cross-section specification of the F-H criterion.
Sources: Frankel and MacArthur (1988), Frankel (1989) and Lemmen and Eijffinger (1993).
The fourth criterion -- the Feldstein-Horioka (F-H) condition -- examines perfect capital mobility
of type IV. The F-H condition infers from a regression of the investment ratio [I;,,~1';,,tk] on
the savings ratio [S; ~~~IY; ~~k] the degree of capital mobility of type IV. The F-H criterion requires
two additional assumptions to the ex ante RIP condition and is therefore the strongest criterion
for financial integration. If it is true (1) that in each country i the investment rate depends linearly
on the expected domestic real interest rate, i.e.;
I~.~,k - -~E~(r~.~~k)`p~ (1)
and if it is true (2) that the stochastic error term ~t; that captures all other determinants of the
investment rate is uncorrelated with the savings ratio in that country;
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COV (lti' `Si t.k,Yi r.k) - O
and if (3) the savings ratio is not affected by the expected real foreign interest rate;
Cov (Etri,t.k,`Sl.t.k,Yi,t.k) - 0
and if (4) deviations from real interest parity are uncotrelated with the savings ratio;
(2)
(3)
Cov (Er(ri.r.k-ri~t.k),Si.t.k~Yi,t.k) - 0 (4)
then a regression of the investment ratio (I;,t,~lY;.ttk) on the savings ratio (S;,,t~lY;.,tk) must yield
a zero coefficient (i. Thus, the F-H criterion for perfect capital mobility of type IV requires
a zero coefficient R in the following equation:
li,t.k,Yi,t.k - a}r`Si,t.k,Yi,t.k}Ei,t.k (5)
Equation (5) specifies the F-H criterion for testing the degree of capital mobility of type IV.
Dooley et al. (1987) summarize these three covariances in the following equation ( see also Table
3.1):2
COV (I;,t.k,Yi,t.k' `Si,t.k, Yi,tak) -
COV (~ti' Si,tak,Yi.t.k) -
~ I..OV (Gtri,t.kr `~i.t.k,` i.t.k) -
~COV (Et(ri.t.k-ri,t.k)~si.t.klYi.t.k) -O (6)
Note that real interest parity is not required. If it is assumed as in our chapter, (4) is automatically
satisfied because the first variable in the covariance i.e. the real interest differential is
nonstochastic. This means that contrary to what is argued in the literature (e.g. Blundell-Wignall
and Browne, 1991) real interest parity is not a necessary condition for perfect capital mobility
of type IV, it merely is a sufficient condition for perfect capital mobility of type IV. Furthermore,
note that although the regression must yield a zero coefficient p if (1)-(4) hold, a zero coefficient
(3 can also be obtained if some terms cance] out.
Z The equation is based on the specification of the F-H criterion used with cross-section analysis. The equation
could equally well be specified in a time-series context.
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Using annual data of saving and investment ratios for 16 OECD countries averaged over the
period 1960-1974 and the subperiods 1960-1964, 1965-1969 and 1970-1974, F-H estimated
with Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) equation (5). F-H convert gross national savings (S;.,,r)
and gross domestic investment (I; ~tk) into relative form by dividing by GDP (Y; ~,r). F-H argued
that, under the null hypothesis of perfect financial integration, (~ should be zero for small
countries, whereas for large countries p should approximate the country's share of the world
capital stock. F-H obtained an estimated value of (3 of 0.887 (with a standard error of 0.074)
over the period 1960-1974 which is significantly different from zero and insignificantly different
from one at the 95qo level ofconfidence. Resulting, F-H concluded this Q value to be consistent
with a low degree of financial integration among OECD countries during that period.3 Also
their estimates for the subperiods were closely centered around this value. Furthermore, the
coefficient estimate is above the industrial-country benchmark value of 0.6. This finding was
robust to the inclusion of a quadratic term for the savings ratio, to the inclusion of the population
growth rate as an additional explanatory variable, to a linear specification for ~i that permitted
it to be a function of "openness" variables such as the share of trade in GDP or the size of the
economy, as well as to the use of instrumental variables for the savings ratio.
The findings ofF-H have been confirmed by many other researchers, using different samples
and different empirical estimation techniques. Bayoumi (1990), for example, examined saving-
investment correlations of ten OECD countries over the period 1965-1986, estimating p using
cross-sectional data for the full period as well as several subperiods. He also found high values
of (3, with no clear pattern over time, whether the estimates were conducted in levels or first
differences. The view that (3 has not fallen over time among industrial countries, however, has
proven to be somewhat less robust than the finding that the value of (3 has been relatively high
on average (Montiel, 1993, p. 14). Obstfeld (1986) found that ~i fell after 1973, contrary to
the results cited above. Obstfeld used time-series regressions based on quarterly observations
of changes in the savings and investment ratios for several OECD countries. These results are
consistent with those ofFeldstein and Bacchetta (1989) who found (3 declining from 0.914 (with
a standard error of 0.063) in the 1960s to 0.607 (with a standard error of 0.126) over the period
1980-1986 for a cross-section sample of 23 OECD countries. The most extreme evidence of
a decline in (3 was provided by Frankel (1989), though only for the United States. Using
cyclically-adjusted annual data and instrumental variable estimation, he found that, while the
coefficient (~ was 0.67 (with a standard error of 0.19) during 1930-1979, it became 0.15 (with
a standard enor of 0.27) during 1980-1986 which is statistically insignificantly different from
zero.
' Penati and Dooley (1983), however, show that the F-H findings aze not very stable. Results differ from one
estimation period to another and from one country to another.
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3.3 The Interpretation of Saving-Investment Correlations
The empirical and theoretical criticism that has been put forward against the F-H criterion is
strongly related to above covariances which represent the underlying assumptions of the F-H
criterion. We briefly analyze these covariances (see Dooley et al. (1987) and Tesar (1991) for
a further discussion of these issues). They capture possible explanations for observed capital
immobility.
With reference to the last covariance: Imperfect financial andlornonfinancial capital mobiliry,
which means Cov(E,(r;,tk r; ~,,J, S; ~t,fl;.,t J~O. It is very difficult to infer from the F-H results
something about the degree of capital mobility of type I, i.e. financial integration. The identifica-
tion problem of the F-H criterion with respect to financial integration either in cross-section
or in time-series analysis is a serious problem. Recall that ex ante RIP is a sufficient condition
for perfect capital mobility of type IV which means that the ex ante real interest differential
is zero: ~(r~.rr~}k)-[k-i ~`.~.~
(~tr-s
J]f[(t;}~-sJ-(~(~tr sJ]}[~(s~tr ~(P~trPJ}~(P ~`.r P~`)]-fl.
Ex ante RIP simply may not hold because ex ante purchasing power parity (PPP) is not valid
andlor because an exchange risk premium exists. Frankel (1986, 1989) has adopted the view
that F-H evidence reflects imperfect integration in goods and factor markets, rather than financial
markets. Frankel argues that domestic crowding out occurs via the domestic real interest rate.
Even in a world with perfect financial integration and rational exchange rate expectations there
can be sizable short run deviations among real interest rates across countries because of imperfect
substitutability in goods markets. If goods prices and wages are sticky, a fiscal expansion can
cause an increase in the domestic interest rate and a simultaneous overshoot in the exchange
value of the domestic currency. The expected depreciation back to the long run equilibrium
value of the currency then equates expected returns on domestic and foreign financial assets.
But the rise in the domestic interest rate causes crowding out of domestic spending. Frankel
therefore attributes the correlation of savings and investment rates to imperfections in goods
and factor markets, not to imperfections in financial markets.' An increase in institutional
restrictions on labor mobility, physical capital mobility or on trade in goods and services may
cause positive correlation between savings and investment ratios which may well go together
with increasing financial integration.
Sinn (1992, p. 1165) criticizes the cross-sectional estimation procedure of the F-H criterion.
Sinn argues: "Since saving and investment shares are approximately equal if averaged over
the adjustment period, a correlation coefficient calculated from average savings and investment
shares is likely to be higher than one that is not. It would erroneously signal a low degree of
' Frankel's argument can hold only for the short-to-medium run, since goods prices and wages aze flexible in the
long run.
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international capital mobility because ít ignores net capital flows that have occurred in reverse
directions during the period over which averages are taken." Even with perfect capital mobility
high positive cross-sectional correlation may arise when savings and investment ratios are
averaged over long periods of time, while low cross-sectional correlation may arise when savings
and investment ratios are averaged over short periods of time. That is, cross-sectional analysis
of savings and investment ratios averaged over long periods of time causes an upward bias
in the estimate for the coefficient (3. In addition, gross (two-way) financial and non-financial
capital mobility may well be higher then net financial and non-financial capital mobility (see
also Golub, 1990, p. 428). However, the F-H criterion only examines net financial and non-
iinancial capital mobility. Consequently, cross-sectional analysis of saving-investment correlations
using averages over long periods of time may underestimate the degree of financial integration.
Furthermore, saving and investment will be perfectly correlated in the long run due to
intertemporal budget constraints (Sachs, 1981). A country may run a current account deficit
for a short period of time but current account imbalances must accumulate to zero over a long
period of time unless the country defaults on its foreign debt (see Coakley, Kulasi and Smith,
1996, p. 621).
Wong (1990, pp. 61-62) comments on another deficiency of the cross-sectional estimation
of the F-H criterion. The cross-sectional correlation between savings and investment may be
rather sensitive to the inclusion c.q. exclusion of particular countries in the sample. Wong points
out that outliers may significantly bias the result when cross-sectional country averages are
calculated. Moreover, Wong shows that the existence of non-traded goods can lead to a short
run correlation between saving and investment even under perfect capital mobility of type III.
Finally, Feldstein and Bacchetta (1989, pp. 10-11) give an important interpretation of the
cross-sectional savings and investment correlations. The coefficient (3 not only refers to the
degree of capital mobility among (a group of) EU countries but also to the degree of capital
mobility among (a group of) EU countries and the rest of the world which ofcourse also include
countries like the United States and Japan. The same holds for the time-series interpretation
of correlations between savings and investment ratios of individual EU countries.
With reference to the second covariance: The foreign expected real interest rate is endogenous,
which means Cov(E,r; ~,~, 5;,,,,,Ii';,~,~~0. The second covariance says that savíngs and investment
ratios may be correlated even in the presence of perfect capital mobility of type III because
of the effect of country size. The first interpretation of the country-size argument is as follows.
Small countries take the world interest rate as given, while changes in savings and investment
behavior of large countries will have an impact on the world interest rate (Murphy, 1984).5
5 Lazge countries are countries with a large shaze of world output and likely have a lazge share in world's savings
and investmen[.
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Shocks to nationa] saving in large countries could thus affect world interest rates and through
them domestic investment. Murphy (1984), in par[icular, shows that the high value of (3 can
be attributed to the inclusion of three large countries in the sample (the United States, Japan
and the United Kingdom). When these are removed from the sample, the value of p falls to
approximately 0.6. The second interpretation of the country-size argument follows from Harberger
(1980). Harberger argues that in small less diversified countries savings and investment shocks
do not compensate each other. When a country becomes larger it also becomes more diversified
and the need to borrow from abroad in the event of a shock declines.b Differences between
savings and investment are therefore greater in small than in large countries. These greater
differences, however, do not mean that the degree of capital mobility of type IV is higher, or
saving-investment correlations are high even though type III capital mobility is perfect.
With reference to the first covariance: Savings are endogenous, which means Cov(p;, 5;,,~ fY;.,t,~
~0. Even with perfect capital mobility of type III savings ratios may be positively correlated
for reasons unrelated to capital mobility. This endogeneity of savings especially arises in time-
series analysis but may also arise in cross-section analysis. Dooley et al. (1987, p. 508) argue:
"Any economic variable, in addition to the cost of capital that influences the investment rate,
will probably be correlated with the national saving rate." Essentially, the savings ratio may
be correlated with the stochastic error term p; that captures all other determinants of the
investment rate - other than the ex ante real interest rate of that country. Furthermore, investment
may also be endogenous. Although it takes time to adjust investment in equipment ( fixed capital
formation), investment in inventory can be changed quickly. In time-series, the correlation could
arise because both UY and SIY are functions of the state of the business cycle -- i.e. of a third
variable. In particular, both UY and S~Y are known to be procyclical. UY and SIY may be
correlated even if RIP holds, because they are both endogenous variables which respond to
movements in common factors. Tesar (1988) argues that capital is in fact mobile, but that shocks
to the productivity of domestic capital and labor in a country affect both desired savings and
desired investment in the same way, leading to a positive correlation between saving and
investment. Moreover, other real shocks such as shocks to the prices of imported means of
production, or to world real interest rates (see the previous argument) may move savings and
investment in the same direction. Similarly, Obstfeld ( 1986) argues that income and population
growth may simultaneously affect saving and investment.
Not only private sector behavior but also public sector behavior may cause savings and
investment to be positively correlated. Artis and Bayoumi (1991, p. 301) note that common
cause variations in savings and investment of the private and public sector ( positively correlated
shocks) will suffice to induce a high correlation between total savings and investment. For
6 Montiel (1993) finds lower p coefficients in samples of developing countries.
72 The Quantity Approach to Financial Integration
example, the government may use its policy instruments to balance savings and investment
of the private sector in the light of iu current account target. The government -- which aims
at long-term current account balance -- may react to an incipient current account deficit arising
from growing investment relative to saving by raising [axes or lowering their spending (Fieleke,
1982, Westphal, 1983 and Summers, 1988). Taking national saving as the sum of private and
public saving, this makes national saving endogenous through its public component.
Gordon and Bovenberg (1994) argue that asymmetric information between investors in
different countries provides the most plausible explanation for saving-investment to be correlated.
Foreign investors are at a handicap relative to domestic investors due to their poorer knowledge
ofdomestic markets. As a result, they are likely to be less successful when setting up new firms,
and they are vulnerable to being overcharged if they acquire existing domestic fitms.
An econometric solution to the endogeneity problem of savings is offered by the use of
instrumental variables. Instrumental variable estimation requires an instrumental variable that
is highly correlated with the savings ratio (S;,~t~lY;.~,k) and uncorrelated with the error term (e;~t~.
However, these 2SLS-estimates of the coefficient ~i do not particularly differ from OLS-estimates
(Feldstein and Horioka, 1980, p. 312 and Dooley et al., 1987, p. 518). In Section 3.4, however,
we will introduce the concept of cointegration to cope with the simultaneity problem.
To summarize, the use of saving-investment correlations to draw inference about the degree
of financial integration is problematic, because there are at least three ways that saving and
investment could be correlated even if financial markets are well integrated, in the sense that
CIP or UIP hold exactly. The interpretation of the F-H criterion heavily depends on three
covariances which must be zero before no correlation between savings and investment ratios
would be expected. Therefore, the interpretation of the F-H criterion must be done with caution.
3.4 The Feldstein-Horioka Criterion and Cross-Section Analysis
In spite of the interpretation problems posed by saving-investment correlations as indicator of
the degree of financial integration, it is useful to examine what information such correlations
can provide about financial integration in the EU. The coefficient p at least represents a direct
and simple measure of the degree of capital mobility. The annual data employed in this section
are taken from the OECD (1995b), National Accounts of OECD countries, Main Aggregates
1960-1993, Vol. I. A nonzero statistical discrepancy is split equally between savings and
investment (see Appendix 3.A). The sample period 1960-1993 is divided into two subperiods:
1960-1978 and 1979-1993.' The division reflects the formation of the European Monetary System
' Although the focus of our study is on the decade of the eighties, restricting the sample period to this decade
would have left too few degrees of freedom in regressions based on annual data. Moreover, currency convertibility
with respect to the current account was restored in December 1958.
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(EMS) and the establishment of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) in 1979. Ratios of savings
and investment to GDP for individual EU countries are averaged over time in order to avoid
bias caused by the correlation of savings and investment over the business cycle.
Figure 3.1 plots average savings and investment ratios over the subperiods 1960-1978 and
1979-1993 for EU countries (excluding Luxemburg) similar to Murphy (1984, p. 334) and Tesar
(1991, p. 61).
Figure 3.1 - Average gross national savings versus gross domestic investment ratios over
the periods 1960-1978 and 1979-1993 of EU countries (excluding Luxemburg)
1960 - 1978
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Source: OECD (1995b), National Accounts of OECD counvies, Main Aggregates 1960-1993, Vol. I.
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The interpretation of Figure 3.1 runs as follows. An observation on the 45o-line indicates that
the country's current account is balanced i.e. the country's domestic investment equals its supply
of national savings. An observation above the 45o-line reflects a current account deficit i.e.
the country's domestic investment exceeds its supply of national savings and the country is
a net borrower in the international capital market (Tesar, 1991, p. 61). An observation below
the 45o-line reflects a current account surplus. National savings exceed domestic investment.
The country must have a corresponding capital account deficit (i.e. a capital outflow). The capital
account is simply the inverse of the current account.
The F-H criterion for testing the degree of financial integration in the EU with cross-section
data can be specified as follows:
I~ ~,kl Y~.~,k - at psi,I~klyi,t~k}Ei,t~k (~)
where e; stands for the error term and i stands for the country index. F-H convert gross national
savings (S;,~r) and gross domestic investment (I;,,k) into relative form by dividing by GDP
(Y;,,,k).g The coefficient (3 is called the "savings retention coefficient" and indicates the proportion
of the incremental savings that is invested domestically (Feldstein and Bacchetta, 1989, p. 10).
When financial markets are not integrated the current account is forced to balance and the
coefficient (i should be unity. With perfect capital mobility of type IV a zero value of ~i is
predicted.
We distinguish between three cross-sectional samples of European countries. The first sample
consists of thirteen EU member states excluding Greece and Luxemburg (EU-13). The scatter
plots in Figure 3.1 show that Greece and Luxemburg may have an "oudier" effect on the results.
Luxemburg even lies out of the range of the graph. Furthermore, Greek saving-investment
correlations are less comparable with saving-investment cocrelations of other EU countries.
Greece is the only EU member state which national accounting definitions of savings and
investment are based on the earlier S.N.A.-definitions (see Appendix 3.A). Greece almost certainly
has less claim to be included among the EU-13 countries than either Spain or Portugal. The
second sample includes all EU countries except Austria, Finland, Greece, Luxemburg and Sweden
(EC-10). The third sample consists of the core ERM countries who entered the European
Community (EC) in 19~9 with a small fluctuation margin oft 2.25q~, Belgium, Denmark, France,
Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands (ERM-6). We estimate the standard cross-section
specification of the F-H criterion in level form for three cross-sections of EU countries with
OLS. The results are summarized in Table 3.2.
8 We examine gross saving and investment ratios, rather than net savings and investment ratios, because the
depreciation data used to calculate the net savings and investment ratios are very unreliable.
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Table 3.2 - The F-H criterion and cross-section analysis (EU-13, EC-10 and ERM-6)
( OL.S estimation of I~ ~.k~Y~.~.k - oct(3S~ ~.k~Y~ ~.kte~.~.k )
EU-13 6t Q RZ
1960-1993 0.06 (0.03) 0.75 (0.15)" 0.70
1960-1978 0.07 (0.03) 0.74 (0.12)" 0.76
1979-1993 0.05 (0.04) 0.82 (0.18)" 0.66
EC-10 á a RZ
1960-1993 0.08 (0.04) 0.68 (0.18)" 0.63
1960-1978 0.08 (0.03) 0.67 (0.14)' 0.74
]979-1993 0.05 (0.05) 0.79 (0.23)" 0.59
ERM-6 6t p RZ
1960-1993 0.16 (0.03) 0.30 (0.14)' 0.55
1960-1978 0.15 (0.03) 0.40 (0.13)r 0.69
1979-1993 0.15 (0.04) 0.27 (0.21)' 0.29
' Indicates that the coefficient (3 is insignificantly different from zero and significantly different from one at
the 95qo level of confidence (two-tailed test).
" Indicates that the coefficient ~i is significantly different from zero and insignificantly different from one at
the 95oIo level of confidence (two-tailed test).
? Indicates that the coefficient ~3 is imprecisely estimated and differs significantly from zero and significantly
from one at the 95010 level of confidence (two-tailed test).
Standard errors are shown in parentheses. RZ is the coefficient of determination.
Source: OECD (1995b), National Accounts of OECD Countries, Main Aggregates 1960-1993, Vol. I.
The results for the EU-13 and EC-10 countries in Table 3.2 show a rise in the estimated value
of ~i in the period 1979-1993 relative to the period 1960-1978 indicating a declining degree
of capital mobility of type IV. The results for the ERM-6 countries show a decline in the
estimated value of (3 in the period 1979-1993 relative to the period 1960-1978 indicating an
increasing degree of capital mobility of type IV.
Following Feldstein and Horioka (1980) and Feldstein ( 1983), we simultaneously test the
null hypothesis Ho R-0 against the alternative hypothesis H, ~0 and the null hypothesis Ho
(3-1 against the alternative hypothesis H, p~l at the 5~70 level of significance. The results for
the EU-13 show that the coefficient (3 is significantly different from zero and insignificantly
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different from one over the three periods 1960-1993, 1960-1978 and 1979-1993. The resulu
for the EC-10 are comparable to the results for the EU-13. However, the coefficient ~i is
imprecisely estimated over the period 1960-1978. The results for the ERM-6 show that the
coefficient (i is insignificantly different from zero and significantly different from one over
the period 1960-1993 and the subperiod 1979-1993. Accordingly, for the ERM-6 countries the
assumption of perfect capital mobility of type N cannot be rejected over the period 1960-1993
and subperiod 1979-1993. This result is also illustrated in Figure 3.1 by the greater dispersion
of the ERM-6 points around the 45o-line in the subperiod 1979-1993 relative to the subperiod
1960-1978. The ERM-6 estimates for (~ are smaller than the EC-10 and EU-13 estimates. We
may conclude that capital mobility of type IV between ERM-6 countries is higher than between
EC-10 and EU-13 countries. It seems that the ERM-6 countries are already substantially
integrated. This may be accounted for by the lack of currency risk and by the strong
interdependence of their economies.
As was explained in Section 3.2 the results obtained from F-H regressions are hard to
interpret.9 The results for the EC-10 and EU-13 show a rise in the estimated value of ~3 in the
period 1979-1993 relative to the period 1960-1978, indicating a decreasing degree of capital
mobility of type IV. This increase of savings-investment correlations for the EC-10 and EU-13
countries over the period 1979-1993 relative to the period 1960-1978 bears no relation with
the expected increase of integration between European financial markets after 1979. The apparent
higher correlation in the period 1979-1993 relative to 1960-1978 for the EC-10 and EU-13 may
be explained by emerging investment opportunities in Europe after the formation of the EMS
in 1979 (Obstfeld, 1989, p. 151). The formation of the EMS in 1979 and the subsequent
preparation for the Economic and Monetary Union (EMU), may have caused a pattern of
investment increases only partly financed by foreign savings. Santillán (1991, p. 33) argues:
"Efforts to stimulate savings and enhance its allocation across countries are at the heart of the
process towards Economic and Monetary Union." The higher values in the latter period simply
may be the fact that within the EC-10 and EU-13 countries, markets became so integrated that
there was little need for capital flows to and from the rest of the world (Leachman, 1991, p.
159).
Although savings-investment correlations are difficult to interpret, the lower cross-sectional
savings-investment correlation for the ERM-6 countries do challenge the view what was usually
found for world financial markets. Results obtained by Bhandari and Mayer (1990) have
conf'irmed the higher degree ofcapital mobility among EMS countries than among other industtial
countries. ERM-6 savings-investment correlations are sufficiently far from the value of unity
to conclude that financial markets are not closed.
9 To accept the null hypothesis of perfect capital mobility of type IV (I-!o ~-0), we require all three covaziances
set out in Section 3.2 to be zero or at least to cancel out.
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Finally, the cross-sectional p coefficients simply reflect capital mobility between a sample of
countries taken as a unit to and from the rest of the world, not capital mobility between individual
EC countries (Leachman, 1991, p. 158). A high statistical correlation between savings and
investment ratios based upon a sample of EU countries does not necessarily indicate a low degree
of capital mobility of type IV for each individual EU country. In fact, cross-section analysis
assumes the same degree of capital mobility for each individual country in the sample. Therefore,
the next section turns to time-series analysis of savings-investment correlations of individual
EU countries.
3.5 The Feldstein-Horioka Criterion and Time-Series Analysis
In the previous section we performed cross-section analysis for three samples of EU countties
to eliminate the procyclical nature of saving and investment even when expressed as a fraction
of GDP. However, we argued that the long run correlation between saving and investment may
be a less relevant indicator for the degree of capital mobility. Regressions between variables
that are averaged over many years measure the long run correlation between saving and invest-
ment. First, this section performs time-series analysis with the help of cointegration tests.
Cointegration in the context of the F-H criterion deals with the long run relationship between
savings and investment ratios. Two variables are said to be cointegrated if both are non-stationary
but there exists a linear combination of the variables that is stationary (see Engle and Granger,
1987, p. 253). Subsequently, if the two variables are cointegrated, we may specify an error-
correction model (ECM) to distinguish between the short and long run relationships between
saving and investment.
Before turning to the time-series analysis of saving-investment correlations Figure 3.2 in
Appendix 3.B shows the time-series behavior of saving and investment as percentage of GDP
over the period 1960-1993. Since we know that the difference between saving and investment
need to be equal to balance the current account, Figure 3.2 also presents the behavior of the
current account as percentage ofGDP. The current account may also shed light on the correlation
between saving and investment.'o It is apparent that for some countries the current account
has fluctuated considerably in the 1970s and 1980s. The savings and investment ratios of EU
countries typically display a sharp downfall after 1973, and a rise at the end of the eighties."
The application of cointegration requires savings and investment ratios to be non-stationary
(Engle and Granger, 1987). The original test for unit roots in economic times series was
'~ Tests of cointegration between saving and investment effectively look at the time-series properties of the current
account.
" Dean, Durand, Fallon and Hceller (1990) give a detailed description of these trends.
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developed by Fuller (1976) and Dickey and Fuller (1979). We have performed Augmented
Dickey-Fuller ( ADF) tests. A regression model is used to test for a unit root in Z~,r,;-(htk,fT~~r;,
S~tr.fY~.~):
OZ~~k.i - a} r t}~Zt.k-I.i }~~~~ ~~ OZ„k-l.i }~t.k.i `g)
where a is a constant term, t is a trend term and ~tk; is a white noise enor term. The null
hypothesis of a unit root (Ho: n-0) is tested using the ADF test. For non-stationarity of I,~r,fY„k,;
respectively S,tr.fY,,k; to be rejected, coefficient n has to be significantly negative. A constant
has been included since both I„~,fY„r; and S„k,fY,tr.; have a nonzero mean. Following De Haan
and Siermann (1994, p. 7), we first apply the ADF test with a trend term included. If the
coefficient of the trend term does not differ significantly from zero, we apply the ADF test
without a trend variable. Furthermore, we include the minimum number of lags necessary to
ensure that the residuals p,tk.; are white noise, since the power of the test reduces when more
lagged differences of the dependent variable are included (see Kremers, Ericsson and Dolado,
1992 and McCallum, 1993). Possible serial correlation of l.i„~; in the regression models is
corrected for up to eighth-order lags. Recently, MacKinnon (1991) has tabulated Dickey-Fuller
critical values for any sample size, with a constant andlor a time trend included. We apply
MacKinnon critical values in our unit root tests.
We are aware of the fact that drawing reliable inference from the outcome of the ADF-test
may be problematic due to the limited number of observations when annual data are used. OECD
(1995c) quarterly data of saving and investment ratios are only available for France, West
Germany and the United Kingdom from 1970 onwards. The problem is partly overcome due
to the relatively long 34 (1960-1993), 19 (1960-1978) and 15 (1979-1993) year spans of annual
data and 25 (1970Q1-1994Q4), 9(1970Q1-1978Q4) of 16 (1979Q1-1994Q4) year spans of
quarterly data we examine. Hakkio and Rush (1990) argue that what is relevant for determining
long run relationships is the length of the time-series spanning.
Table 3.3 reports the outcomes of the ADF-tests for fifteen EU countries when annual data
are used and for three EU countries when quarterly data are used. With respect to the annual
data, only for Belgium (1960-1978), Germany (1960-1993), Ireland (1960-1978), Portugal (1960-
1993) and the United Kingdom (1960-1993) the null hypothesis of non-stationarity of one or
both series was rejected at the 95~7o andlor 99qo level of confidence. Similarly, with respect
to the quarterly data, only for Germany (1970Q1-1994Q4) non-stationarity of the investment
series was rejected at the 95~Io and 99qo level of confidence.
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Table 3.3 - The F-H criterion and time-series analysis: Testing for a unit root in I,4k,,lY,tk~
and S;tk,fl',4k~
Country Variable 1960-1993 1960-1978 1979-1993
Austria l„r;lY„r; ADF(c,0)--1.94 (-2.95) ADF(c,0)--2.27 (-3.05) ADF(c,l)--2.09 (-3.08)
S„k;lY„~; ADF(c,0)--1.31 (-2.95) ADF(c,0)--].22 (-3.05) ADF(c,0)--1.49 (-3.08)
Belgium I„r;lY„r; ADF(t,0)--2.58 (-3.55) ADF(c,0)--3.17 (-3.05)' ADF(c,0)--1.78 (-3.08)
S„k;lY„r; ADF(c,0)--1.24 (-2.95) ADF(c,0)--1.76 (-3.05) ADF(t,0)--2.85 (-3.76)
Denmark I„r;lY„r; ADF(t,0)--2.72 (-3.55) ADF(c,0)--2.74 (-3.05) ADF(c,0)--1.24 (-3,08)
S„r;lY„r; ADF(c,l)--1.40 (-2.96) ADF(t,l)--3.22 (-3.71) ADF(t,0)--3.54 (-3.76)
Finland I„r;lY„r; ADF(t,l)--3.55 (-3.56) ADF(c,l)--2.77 (-3.05) ADF(c,0)--0.43 (-3.08)
S„r;lY„r; ADF(t,l)--2.53 (-3.56) ADF(c,0)--2.08 (-3.05) ADF(t,l)--3.37 (-3.76)
France I„r;lY„r; ADF(t,0)--2.27 (-3.55) ADF(c,0)--2.41 (-3.05) ADF(c,0)--0.76 (-3.08)
S„r;~Y„r; ADF(t,l)--2.65 (-3.56) ADF(c,0)--1.44 (-3.05) ADF(c,l)--2.56 (-3.08)
Germany I„t;lY„r; ADF(t,l)--3.88 (-3.56)' ADF(c,0)--1.02 (-3.05) ADF(c,l)--2.76 (-3.08)
S„r;lY„r; ADF(c,0)--1.48 (-2.95) ADF(c,0)--1.08 (-3.05) ADF(c,0)--1.03 (-3.08)
Greece I„~;IY„r; ADF(c,0)--1.83 (-2.95) ADF(c,0)--2.04 (-3.05) ADF(c,0)--1.54 (-3.08)
S„r;lY„k; ADF(c,0)--1.47 (-2.95) ADF(c,0)--1.55 (-3.05) ADF(c,0)-1.56 (-3.08)
Ireland [„r;lY„r; ADF(c,0)--1.63 (-2.95) ADF(t,0)--3.40 (-3.71) ADF(c,0)--0.74 (-3.08)
S„~;IY„~; ADF(c,0)--2.55 (-2.95) ADF(t,0)--4.75 (-3.71)" ADF(t,0)--3.25 (-3.76)
Italy I„r,~1'„r; ADF(t,0)--3.10 (-3.55) ADF(c,0)--2.87 (-3.05) ADF(t,])--3.16 (-3.76)
S„r;~Y„r; ADF(t,0)--2.47 (-3.55) ADF(c,0)--2.94 (-3.05) ADF(t,0)--2.14 (-3.76)
Luxemburg I„r;lY„r; ADF(c,0)-2.10 (-2.95) ADF(t,0)--1.88 (-3.71) ADF(c,0)--0.84 (-3.08)
S„~;tl'„r; ADF(c,0)--1.12 (-2.95) ADF(c,0)--1.44 (-3.05) ADF(c,0)--1.77 (-3.08)
Netherlands I„r;lY„r; ADF(c,0)--1.29 (-2.95) ADF(c,0)--1.14 (-3.05) ADF(c,0)--1.69 (-3.08)
S„~;IY„k; ADF(c,0)--2.19 (-2.95) ADF(c,0)--0.70 (-3.05) ADF(c,0)--1.32 (-3.08)
Portugal I„~;IY„k; ADF(c,l)--3.48 (-2.96)' ADF(c,0)--2.34 (-3.05) ADF(c,l)--2.98 (-3.08)
S„r;lY„k; ADF(c,l)--4.37 (-2.96)" ADF(c,l)--3.04 (-3.05) ADF(c,l)--3.05 (-3.08)
Spain I„r;~Y„r; ADF(t,l)--2.91 (-3.56) ADF(c,0)--2.01 (-3.05) ADF(c,l)--2.38 (-3.08)
S„Y;IY,,,,; ADF(t,0)--2.46 (-3.55) ADF(t,0)--].28 (-3.71) ADF(c,l)--2.83 (-3.08)
Sweden I„r;lY„r; ADF(t,l)--3.53 (-3.56) ADF(t,])--2.80 (-3.71) ADF(c,0)--0.98 (-3.08)
S„k;~Y„r; ADF(t,l)--2.65 (-3.56) ADF(c,0)- 0.38 (-3.05) ADF(c,l)--2.02 (-3.08)
United I„r;lY„k; ADF(c,l)--3.19 (-2.96)' ADF(c,Oj--2.91 (-3.05) ADF(c,l)--2.86 (-3.08)
Kingdom S„r;lY„r; ADF(t,0)--2.11 (-3.55) ADF(c,0)--1.99 (-3.05) ADF(c,0)--0.33 (-3.08)
Country Variable 1970Q1-1994Q4 1970Q1-1978Q4 1979Q1-1994Q4
France I„r;lY„r; ADF(t,l)--2.73 (-3.46) ADF(t,l)--3.51 (-3.55) ADF(c,0)--1.50 (-2.91)
S„k;lY„r; ADF(t,0)--1.84 (-3.46) ADF(t,0)--2.04 (-3.55) ADF(c,0)--2.44 (-2.91)
Germany I„r;lY„r; ADF(c,4)--2.92 (-2.89)' ADF(c,4)--1.59 (-2.96) ADF(c,4)--2.72 (-2.91)
S„k;lY„r; ADF(c,4)--2.53 (-2.89) ADF(t,4)--2.91 (-3.56) ADF(c,4)--1.92 (-2.91)
United I„r;~l'„k; ADF(t,l)--2.72 (-3.46) ADF(c,l)--1.94 (-2.95) ADF(c,0)--1.82 (-2.91)
Kingdom S„k;lY„r; ADF(c,4)--1.90 (-2.89) ADF(c,0)--2.66 (-2.95) ADF(t,0)--3.38 (-3.48)
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' The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 953'0 level of confidence (one-tailed test).
" The null hypothesis of a unit root is rejected at the 99qr, level of confidence (one-tailed test).
ADF stands for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with the specification of the test equation between brackets
(c estimated with constant term or t estimated with constant and trend term). In addition, the number of lagged
differences of the dependent variable is also indicated between brackets.
MacKinnon critical values at the 95qo level of confidence are shown in brackets.
Sources: OECD (1995b), National Accounts of OECD Countries, Main Aggregates 1960-1993, Vol. I and OECD
(1995c), Quarterly National Accounts, No. 1.
Concluding, interpreting the rejection of non-stationarity as a small sample problem, we safely
may conclude from Table 3.3 that in general saving and investment ratios are non-stationary.
If they are, and they are not cointegrated, then a regression in levels may lead to spurious cor-
relation (Granger and Newbold, 1974). This may provide an alternative interpretation for the
high correlations between saving and investment. If both savings and investment ratios possess
a unit root, first dífferencing would make them stationary and regressions based on first
differences would not exhibit the spurious correlation problem. Therefore cointegration tests
are needed.
Cointegration between savings and investment raáos implies the existence of an ECM or,
in other words, a long run equilibrium relationship (see Engle and Granger, 1987). This ECM
corresponds with the theoretical prediction that in the long run saving and investment need
to move together to balance the current account. Theoretical considerations suggest that in the
long run saving and investment should cointegrate with a unit coefficient, irrespective of the
degree of capital mobility. The reason is that the current account provides the resources with
which a country repays its external creditors (Sachs, 1981). Solvency thus imposes a consuaint
which prevents deviations between national saving and domestic investment from becoming
permanent. Since gaps between saving and investment must eventually be reversed for the country
to remain solvent, we expect these series to be cointegrated. The current account or the capital
account are expected to balance over long periods of time. Consequently, in the long run savings
and investment ratios necessarily have to move together, that is, we have cointegration of saving
and investment. The cointegrating regression equation is specified as follows:
,t.k,i,Yt.k,i - a}~`~Hk,ilYt.k.i}EHk,i (9)
This equation (9) is simply the specification of the F-H criterion with time-series analysis. Table
3.4 summarizes the estimation results for the cointegrating regression. The coefficient p basically
represents the long run saving-investment correlation and therefore it indicates long-run capital
mobility. Table 3.4 shows that the long run saving-investment correlation diffecs substantially
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among EU countries and over time. It is particularly interesting to compare OLS estimates of
(3 in the subperiods before and after the formation of the EMS in 1979. Clearly, the magnitude
of the coefficient (~ declined over the period 1979-1993 as opposed to the period 1960-1978
in all EU countries with the exception of Austria, France, Luxemburg and Sweden (annual data)
and France (quarterly data). The empirical results seem consistent with an increasing degree
of long run capital mobility of type IV in the 1980s.
Table 3.4 - The F-H criterion and time-series analysis: The cointegrating regression
( OLS estimation of I~.t.~tY,.k.~ - ot'RS~.k.~~Y~.t ~te~.k.~ )
Country Period 6c (i DW R2
Austria 1960-1993 0.03 (0.02) 0.9] (0.08)" 1.09 0.79
1960-1978 0.09 (0.04) 0.68 (0.13)t 1.49 0.63
1979-1993 -0.05 (0.06) 1.23 (0.25)" 1.24 0.66
Belgium 1960-1993 0.07 (0.02) 0.67 (0.08): 0.41 0.69
1960-1978' O.10 (0.02) 0.53 (0.09)x 1.24 0.66
1979-1993 0.11 (0.03) 0.38 (0.18): 0.45 0.26
Denmark 1960-1993 0.04 (0.02) 0.90 (0.09)" 0.56 0.74
1960-1978 0.10 (0.03) 0.63 (0.12)' 2.72 0.59
1979-1993 0.16 (0.05) 0.08 (0.33)' 0.57 0.004
Finland 1960-1993 0.04 (0.02) 0.92 (0.09)" 0.92 0.76
1960-1978 -0.05 (0.06) 1.26 (0.25)" 0.96 0.61
1979-1993 0.05 (0.02) 0.86 (0.11)" 0.95 0.83
France 1960-1993 0.03 (0.01) 0.86 (0.05)" 1.21 0.91
1960-1978 0.003 (0.05) 0.96 (0.18)" 1.40 0.63
1979-1993 0.01 (0.03) 0.98 (0.13)" ].Ol 0.82
Germany 1960-1993' - 0.01 (0.02) 1.00 (0.10)" 0.50 0.75
1960-1978 -0.03 (0.02) 1.09 (0.09)" 1.13 0.89
1979-1993 0.18 (0.05) 0.13 (0.22)' 0.58 0.02
Greece 1960-1993 0.08 (0.01) 0.78 (0.05)t 1.45 0.89
1960-1978 0.04 (0.02) 0.96 (0.07)" 1.56 0.91
1979-1993 0.10 (0.01) 0.65 (0.07)t 1.69 0.87
Ireland 1960-1993 0.23 (0.06) -0.08 (0.34)' 0.33 0.002
1960-1978" 0.01 ( 0.09) 1.16 (0.46): 1.56 0.27
1979-1993 0.38 ( 0.09) -0.99 (0.55)' 0.54 0.20
Italy 1960-1993 0.05 (0.02) 0.80 ( 0.07): 1.24 0.80
1960-1978 0.02 ( 0.06) 0.91 (0.22)" 1.09 0.51
1979-1993 0.03 ( 0.03) 0.88 ( 0.14)" 1.60 0.76
Luxemburg 1960-1993 0.22 ( 0.03) -0.02 ( 0.08)' 0.53 0.002
1960-1978 0.25 ( 0.09) -0.09 ( 0.27)' 0.58 0.01
1979-1993 0.18 (0.07) 0.08 (0.15)' 0.48 0.02
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Netherlands 1960-]993 -0.02 (0.03) 1.0] (0.13)" 0.46 0.66
1960-1978 0.03 (0.05) 0.84 (0.18)" 0.62 0.57
1979-1993 0.13 (0.04) 0.34 (0.19)' 0.71 0.19
Portugal 1960-1993a6 0.20 (0.03) 0.33 (0.12)r 0.65 0.19
1960-1978 0.18 (0.02) 0.35 (0.10)' l.ll 0.44
1979-1993 0.26 (0.10) 0.12 (0.40)~ 0.49 0.01
Spain 1960-1993 0.06 (0.03) 0.79 (0.13)" 0.62 0.54
1960-1978 0.11 (0.08) 0.59 (0.30)' 0.65 0.18
1979-1993 0.11 (0.08) 0.53 (0.40)' 0.57 0.12
Sweden 1960-1993 0.06 (0.01) 0.77 (0.05); 1.39 0.87
1960-1978 0.04 (0.03) 0.82 (O.ll)" 1.34 0.75
1979-1993 0.04 (0.03) 0.86 (0.17)" 1.32 0.67
United 1960-1993' 0.11 (0.02) 0.42 (0.13)i 0.67 0.24
Kingdom 1960-1978 0.12 (0.03) 0.39 (0.19)' 1.27 0.21
1979-1993 0.15 (0.04) 0.15 (0.27)' 0.59 0.02
Country Period á Q DW RZ
France 1970Q1-1994Q4 0.02 (0.007) 0.92 (0.03)t 0.44 0.90
1970Q1-1978Q4 0.02 (0.03) 0.92 (0.1])" 0.53 0.67
1979Q1-1994Q4 -0.02 (0.02) 1.02 (0.07)" 0.42 0.80
Germany 1970Q1-1994Q4" 0.13 (0.006) 0.80 (0.05)t 1.22 0.69
1970Q1-1978Q4 0.10 (0.008) 1.01 (0.06)" 1.53 0.90
1979Q1-1994Q4 0.15 (0.01) 0.61 (0.11)t 1.32 0.34
United 1970Q1-1994Q4 0.02 (0.01) 0.96 (0.07)" 0.29 0.63
Kingdom 1970Q]-1978Q4 0.07 (0.05) 0.78 (0.24)" 0.28 0.23
1979Q1-1994Q4 0.05 (0.02) 0.77 (0.09)i 0.23 0.52
Indicates that the coefficient R is insignificantly different from zero and significantly different from one at
the 95010 level of confidence (two-tailed test).
Indicates that the coefficient R is significantly different from zero and insignificantly different from one at
the 95qo level of confidence (two-tailed test).
Indicates that the coefficient p is imprecisely estimated and differs insignificantly from zero and insignificantly
from one at the 95~10 level of confidence (two-tailed test).
Indicates that the coefficient ~3 is imprecisely estimated and differs significantly from zero and significantly
from one at the 95010 level of confidence (two-tailed test).
Note that in Table 3.3 the null hypothesis of a unit root in I„r;lY„~; was rejected at the 9590 level of confidence.





Standard errors are shown in parentheses. DW is the Durbin-Watson statistic for first-order serial correlation and
R2 is the coefficient of determination.
Next, we consider two common tests for cointegration. The first test is the Engle-Granger
cointegration test. Engle and Granger (1987) proposed the following two-step procedure to test
for cointegration between saving-investment. First, one has to test for unit roots in the saving
and investment ratios and estimate coefficient (i in the cointegrating regression as specified
in equation (9). Subsequently, one has to test for of a unit root in the OLS residuals (E„r.,) of
the cointegrating regression. The test regression is fitted without an intercept since the residuals
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have zero mean. Again, the null hypothesis of a unit root in the residuals (i.e. no cointegration)
is rejected if the value of the ADF test exceeds its Sqo critical value. Second, if the null
hypothesis of a unit root in ~ttk.; is rejected, than we may specify an ECM where the error-
correction term is replaced by ~„k-,,;. The second test is the Johansen (1988) cointegration test.
Although the Johansen cointegration test is a multivariate test, it is also possible to apply it
to the two-dimensional case to discover a unique cointegrating vector (r) which may exist between
savings and investment ratios. If the null hypothesis of Ho r-0 is rejected and the alternative
hypothesis H, r-1 is accepted, we have cointegration.12 Further details are available in Johansen
(1988, 1991) and Johansen and Juselius (1990). Table 3.5 reports the results for the Engle-
Granger and the Johansen cointegration tests.
Table 3.5 - The F-N criterion and time-series analysis: Testing for cointegration between
It~k,~ttk~ and Sttk~tfk,l
Country Period Engle-Granger Johansen cointegration Johansen cointegration
cointegration test test I: Ho r-0, H,-1 test IL Ho r-0, H,-1
Austria 1960-1993 ADF(n,0)--3.54 (-3.53) 11.98 (15.67) 14.05 (19.96)
1960-1978 ADF(n,0)--3.20 (-3.70) 9.24 (15.67) ]1.24 (19.96)
1979-1993 ADF(n,0)--2.45 (-3.81) 6.33 (15.67) 9.45 (19.96)
Belgium 1960-1993 ADF(n,0)--1.17 (-3.53) 9.25 (15.67) 12.57 (19.96)
1960-1978' ADF(n,0)--3.22 (-3.70) 12.40 (15.67) 14.61 (19.96)
]979-1993 ADF(n,0)--1.82 (-3.81) 14.48 (15.67) 17.72 (19.96)
Denmark 1960-1993 ADF(n,0)- 1.33 (-3.53) 3.78 (15.67) 6.26 (19.96)
1960-1978 ADF(n,lr-5.45 (-3.72) 21.89 (15.67) 24.60 (]9.96)
1979-1993 ADF(n,0)--1.51 (-3.81) 7.45 (15.67) 8.47 (19.96)
Finland 1960-1993 ADF(n,l)--4.39 (-3.53) 20.55 (15.67) 25.14 (19.96)
1960-1978 ADF(n,l)--3.57 (-3.72) 12.35 (15.67) 20.18 (19.96)
1979-1993 ADF(n,Or-1.97 (-3.81) 10.32 (15.67) 15.31 (19.96)
France 1960-1993 ADF(n,Or-4.09 (-3.53) 17.84 (15.67) 19.86 (]9.96)
1960-1978 ADF(n,0)--3.62 (-3.70) 11.35 (15.67) 14.0] (19.96)
1979-1993 ADF(n,Or-2.23 (-3.81) 15.28 (15.67) 22.01 (19.96)
Germany 1960-1993a ADF(n,0)--2.15 (-3.53) 6.73 (15.67) 10.67 (19.96)
1960-1978 ADF(n,1)--3.63 (-3.72) 7.41 (15.67) 9.50 (19.96)
1979-1993 ADF(n,l~-3.85 (-3.85) 11.33 (I5.67) 19.94 (19.96)
Greece 1960-1993 ADF(n,0)--4.39 (-3.53) 15.74 (15.67) 17.98 (19.96)
1960-1978 ADF(n,0)--3.25 (-3.70) 10.79 (15.67) 14.70 (19.96)
1979-1993 ADF(n,0~-3.50 (-3.81) 11.35 (15.67) 18.76 (19.96)
Ireland 1960-1993 ADF(n,0}--1.70 (-3.53) 10.27 (15.67) 16.29 (19.96)
1960-1978' ADF(n,0)--3.42 (-3.70) 23.19 (15.67) 31.16 (19.96)
1979-1993 ADF(n,0)--3.12 (-3.81) 13.55 (15.67) 17.65 (19.96)
12 Johansen tests of Ho r-1 against H, r-2 should also reject die alternative hypothesis.
84 The Quantity Approach to Financial Integration
Italy 1960-1993 ADF(n,Or-3.67 (-3.53) 17.17 (15.67) 20.29 (19.96)
1960-1978 ADF(n,0)-2.45 (-3.70) 7.85 (15.67) ]0.65 (19.96)
1979-1993 ADF(n,Or-3.43 (-3.81) 28.88 (15.67) 39.20 (19.96)
Luxemburg 1960-1993 ADF(n,0}--2.15 (-3.53) 7.24 (15.67) 9.17 (19.96)
1960-1978 ADF(n,Or-1.77 (-3.70) 5.90 (15.67) 8.14 (19.96)
1979-1993 ADF(n,0~-1.07 (-3.81) 7.02 (15.67) 8.71 (19.96)
Netherlands 1960-1993 ADF(n,Or-1.98 (-3.53) 7.16 (15.67) 10.22 (19.96)
1960-1978 ADF(n,0)--1.83 (-3.70) 6.59 (15.67) 9.08 (19.96)
1979-1993 ADF(n,Or-2.27 (-3.81) 8.47 (15.67) 12,41 (19.96)
Portugal 1960-1993'' ADF(n,Or-2.56 (-3.53) 10.61 (15.67) 16.91 (19.96)
1960-1978 ADF(n,0~-3.32 (-3.70) 7.10 (15.67) 9.57 (19.96)
1979-1993 ADF(n,l)--4.28 (-3.85) 17.71 (15.67) 30.21 (19.96)
Spain 1960-1993 ADF(n,lr-4.04 (-3.53) 16.72 (15.67) 18.82 (19.96)
1960-1978 ADF(n,Or-2.81 (-3.72) 15.50 (15.67) 21.05 (19.96)
1979-1993 ADF(n,l)--2.75 (-3.85) 18.19 (15.67) 24.48 (19.96)
Sweden 1960-1993 ADF(n,0)--4.08 (-3.53) 23.13 (15.67) 24.90 (19.96)
1960-1978 ADF(n,Or-2.91 (-3.70) 13.59 (15.67) 14.67 (19.96)
1979-1993 ADF(n,0)--2.46 (-3.81) 14.96 (15.67) 17.98 (19.96)
United 1960-1993' ADF(n,l}--3.55 (-3.53) 6.11 (15.67) 7.27 (19.96)
Kingdom 1960-1978 ADF(n,l)--3.76 (-3.72) 8.77 (15.67) 12.75 (19.96)
1979-1993 ADF(n,l)--3.16 (-3.85) 10.18 (15.67) 11.73 (19.96)
Country Period Engle-Granger Johansen cointegration Johansen cointegration
cointegratíon test test I: Ho r-0, H,-1 test II: Ho r-0, H,-1
France 1970Q1-1994Q4 ADF(n,lr-3.31 (-3.40) 20.10 (15.67) 24.41 (19.96)
1970Q1-1978Q4 ADF(n,0)--2.24 (-3.52) 23.69 (15.67) 25.99 (19.96)
1979Q1-1994Q4 ADF(n,0)--2.97 (-3.43) 13.23 (15.67) 20.83 (19.96)
Germany 1970Q1-1994Q4' ADF(n,Or-6.58 (-3.40) 13.27 (15.67) 16.68 (19.96)
1970Q1-1978Q4 ADF(n,lr-3.50 (-3.52) 33.79 (15.67) 36.56 (19.96)
1979Q1-1994Q4 ADF(n,l)--3.05 (-3.44) 17.56 (15.67) 26.73 (19.96)
United 1970Q1-1994Q4 ADF(n,0}--3.02 (-3.40) 7.23 (15.67) 13.18 (19.96)
Kingdom 1970Q1-1978Q4 ADF(n,lr-1.71 (-3.52) 19.74 (15.67) 24.34 (19.96)
1979Q1-1994Q4 ADF(n,0)--2.01 (-3.43) 8.42 (15.67) 10.41 (19.96)
' Note that in Table 3.3 the null hypothesis of a unit root in I„r;lY„k; was rejected at the 95qo level of confidence.
b Note that in Table 3.3 the null hypothesis of a unit root in S„k;il',,,~; was rejected at the 99qo level of confidence.
ADF stands for the Augmented Dickey-Fuller test with the specification of the test equation between brackets
(n estimated without constant or trend term). In addition, the number of lagged differences of the dependent vaziable
are also shown between brackets. MacKinnon critical values for the ADF test at 95~0 level of confidence aze shown
in brackets.
Johansen cointegration test I: cointegration likelihood ratio test based on maximal eigenvalue of ihe stochastic
matrix (non-trended case, maximum lag in VAR is 1(annual data) and 4(quarterly data). Johansen cointegration
test II: cointegration likelihood ratio test based on the trace of the stochastic matrix (non-trended case, maximum
lag in VARis 1(annual data) and 4(quarterly data). Critical values for the Johansen tests at 95~0 level of confidence
aze shown in brackets.
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If both the Engle-Granger and the Johansen cointegration tests reject no cointegration, we find
the strongest evidence for cointegration of savings and investment ratios. However, it appears
rather difficult to reject no cointegration of saving and investment. For the annual data at least
two out of three tests (Engle-Granger cointegration test, Johansen cointegration test I, Johansen
cointegration test II) reject no cointegration between savings and investment ratios for Denmark
(1960-1978), Finland (1960-1993), France (1960-1993), Greece (1960-1993), Ireland (1960-1978),
Italy (1960-1993, 1979-1993), Portugal (1979-1993), Spain (1960-1993, 1979-1993) and Sweden
(1960-1993). For the quarterly data at least two tests reject no cointegration between savings
and investment ratíos for France (1970Q1-1994Q4, 1970Q1-1978Q4) and Germany (1970Q1-
1978Q4, 1979Q1-1994Q4) and the United Kingdom (1970Q1-1978Q4).
The weak evidence in favor of cointegration of saving and investment could be explained
by the low power of the tests. Furthermore, the length of the time-series spanning may still
be too short. Alternatively, the outcomes of the Engle-Granger and the Johansen cointegration
tests for the subperiods probably have less weight due to the limited number of (annual) data.
The Johansen test is biased in small samples because it is based upon asymptotic theory and
it probably rejects Hr, r-0 (no cointegration) too often. Therefore, Engle and Granger recommend
the ADF-test of the residuals. Alternatively, equation (9) may be subject to several econometric
problems. First, as is often the case with OLS results and time-series data, there is autocorrelation
in the error term which introduces bias in the sampling variances and makes estimates inefficient.
Second, the savings variable may well be endogenous implying inconsistent estimates. Third,
the small sample size introduces a sample bias. Fourth, results are meaningless if savings and
investment are integrated of order one, or have different degree of integration (see Table 3.3)
and their linear combination (~tk.;) is not stationary.
Kremers et al. (1992) argue that a more powerful test of cointegration follows from the direct
specification ofan error-correction model. To examine the short and long run relationship between
saving and investment, we derive the following enor-correction model. For simplicity, we may
start with an Autoregressive Distributed Lag (abbreviated ADL(1,1)) model (see Hendry, Pagan
and Sargan, 1984):
(IIY)~.k~ -~(IIY)~.k-i.~}Í~a(SIY)~.k.r}Í~1(SIY)~.k-i.~}~~~k.~ (10)
where disturbance term rl is white noise. After transformation, we get
0(l,Y) ~.k.~ - (~-1)(IIY) Hk-l.i} Roe(siY) t~k.i}(F,OtFi~)(S~y)t.k-I.i}~t~k.i (11)
and
A(IIY)~.kr - ao0(SlY)~.k.~}~.~(IIY)~.k-~.~-9(SIY)~.k-~.~~}T1~.k.~ (12)
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with ~,-(~-1), A--(~iof~i,)l(~-1) and tl - N(O,an). ~io is the impact multiplier, 6 is the long run
multiplier and [(UY),~k-,,; 8(SIY),tk-, ;] is the error-correction tem1. If equation (12) is well
specified -- i.e. the error term rl is white noise -- it may be estimated with OLS. Equation (12)
is a valid error-correction model. The long run multiplier 6 may be interpreted as a measure
for long run saving-investment correlations: íf from time tfk it holds that (SlY),tr,~,;-5~1' and
tJ,~k,~;-0, s-0,1,2..., then UY,tr~; converges to UY-6SlY, the long-term solution of the model.
The impact multiplíer po may be interpreted as a measure for short run saving-investment
correlation while the long run multiplier 6--(~3of(3,)I(~-1) may be interpreted as a measure
for long run saving-investment correlations. Finally, the parameter ~, is called the error-cotTection
coefficient or adjustment coefficient. If À--O (~-1) error-correction does not take place, and
we arrive at a model in first diffèrences, while when -2 ~~, ~ 0( ~~~~1) the model is stable.
Notwithstanding the above, many tests of saving-investment correlations are based on regression
models in first differences (with ~,-0):'~
0(IlY)~,k,; - botb~A(SIY)~,k.;}v~,k.; (13)
However, Engle and Granger (1987) argue, that when the long run correlations between saving
and investment are not included in the model, the estimates of short run correlations (coefficient
p) in equation (13) may be biased due to omitted long run variables. Equation (12) is the
appropriate specification since it distinguishes between short and long run saving-investment
correlations. From ihe estimation of equation (11) one may calculate the short and long run
saving and investment correlations. Only short run saving-investment correlations may be used
as an indication of the degree of capital mobility of capital mobility of type IV.
The existence of cointegration (that is long run saving-investment correlation close to unity)
can be ascertained by testing whether the coefficient on (UY)„k-,.; (~-tp-1) has a significantly
negative t-value (Banerjee, Dolado, Hendry and Smith, 1986). Banerjee et al. (1986) show in
Monte Carlo simulations that in finite samples this test is more efficient and less biased than
the Engle-Granger cointegration test. Kremers et al. (1992, p. 7) advise to use the critical values
from the standard normal distribution in large samples and the critical values from the Dickey-
Fuller distribution in small samples. To ensure that the etror term is white noise, up to fourth-
order lagged variables of changes in the savings and investment ratio (0(UY),tk-~.; and ~(SIY)„k~.;
j-1,..,4) have been added. Only significant lagged variables have been reported in Table 3.6a.
In addition, if significant a trend term (t) has been added. Note that we do not set coefficient
9 equal to 1, contrary to Jansen (1995). To increase efficiency we estimate coefficient A. Table
3.6a presents the results. Furthetmore, Table 3.6b also reports various diagnostic tests. The
regressions generally pass all diagnostic tests.
" See for instance Obstfeld (1986), Feldstein and Bacchetta ( 1989) and Bayoumi (1990).
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If we take critical values from the standard normal distribution at the 95qo level of confidence,
the results indicate that savings and investment are cointegrated in Austria (1960-1993, 1960-
1978, 1979-1993), Belgium (1960-1978), Denmark (1960-1993, 1960-1978), Finland (1960-1993,
1960-1978), France (1960-1993, 1960-1978), Germany (1960-1993, 1960-1978), Greece (1960-
1993, 1960-1978, l 979-1993), Ireland (1960-1978, 1979-1993), Italy (1960-1993, 1979-1993),
Luxemburg (1979-1993), Portugal (1960-1993, 1979-1993), Spain (1960-1993, 1960-1978),
Sweden (1960-1993, 1960-1978, 1979-1993) and the United Kingdom (1960-1993, 1960-1978).
Similarly, we find cointegration between savings and investment for France (1970Q1-1994Q4,
1970Q1-1978Q4 1979Q1- l 994Q4), Germany (1970Q 1-1994Q4, 1970Q1-1978Q4, 1979Q 1-
1994Q4) and the United Kingdom (1970Q1-1994Q4, 1970Q1-1978Q4, 1979Q1-1994Q4). If
we take the very conservative critical values from the Dickey-Fuller distribution (as calculated
by MacKinnon, 1991), we find cointegration between saving and investment for Austria (1960-
1993), Denmark (]960-1978), Finland (1960-1978), France (1960-1993, 1960-1978), Greece
(1960-1993), Ireland (1960-1978), Italy (1960-1993, 1979-1993), Luxemburg (1979-1993), Spain
(1960-1993), Sweden (1960-1993, 1979-1993) and the United Kingdom (1960-1993). Similarly,
we find cointegration between savings and investment for France (1970Q1-1994Q4, 1970Q1-
1978Q4, 1979Q1-1994Q4) and Germany (1970Q1-1994Q4, 1970Q1-1978Q4, 1979Q1-1994Q4).
The finding of no cointegration is probably due to the small sample size and time span. The
results confirm that equation (11) is the correct specification.
From Table 3.6a we may calculate the long run saving-investment correlation (6--(Rot~3,)I
(~-1)) for annual data: Austria (0.96, 0.70, 1.41), Belgium (1.06, 0.37, 0.95), Denmark (0.38,
0.62, -3.2), Finland (0.93, 2.3, 1.29), France (0.91, 1.02, 1.06), Germany (1.22, 1.16, 1.23),
Greece (0.78, 0.97, 0.65), Ireland (-1.68, 2.03, 1.15), Italy (0.85, 1.04, 0.86), Luxemburg (0.12,
0.64, -0.28), Netherlands (1.25, 0.41, 0.87), Portugal (0.68, 0.38, 1.57), Spain (0.95, 0.81, 4.17),
Sweden (0.79, 1.09, 1.25) and the United Kingdom (0.30, 0.52, 0.50). Similarly, we may calculate
the long run saving-investment correlation for quarterly data: France (1.00, 0.80, 1.28), Germany
(0.61, 0.88, 0.33) and the United Kingdom (1.09, 1.76, 0.62). The long run correlations are
close to one, at least over the longer sample periods.
The short run correlations differ considerably from the long run correlations. From Table
3.6a we may obtain the short run saving-investment correlation ((30) for annual data: Austria
(0.88, 0.78, 1.03), Belgium (0.62, 0.55, 0.44), Denmark (0.70, 0.55, 0.64), Finland (0.74, 1.14,
0.83), France (0.80, 0.90, 1.04), Germany (0.77, 1.03, 0.16), Greece (0.73, 0.94, 0.55), Ireland
(-0.11, 0.07, 0.85), Italy (0.71, 1.30, -0.45), Luxemburg (0.03, 0.25, -0.07), Netherlands (0.63,
0.72, 0.44), Portugal (0.40, 0.43, -0.14), Spain (0.29, 0.27, 0.64), Sweden (0.45, 0.49, 0.49)
and the United Kingdom (0.63, 0.49, 1.28). Similarly, we may obtain the short run saving-
investment correlation for quarterly data: France (0.71, 0.21, 0.76), Germany (0.41, 1.18, 0.37)
and the United Kingdom (0.55, 0.51, 0.52).
Table 3.6a - The F-H criterion and time-series analysis: An error-correction model
e a
~(~~Í')r.kJ -CORSIQIUt(~-1)(~~Ï)~.4-i.l} Roe(sir) ~.k.i`(t'0}1'I)(S~Y)r.k-I.i}LA~~(~~Y)t.k-IJ`LB,~(S1Y)~.k-I.i}CIf~,.kJ
i-~ i'~
Country Period constant (U~„~-~; 0(SIY),,,~; (SIY)„~-~; ~(UY)~,,~.~; 0(SIY)„~-,, ~(SIY)„k-z~ 0(1IY)~.k-3; A(IIY)~.ka; t
Austria 1960-1993 0.008 (0.02) -0.56 (0.17)'" 0.88 (0.16)" 0.54 (0.17)
1960-1978 0.06 (0.05) -0.71 (0.27)' 0.78 (0.21)" 0.50 (0.22)
1979-1993 -0.06 (0.06) -0.64 (0.27)' 1.03 (0.35)" 0.90 (0.42)
Belgium 1960-1993 -0.003 (0.01) -0.16 (0.14) 0.62 (0.13)i 0.17 (0.10)
1960-1978 0.09 (0.03) -0.67 (0.23)' 0.55 (0.13)3 0.25 (0.15)
1979-1993 0.0002 (0.04) -0.22 (0.30) 0.44 (0.38)r 0.21 (0.17)
Denmark 1960-1993 0.08 (0.04) -0.42 (0.18)' 0.70 (0.22)" 0.16 (0.15) -0.001 (0.0005)
1960-1978 0.15 (0.04) -1.42 (0.26)a6 0.55 (0.22)" 0.88 (0.20)
1979-1993 0.03 (0.05) -0.OS (0.20) 0.64 (0.36)T -0.16 (0.22)
Finland 1960-1993 0.02 (0.03) -0.58 (0.17)'' 0.74 (0.16)" 0.54 (0.16) 0.31 (0.12)
1960-1978 -0.15 (0.06) -0.47 (0.22)' 1.14 (0.27)"" 1.09 (0.30)
1979-1993 -0.02 (0.03) -0.45 (0.27) 0.83 (0.21)" 0.58 (0.22)
France 1960-1993 0.01 (0.01) -0.69 (0.18)'" 0.80 (0.16)" 0.63 (0.16)
1960-1978 -0.O1 (0.05) -0.81 (0.25)'" 0.90 (0.25)'" 0.83 (0.28)
1979-1993 -0.04 (0.03) -0.30 (0.28) 1.04 (0.24)" 0.50 (0.23)
Germany 1960-1993 -0.02 (0.02) -0.27 (0.12)' 0.77 (0.15)"' 0.33 (0.13)
1960-1978 -0.03 (0.03) -0.58 (0.24)' 1.03 (0.17)"" 0.67 (0.28)
1979-1993 0.01 (0.08) -0.47 (0.33) 0.16 (0.33)' 0.58 (0.18) -0.002 (0.0008)
Greece 1960-1993 0.06 (0.02) -0.74 (0.18)'' 0.73 (0.10): 0.58 (0.15)
1960-1978 0.03 (0.02) -0.81 (0.29)' 0.94 (0.17)'" 0.79 (0.28)
1979-1993 0.08 (0.03) -0.83 (0.32)' 0.55 (0.15): 0.54 (0.23)
Ireland 1960-1993 -0.O1 (0.05) -0.19 (0.11) -0.11 (0.27)' -032 (0.21)
1960-1978 -0.09 (0.07) -0.61 (0.15)~ 0.07 (0.33)' 1.24 (0.43)
1979-1993 0.31 (0.12) -0.71 (0.24)' 0.85 (0.41)~ 0.82 (0.36) -0.Ol (0.004)
Italy 1960-1993 0.02 (0.02) -0.65 (0.19)a6 0.71 (0.27)" 0.55 (0.16)
1960-1978 -0.008 (0.06) -0.45 (0.26) 1.30 (0.40)" 0.47 (0.30)
1979-1993 0.03 (0.02) -0.98 (0.19)'" -0.45 (0.28)' 0.84 (0.14)
Luxemburg 1960-1993 0.04 (0.04) -0.25 (0.13) 0.03 (0.16)' 0.03 (0.06)
1960-1978 0.002 (0.09) -0.22 (0.20) 0.25 (0.30)' 0.14 (0.23)
1979-1993 0.14 (0.04) -1.18 (0.26)'" -0.07 (0.11)' -0.33 (0.10) 0.01 (0.002)
Netherlands 1960-1993 -0.02 (0.02) -0.20 (0.11) 0.63 (0.17): 0.25 (0.14)
1960-1978 0.04 (OAS) -0.27 (0.21) 0.72 (0.24)" 0.11 (0.27)
1979-1993 -0.0006 (0.05) -0.31 (0.21) 0.44 (0.28)' 0.27 (0.15)
Portugal 1960-1993 0.03 (0.04) -0.31 (0.14)' 0.40 (0.14): 0.21 (0.10)
1960-1978 0.09 (0.06) -0.52 (0.29) 0.43 (0.15): 0.20 (0.14)
1979-1993 0.03 (0.09) -0.49 (0.17)' -0.14 (0.30)' 0.77 (0.18) -0.003 (0.001)
Spain 1960-1993 0.009 (0.02) -0.42 (O.ll)'" 0.29 (0.20)' 0.40 (0.12) 0.38 (0.14)
1960-1978 0.03 (0.08) -0.54 (0.22)' 0.27 (0.38)' 0.44 (0.25)
1979-1993 -0.12 (0.06) -0.18 (0.19) 0.64 (0.37)' 0.75 (0.24)
Sweden 1960-1993 0.03 (0.02) -0.66 (0.19)a6 0.45 (0.16)x 0.52 (0.16) 0.36 (0.17)
1960-1978 -0.02 (0.04) -0.70 (0.24)' 0.49 (0.20)' 0.76 (0.20)
1979-1993 -0.02 (0.04) -0.83 (0.26)'' 0.49 (0.24)~ 1.03 (0.24)
United 1960-1993 0.06 (OA3) -0.44 (0.14)'" 0.63 (0.19)" 0.13 (0.1]) 0.38 (0.16)
Kingdom 1960-1978 0.06 (0.06) -0.60 (0.27)' 0.49 (0.25)t 0.31 (0.23)
1979-1993 0.02 (0.05) -0.16 (0.20) 1.28 (0.61)r 0.08 (0.19)
x~





Country Period constant (T~Y)„~.~, 0(S~)~.t, (S~)~.k-i, ONY)~,~-i, ~(S~)~,k.i, 0(S~)~.k-s, ONY)„~3, Dí~)~.k.~, t
France 1970Q1-1994Q4 0.0008 (0.004) -0.22 (0.06)~ 0.71 (0.10)z 0.22 (0.06)
1970Q1-1978Q4 0.02 (0.02) -0.44 (0.11)~ 0.21 (0.20)" 0.35 (0.12) 0.80 (0.18) -0.59 (0.20)
1979Q1-1994Q4 -0.01 (0.008) -0.21 (0.07)~ 0.76 (0.11)x 0.27 (0.08)
Germany 1970Q1-1994Q4 OA3 (0.009) -0.23 (0.O6)~ 0.41 (0.08)i 0.14 (0.05) -0.11 (0.05) -0.16 (0.06) -0.13 (0.04) 0.51 (0.06)
1970Q1-1978Q4 0.08 (0.02) -0.68 (O.14)~ 1.18 (Q06)t 0.60 (0.14)
1979Q1-1994Q4 0.04 (0.01) -0.21 (0.07)~ 0.37 (0.10): 0.07 (0.06) 0.69 (0.06)
United 1970Q1-1994Q4 -0.002 (0.007) -0.11 (0.05)' 0.55 (0.08)f 0.12 (0.06) 0.17 (0.08)
Kingdom 1970Q1-1978Q4 -0.02 (0.03) -0.17 (0.08)' 0.51 (0.15)t 0.30 (0.14)
1979Q1-1994Q4 0.01 (0.008) -0.13 (0.06)' 0.52 (0.09)f 0.08 (0.06) 0.26 (0.10)
b
r
[ndicates that the ccefficient is significantly negative at the 95~Io level of confidence (one-tailed test). Critical values are taken from the standard normal distribution
(one-tailed test).
[ndicates that the coefficient is significantly negative at the 99~Io level of confidence (one-tailed test). Critical values are taken from the Dickey-Fuller distribution
(one-tailed test).
Indicates that the coefticient R is insignificantly different from zero and significanUy different from one at the 95~10 level of confidence (two-tailed test).
Indicates that the coefficient p is significantly different from zero and insignificantly different from one at the 95~10 level of confidence (two-tailed test).
Indicates that the coefficient p is imprecisely estimated and di ffers insignificantly from zero and insignificantly from one at the 95qo level of confidence (two-tailed
tes[).
Indicates that the coefficient ~i is imprecisely estimated and differs significanUy from zero and significanUy tiom one at the 95~10 level of confidence (two-tailed
test).
Standard errors are indicated in parentheses.
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Country Period RZ DW LM„~(1) LB 1B LM,,a~„(1)
Austria 1960-1993 0.60 1.80 1.46 (0.23) 0.35 (0.56) 1.36 (0.51) 0.32 (0.57)
1960-1978 0.63 1.73 3.06 (0.08) 0.21 (0.65) 0.20 (0.91) 0.05 (0.83)
1979-1993 0.50 1.61 2.85 (0.09) 0.64 (0.42) 0.26 (0.88) 0.37 (0.54)
Belgium 1960-1993 0.50 1.92 0.20 (0.65) 0.13 (0.72) 1.19 (0.55) 0.30 (0.58)
1960-1978 0.73 2.01 0.01 (0.92) 0.00 (0.95) 1.05 (0.25) 1.33 (0.25)
1979-1993 0.33 1.87 0.26 (0.61) 0.18 (0.68) 1.12 (0.57) 0.004 (0.95)
Denmark 1960-1993 0.35 2.22 2.10 (0.15) 0.62 (0.43) 0.01 (0.99) 0.19 (0.67)
1960-1978 0.72 2.33 4.11 (0.04) 0.76 (0.38) 0.70 (0.70) 0.45 (0.50)
1979-1993 0.21 2.00 0.30 (0.58) 0.22 (0.64) 1.55 (0.46) 0.87 (0.35)
Finland 1960-1993 0.72 1.89 0.21 (0.64) 0.04 (0.84) 0.61 (0.74) 9.03 (0.06)
1960-1978 0.67 1.25 3.28 (0.07) 1.94 (0.16) 1.42 (0.49) 5.88 (0.21)
1979-1993 0.77 1.76 0.27 (0.60) 0.14 (0.70) 0.12 (0.94) 1.15 (0.28)
France 1960-1993 0.64 2.03 1.08 (0.29) 0.26 (0.61) 0.48 (0.79) 0.29 (0.59)
1960-1978 0.63 2.25 3.15 (0.08) 0.77 (0.36) 2.01 (0.37) 0.01 (0.93)
1979-1993 0.68 2.04 0.99 (0.32) 0.43 (0.51) 1.44 (0.49) 0.10 (0.75)
Germany 1960-1993 0.51 1.44 4.12 (0.04) 2.76 (0.10) 0.07 (0.96) 0.20 (0.65)
1960-1978 0.70 1.50 1.28 (0.26) 1.28 (0.26) 0.32 (0.85) 0.28 (0.60)
1979-1993 0.47 1.47 0.74 (0.39) 0.53 (0.47) 0.65 (0.72) 1.26 (0.26)
Greece 1960-1993 0.69 1.88 0.57 (0.45) Q07 (0.80) 2.92 (0.23) 0.59 (0.44)
1960-1978 0.78 1.79 2.50 (0.11) 0.12 (0.73) 2.09 (0.35) 0.80 (0.37)
1979-1993 0.53 1.89 0.53 (0.47) 0.04 (0.85) 0.87 (0.65) 0.55 (0.46)
Ireland 1960-1993 0.09 1.85 0.12 (0.73) 0.09 (0.77) 1.22 (0.54) 0.17 (0.68)
1960-1978 0.54 1.72 0.17 (0.68) 0.15 (0.70) 0.42 (0.81) 0.01 (0.92)
1979-1993 0.35 1.70 1.88 (0.17) 0.33 (0.57) 1.43 (0.49) 0.56 (0.46)
Italy 1960-1993 0.44 1.80 0.80 (0.37) 0.11 (0.74) 3.06 (0.22) 2.10 (0.15)
1960-1978 0.53 1.62 1.98 (0.16) 0.54 (0.46) 3.50 (0.17) 1.42 (0.23)
1979-1993 0.71 2.25 1.00 (0.32) 0.94 (0.33) 1.29 (0.52) 1.47 (0.23)
Luxemburg 1960-]993 0.04 1.61 0.67 (0.41) 0.39 (0.53) 0.30 (0.86) 1.30 (0.25)
1960-1978 0.02 1.35 1.79 (0.18) 1.03 (0.31) 0.44 (0.80) 0.001 (0.98)
1979-1993 0.58 2.40 2.03 (0.15) 0.85 (0.36) 2.59 (0.27) 0.007 (0.93)
Netherlands 1960-1993 0.30 1.76 0.63 (0.43) 0.41 (0.52) 0.78 (0.68) 0.36 (0.55)
1960-1978 0.34 1.70 0.90 (0.34) 0.29 (0.59) 0.23 (0.89) 0.53 (0.47)
1979-1993 0.27 1.77 0.02 (0.90) 0.01 (0.91) 1.38 (0.50) 1.07 (0.30)
Portugal 1960-1993 0.34 1.66 1.57 (0.21) 0.82 (0.37) 0.77 (0.68) 5.78 (0.02)
1960-1978 0.47 2.03 0.37 (0.54) 0.05 (0.82) 0.99 (0.60) 1.15 (0.28)
1979-1993 0.63 1.64 0.35 (0.55) 0.32 (0.57) 0.20 (0.90) 1.40 (0.24)
Spain 1960-1993 0.45 1.99 0.02 (0.88) 0.0] (0.94) 0.76 (0.68) 1.28 (0.26)
1960-1978 0.38 1.28 2.48 (0.12) 1.56 (0.21) 0.15 (0.93) 0.35 (0.55)
1979-1993 0.40 1.43 0.45 (0.50) 0.26 (0.61) 0.99 (0.61) 0.50 (0.48)
Sweden 1960-1993 0.61 1.82 0.86 (0.35) 0.14 (0.71) ].10 (0.58) 0.03 (0.87)
1960-1978 0.55 1.58 2.35 (0.13) 0.82 (0.37) 1.00 (0.61) 5.32 (0.02)
1979-1993 0.69 1.86 0.04 (0.84) 0.02 (0.89) 0.95 (0.62) 1.35 (0.25)
United 1960-1993 0.43 1.72 1.69 (0.19) 0.52 (0.47) 1.30 (0.52) 0.02 (0.90)
Kingdom 1960-1978 0.40 1.58 4.59 (0.03) 0.74 (0.39) 2.63 (0.27) 1.47 (0.23)
1979-1993 0.21 1.47 3.12 (0.08) 1.17 (0.28) 0.64 (0.73) 0.43 (0.51)
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Counvy Period R2 DW LM,~(4) LB JB LM,,~a(4)
France 1970Q1-1994Q4 0.40 7.74 4.67 (0.32) 3.56 (0.47) 3.75 (O.1S) 9.03 (0.06)
1970Q1-1978Q4 O.SS 2.15 2.25 (0.69) 1.36 (0.85) 2.25 (0.32) 5.88 (0.2])
1979Q1-1994Q4 0.47 2.35 3.63 (0.46) 3.52 (0.48) 2.33 (03]) 2.27 (0.69)
Germany 1970Q1-1994Q4 0.94 2.27 5.71 (0.22) 5.66 (0.23) 5.62 (0.06) 4.60 (0.33)
1970Q1-1978Q4 0.95 2.05 S.S8 (0.23) 5.87 (0.21) 0.62 (0.73) 2.50 (0.65)
1979Q1-1994Q4 0.92 2.55 11.27(0.02) 8.98 (0.06) 3.32 (0.19) ].02 (0.91)
United 1970Q1-1994Q4 0.33 1.96 1.29 (0.86) 0.82 (0.94) 8.32 (0.02) 12.55 (0.01)
Kingdom 1970Q1-1978Q4 0.27 1.79 3.92 (0.42) 3.65 (0.46) 1.OS (0.60) 5.90 (0.21)






the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom.
he Durbin-Watson test statistic for first-order serial correlation.
the Lagrange Multiplier test for serial correlation of order p.
the Lagrange Multiplier test for autoregressive conditional heteroskedasticity of order p.
the ]arque-Bera test statistic for normality.
Probability-values of the test statistic are indicated between pazentheses.
Overall, the short run correlations are smaller than long run conelations. Furthermore, the short
run correlation declined over the period 1979-1993 relative to the period 1960-1978 in Belgium,
Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands and Portugal, while the long run
correlation were relatively stable. Similarly, comparing the subperiods 1970Q1-1978Q4 and
1979Q1-1994Q4, the short run correlation declined in France and Germany.
Using the error-correction estimates for coefficient ao, perfect short-term capital mobility
could not be rejected at the 95qe level of confidence with respect to Germany (1979-1993),
Ireland (1960-1993, 1960-1978), Italy (1979-1993), Luxemburg (1960-1993, 1960-1978, 1979-
1993), Portugal (1979-1993) and Spain (]960-1993). Similarly, perfect short-term capital
immobility could not be rejected at the 95~Ie leve] of confidence with respect to Austria (1960-
1993, 1960-1978, 1979-1993), Denmark (1960-1993, 1960-1978), Finland (1960-1993, 1960-1978,
1979-1993), France (1960-1993, 1960-1978, 1979-1993), Germany (1960-1993, 1960-1978),
Greece (1960-1978), Italy (1960-1993, 1960-]978), Netherlands (1960-1978), United Kingdom
(1960-1993) and France (1960Q 1-1978Q4). The other (3o-estimates are too imprecise to be useful.
Furthermore, the F-H methodology indicates that EU countries tend to differ substantially
among themselves with respect to the extent of short and long run correlations between savings
and investment. If we take the EU countries with below industrial-country benchmark value
estimates for (io (i.e. 0.6) to be financially integrated, we find below 0.6 (3o's for Belgium (1960-
1978, 1979-1993), Denmark (1960-1978), Greece (1979-1993), Italy (1979-1993), Luxemburg
(1960-1993, 1960-1978, 1979-1993), Netherlands (1979-1993), Portugal (1960-1993, 1960-1978,
1979-1993), Spain (1960-1993, 1960-1978), Sweden (1960-1993, 1960-1978, 1979-1993), United
Kingdom (1960-1978), France (197(K21-1978Q4), Germany (1960Q1-1993Q4, 1979Q1-1993Q4)
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and the United Kingdom (1960Q1-1993Q4, 1960Q1-1978Q4, 1979Q1-1993Q4).
3.6 Conclusions
In this chapter we examined the extent of financial integration on the basis of saving-investment
correlations. It is difficult to accept that most evidence from savings-investment correlations
with respect to a sample of OECD countries often contradicts with the finding of high capital
flows in world financial markets. We stressed that much of these high correlations may be due
to the underlying assumptions of the F-H criterion. Importantly, we stressed that the F-H criterion
measures more than financial capital mobility alone. Furthermore, we apply an error-correction
specification of saving-investment correlations to distinguish between short and long run saving-
investment correlations. The evidence in this chapter allows us to draw a few conclusions about
financial integration in the EU.
1. The results for the EU-13 and EC-10 countries in Table 3.2 show a rise in the esumated
value of (3 in the period 1979-1993 relative to the period 1960-1978 indicating a declining
degree of capital mobility of type IV. The results for the ERM-6 countries show a decline
in the estimated value of (3 in the period 1979-1993 relative to the period 1960-1978 indicating
an increasing degree of capital mobility of type IV.
2. It is important to account for non-stationarity of the underlying time-series of saving and
investment.
3. An error-correction specificauon of saving-investment correlations is to be preferred as it
distinguishes between short and long run correlations between saving and investment.
Theoretically, long run saving-investment correlations should be close to one, while short
run correlations may differ from one. A country may run a current account deficit for a short
period of time but current account imbalances must accumulate to zero over a long period
of ume unless the country defaults on its foreign debt. That is, the current account should
be stationary. Only short run saving-investment correlations may be used as an indication
of the degree of capital mobility of capital mobility of type IV.
4. From the time-series analysis based upon cointegration techniques, we concluded that savings
and investment ratios of EU countries are cointegrated. The finding of no cointegration is
probably due to the small sample size and time span. The results confirm that our error-
correction specification is the correct specification.
5. From Section 3.2 we know that departures from perfect capital mobility of type IV may
be caused by investors who are risk averse with respect to exchange risk. Therefore, an
important explanation for an increasing degree of financial integration in the EU may be
the smoothing of exchange rate volatility. Bhandari and Mayer (1990) conclude "(...) it appears
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that the exchange rate stability achieved in the EMS has been an important factor promoting
capital mobility". Feldstein and Bacchetta (1989) argue: "Although capital might in principle
flow with equal ease among all countries or at least all industrial countries, the availability
of market information, the existence of institutional relationships, and the perception of risk
might make capital flows greater among some pairs of countries than among others." Another
important explanation for an increasing degree of iinancial integration is the gradual
elimination of all barriers to short-term and long-term capital mobility in the EU.
6. Furthermore, the F-H methodology indicates that EU countries tend to differ substantially
among themselves with respect to the extent of short and long run correlations between savings
and investment. The short run correlations are smaller than long run correlations. The short
run correlation declined over the period 1979-1993 relative to the period 1960-1978 in
Belgium, Finland, Germany, Greece, Italy, Luxemburg, Netherlands and Portugal, while the
long run correlation were relatively stable. Similarly, comparing the subperiods 1970Q1-
1978Q4 and 1979Q1-1994Q4, the short run correlation declined in France and Germany.
In summary, the F-H criterion has some meaning in quantifying the degree of fmancial integration
in the EU. Its value will further increase when it is examined in combination with related criteria
for financial integration such those examined in the previous chapter. Financial markets may
be divided into two segments: one segment with highly rated financial instruments traded in
liquid wholesale markets and one segment with low rated financial instruments traded in less
liquid retail markets. Clearly, the F-H criterion is more concerned with this latter segment whereas
interest parity conditions are more concerned with the former segment. Overall, the apparent
decline of short run saving-investment correlations indicates that an increasing share of total




Data of gross national savings, gross domestic investment and gross domestic product are taken
from OECD (1995b), National Accounts of OECD Countries, Main Aggregates 1960-1993,
Vol. I, Paris. Gross national savings, gross domestic investment and gross domestic product
are taken at current prices. The OECD-definitions of gross national savings, gross domestic
investment and gross domesdc product ofall EU member states except Greece are the one used
in the United Nations Present System of National Accounts (S.N.A.). Definitions of Greece
are based on an earlier system. The national accounting framework underlying the F-H criterion




Now, the current account can be written as the difference of saving and investment which is
equal to the difference between exports and imports plus net factor income and net current
transfers from abroad.
CA -S-I-X-MtNFItNCT
I - FCF t ST
EU countries reporting a nonzero value for the statistical discrepancy include Italy, Netherlands,
Portugal, Spain and the United Kingdom. The statistical discrepancy is split equally between
savings and investment so that the identity containing only the three aggregate variables, S,
I and the CA, holds exactly across all countries.
CA -(S t ll2 x statistical discrepancy) - (I - ll2 x statistical discrepancy)- S' - I'
Following Feldstein and Horioka (1980), gross national savings and gross domestic investment
are converted into relative form by dividing by gross domestic product.
Y - GNP t NCT
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Symbols:
S - total national savings
I - total domestic investment
C - total final consumption expenditure
M - import of goods and services
X - export of goods and services
Y - gross domestic product
CA - current account of the balance of payments
GNP - gross national product
NCT - net current transfers from the rest of the world
NFI - net factor income from the rest of the world
FCF - fixed capital formation
ST - increase in stocks
' - corrected for a nonzero value of the statistical discrepancy
Appendix 3.B
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Chapter 4
Financial Integration in Europe:
Evidence from Euler Equation Tests
4.1 Introduction
This chapter contributes to the ongoing debate on the theory and measurement of capital mobility.
Particularly, in combination with other criteria for the degree of financial integration such as
arbitrage conditions and savings-investment correlations, Euler equation tests may be valuable.
We examine the relationship between returns on financial assets and consumption growth rates
across countries to test for the extent of financial integration in the European Union. Traditional
tests of financial integration have compared interest rates across countries (Frankel and
MacArthur, 1988, Eijffinger and Lemmen, 1995) and provided measures of the correlation of
saving and investment (Feldstein and Horioka, 1980, Lemmen and Eijffinger, 1995a). Recently,
Obstfeld (1986) proposed a third test to assess the degree of financial integration. Obstfeld's
test is based upon the Euler equation that characterizes optimal intertemporal consumption.
When the financial markets of different countries are integrated, then residents of these countries
have access to the same set of financial instruments denominated in the same currency (law
of one price assumption). This yields testable restrictions for the comovement of consumption
across countries.
In principle, country risks of any given foreign country and exchange risk of any given foreign
currency may well be uncorrelated with other risks faced by investors. This nonsystematic risk
can be diversified away, and therefore will not affect foreign investment decisions. However,
systematic country and exchange risks cannot be diversified away. Nonetheless, as long as risk-
averse investors get a fair reward for the country and exchange risks they bear, they still may
want to hold foreign assets in their portfolio. So, our definition of financial integration should
account for this point. Stulz (1986) defines perfect capital mobility in a world with trade in
risky assets as follows: "Capital mobility is perfect if, in all states of the world, all investors
value identically in a given numeraire any arbitrary cash flow irrespective of where it originates."
International trade in assets may reduce the riskiness of the retum by allowing countries's
residents to diversify their portfolio. With full international portfolio diversification, we expect
portfolio positions to reflect the size of the economy relative to the rest of the world (Krugman
and Obstfeld, 1994, p. 596). However, investors typically have a"home bias", which in most
cases limits investment in foreign markets to less than 10 percent of their financial assets.
The plan of this chapter is as follows. Section 4.2 derives three Euler equation-based tests
of financial integration. Test I-- Obstfeld's (1986, 1989) Euler equation test -- attempts to detect
whether residents of different political jurisdictions have access to the same risk-free asset of
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the home country (the law of one price holds). Specifically, this test allows to evaluate whether
markets for nominal risk-free bonds are integrated for a given pair ofcountries. The test implies
that the expected marginal rates of substitution in consumption will be equalized. Test II --
Obstfeld's (1994a, 1994b) Euler equation test -- assumes trade in a set of Arrow-Debreu
securities. Capital movements more realistically take the form of trade in both risk-free and
risky assets. The idea here is that if an integrated international market for state-contingent claims
existed, then consumption growth rates would be perfectly correlated across countries ex post,
as well as ex ante (provided that all countries have identical iso-elastic preferences and consume
the same good). This concept of consumption risk sharing is the cross-country counterpart of
the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) in the presence of complete markets. Each agent
(country) hedges his positions against any idiosyncratic shock not suffered by the group of agents
(countries) with which the pooling of risks exists (Brennan and Solnik, 1989). Test III focuses
on the prediction that, in the presence of integrated financial markets, cross-country differences
in expected real returns are linearly related to expected consumption growth rates in these
countries (under certain auxiliary assumptions). It can be applied to a broad set of financial
assets (bonds and equities) without imposing the unrealistic assumption of trade in a complete
set of contingent claims. Using data from the latest Penn World Table (Mark 6), Section 4.3
tests for financial integration in the EU. Tests I and III are applied to country pairs which include
Germany. Test II is applied to any possible country pair. Section 4.4 evaluates the three Euler
equation test of financial integration. Importantly, the definitions of financial integration
incorporated in Euler equation tests differ from the definition presented in Chapter l. Finally,
Section 4.5 concludes.
4.2 Theory
I: 06stfeld's (1986, 1989) Euler equation test offinancial integration: Trade in risk-free assets
of the home country
This chapter first applies Obstfeld's (1986, 1989) Euler equation test to assess the degree of
financial integration in the EU.` The idea of this test is essentially as follows. Usual intertemporal
utility maximization gives rise to the Lucas (1978) asset pricing equation or Euler equation,2
1 - E~[R~,~ m~,~] (1)
' We assume that there exists only one consumption good in the world, although the analysis could equally well
be performed with a vector of consumption goods.
2 A key characteristic of the Lucas (1978) asset pricing model is that it assumes complete frictionless markets.
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where Rt„ is the real return on some traded asset between time t and tfl, and m,,, is the marginal
rate of intertemporal substitution of any consumer participating in this market, usually given
by,
- ~ U` ( C`" ) (~)U~ (C~)
for some instantaneous utility function U(C) and some discount factor p ~ 1. Now, consider
two countries, a home country (no asterisk) and a foreign country (asterisk). Further, consider
a nominal bond, denominated in the home currency, paying a nominal interest rate of i,,, known
at date t. Let P„ P; denote price levels and S, the exchange rate. Then,
P
R,,, - (1 ti~.~) ~P~, ~
or
P; S~
R~,, - (1 t i,,, )
P,;, 5~.~
by definition of S,. Define,
P~ S~ P,.
rlr. i- P m ~. i- S-m~. i
r. ~ ~. ~ Pr. ~
then the Euler equation implies that,
E,[(1 }i~.,)rl,,,) - 0







since the nominal interest rate i,t, is known at date t. Now assume, a convenient utility function
that takes the particular form,3




where a is the relative risk-aversion coefficient. Taking C, and C~ to be aggregate consumption
' The virtue of this constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function is its simplicity, and therefore it is well
suited for our benchmark test of financial integration. Section 4.4 addresses some caveats that apply to this utility
function.
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in the home and foreign country (the representative agent assumption), one can write m,t, as
m~. i- Í~ ( CC ~) a (9)
~
and likewise for m~t,.' Thus, the restriction E,(rl,,,)~ becomes testable. Assuming the asset
to be the risk-free asset, the degree of financial integration ( "law of one price") can be tested
as follows,
Tl, - yo}~N~Y~r1r-~}vr (10)
Perfect financial integration with respect to the risk-free asset in the home country implies,
Ho: yo-0 I` y,-0 i-1,..,1V (11)
Condition (11) states that rl, must be orthogonal to lagged information available represented
by rl,-;. No variable contained in the information set available prior to time t should help to
predict the time t value of rl (E(r1,~It.~)-0). Obstfeld's (1986, 1989) Euler equation test only
takes into account trade in risk-free assets of the home counvy. One can go a step further.
II: Obstfeld's (1994a, 1994b) Euler equation test of financial integration: Trade in a set of
Arrow-Debreu securities
Obstfeld's (1994a, 1994b) Euler equation test of financial integration allows countries to trade
differential consumption risks. That is, international financial markeis provide mutual insurance
against purely idiosyncratic national consumption fluctuations. The insurance function of financial
markets is best analyzed by assuming that countries trade a set of Arrow-Debreu securities.5
To that end, assume that there are finitely many states of the world. Let the state at date t be
denoted by ~c„ and assume further that x, follows a Markov process (i.e. the probability tt(x„x,~,)
for a particular state x,t, to occur at date tt 1 depends solely on x~ with n(xt,~c,~,)~0 for all xt,x,t,.
Marginal rates of substitution become a function of the states xt and x,t„
m~„ - m(x,,x,,,) (12)
and the same holds true for retums. As a result, the Euler equation can be written as,
' Since for this utility function mazginal utility is given by Ca.
5 Assets aze characterised by non-negative payoffs they generate in different sta[es. ~he payoff is in terms of a
consumption good. See, for example, Eichberger and Harper (1993, Chapter 3) and Aiyagari (1993).
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1 - E[R(x~,x~,~)m(z~,x~,~) ~z~ - x] (13)
- ~~,.~~(x'x,~,)R(x'xr~,) h`(x'z,~,) (14)
for all states x. Now assume (and this is a"big" assumption) that at date t, all state-contingent
securities are actually traded.b Thus, for any state x', there is an asset (a) that pays one unit
of the consumption good, should the state x,~,-x' be realized, and nothing in all other states,
x,t,~x'. This asset will be exchanged for a certain amount q~(x') of the consumption good at
date t and its return is given by,
R (ar ~) - ~ 9,(x')
Substituting this into the Euler equation above yields the following,
1 - n(x'x~) m(x,x~)
qr(x~)
Thus for two different consumers i and j, say, one gets,
(15)
(16)
m;(x,x~) - m~(x,x~) (17)
for all states of the world x and x'. In other words, if insurance against any state of the world
is traded on the financial market (perfect financial integration), then one gets the strong result
that marginal rates of substitution of different consumers must be perfectly correlated. This
result holds if there is free and costless international asset trade, and if the set of securities
available is complete, so that all consumption risks are insurable.' Accordingly, Obstfeld's
(1994a, 1994b) Euler equation test is a joint test of perfect financial integration and complete
financial markets.
III: The new Euler equation test offinancial integration
Our Euler equation test is intimately related to Obstfeld's (1994a, 1994b) Euler equation test.
Consider two countries, a home country (no asterisk) and a foreign country (asterisk) each issuing
their own country-specific nominal bond. The nominal bond, denominated in the home currency,
tfx -x
0 otherwise
6 Individuals do not face transaction costs, borrowing or short-sale constraints and all claims are always fulfilled;
that is, there is neither default nor bankruptcy (Aiyagari, 1993, p. 19).
' A set of Arrow-Debreu securities is said to be complete if there are exacfly as many securities as there are states
of nature.
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pays a nominal interest rate of i,,, known at date t, and the nominal bond denominated in the
foreign currency pays a nominal interest rate of i~t,. Again, let P, and P; denote price levels,
P
R,,, - (1 tit,,) P̀ (lg)
~.,
and
R~,, - (1 } i~., ) p~ (19)
P,; ,
Then, for simplicity omitting the variables denoting the different states of the world, one gets
that,
E~[ m~„ R ~., ]- E~[ m~. t Rt. t] - 1 (20)
Again assuming that the home country and foreign country apply the constant relative risk
aversion ( CRRA) utility function,8
Er[Q( CC~' )-~`Ri.,] - E~[R~( C~~' )-a~Rr,t] - 1 (21)
, C~
we obtain equation ( 22) by assuming that consumption growth rates and rates of return are
jointly lognormally distributed,9
E~[-a(c,,,-c~)tlogp}rr,~]t ~Var[-oc(c,,,-c~)tlogptr~,t] -
Er[-a'(c;,,-c;)tlog(3'tr~;,]t 1 Var[-ot'(c;,t-c;)tlog~i'trJ;,] - 1 (22)
2
where lower-case variables represent logarithms; thus log(C,,,)-c,t,, log(C~t,)-c~,,, log(R,t,)-rj„
and log(R~~,)-r~t„ 4 is the first difference operator and Var is the abbreviation of variance.
Rearranging leads to
Er[r~,~-r~,,] - ~Var[-a`4cr.,tlog~3'trr,,]- ~Var[-otOc~,~tlog~3trr,t]}
e Representative consumers from different countries need not consume the same basket of goods, nor does the
law-of-one-price necessarily hold for each good. The existence of restrictions on vade between countries will
generally not lead to the segmentation of international asset markets. If no goods can ever be traded, however,
asset markets will be completely segmented internationally ( see Wheadey, 1988, p. 184).
' Subtracting the fundamental equation of the Permanent Income Hypothesis (PIH) for the foreign country from
that of the home country, and assuming CRRA utility, jointly lognormal distribution of consumption growth and
rates of return ( see Mankiw, 1981, Mankiw, 1985, Koedijk and Smant, 1994) also yields equation (22).
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log(3'-log(~ taE~[4c~.,1-a'E~[Oc~.,] (23)
where E,r,,, and E,r~,, are the expectations of the logarithms of the real returns on some traded
asset in the home and the foreign country and E,(Oc,t,) and E,(~c;~,) are expected consumpt3on
growth rates in the home and foreign country. Clearly, the expected real return differential
depends negatively on the value of a and positively on the value of (3', positively on expected
consumption growth in the home country, negatively on expecied consumption growth in the
foreign country, negatively on the variance of home-country-specific factors and positively on
the variance of foreign-country-specific factors. Equation (21) should hold for any asset.'o
To get rid of the conditional expectations one has to assume rational expectations. Assuming
rational expectations gives rise to an estimating equation,
r~, l- r~,, - constanr t a ~ c~,, - a' ~ c~; t t e~,, (24)
where E,,, is the forecast error which satisfies Fn(~,t)-0 and where the constant entails the
difference between the variance terms and the ~i's. Financial markets are perfectly integrated
when no infortnation prior to time tfl may help to explain the real return differential.
rr,~-r,;,-constant-a[~C~,,]ta~[OC~.~]-Ez~Y;~OC~,,-~]tEi-i1'j~OCt.~-i]}vr.~ (25)
Thus, perfect financial integration implies:"
Ho : y~ -7~ -0 i - 1 , . . , N j - 1 , . . , N (26)
The definition of financial integration incorporated in Test III differs from the one presented
in Chapter 1. Test III is a test of real interest parity. The next section applies the three Euler
equation tests to quantify the degree of financial integration in the EU.
4.3 Empirical Results and Interpretation
This section applies the three Euler equations to test for the degree of financial integration in
the EU.'Z Obstfeld's (1986, 1989) Euler equation test requires real (per capita) consumption,
'o Since the interest rates paid on straight bonds aze non-stochasuc, contrary to equity returns, they may be placed
outside the conditional expectations operator.
" Note that since the constant includes variances terms, it does not have to be zero for perfect financial integration
to hold.
'Z This chapter mainly tests for priva[e capital flows. During the 1980s private capital flows became increasingly
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national price level and exchange rate data. The Penn World Table (Mark 6) provides easy-to-use
annual real per capita private consumption data in 1985 international prices, the corresponding
price level of private consumption and US dollar exchanges rates (see Appendix 4.A at the
end of this chapter).13 The 14 European countries considered are Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Ireland, Italy, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden and
the United Kingdom." Test I assumes common risk aversion and time preference in all
countries.ls Test I needs additional assumptions about the numerical values of the degree of
risk aversion (a-a.`). We calculate the mazginal rates of intertemporal substitution and test if
they are equalized across countries. That is, we constructed the variable ~~ as defined in equation
(5) of Section 4.2 for the EU countries (no asterisk) vis-à-vis Germany (asterisk). Three
alternatives were chosen for the risk aversion parameter a, which equals a`: a~.75, a-1 and
a-2. These values for a may be seen as reasonable benchmark values.1ó Furthermore, test
I assumes that domestic and foreign agents apply the same rate of time preference ((i-(i`).
Table 4.1 summarizes t-statistics and F-statistics of bilateral tests of perfect financial
integration between EU countries (home countries) and Germany (foreign country)." The sample
period is divided into two subperiods 1963-1978 and 1979-1992, reflecting ihe start of the
European Monetary System (EMS). As explained in Section 4.2, the test procedure involves
determining whether variables contained in the information set available prior to time t can
help to predict t~,. The sample period begins in 1963, since three degrees of freedom are lost
in estimation. If the null hypothesis yo-0 is rejected and~or the null hypothesis y,-yZ-O is rejected,
financial markets are said to be imperfectly integrated. The number of rejections of the null
hypotheses over the period 1963-1978 are: Austria (Ox), Belgium (Ox), Denmazk (Ox), Finland
(Ox), Greece (Ox), Ireland (Ox), Spain (Ox), France (lx), Italy (lx), Netherlands (lx), United
Kingdom (2x), Portugal (2x) and Sweden (2x). The number ofrejections of the null hypotheses
over the period 1979-1992 are: Denmark (Ox), Belgium (Ox), Greece (Ox), Ireland (Ix), Spain
(lx), Sweden (lx), United Kingdom (lx), Ausvia (2x), Finland (2x), Italy (2x), France (3x),
Netherlands (3x) and Portugal (3x).
more important as opposed to public capital flows.
" Quarterly consumptíon data are not available for a sufficient number of EU countries.
" That is, we exclude Luxembourg. Data for Gennany refer to the Federal Republic ofGermany before unification.
15 Test III relaxes these assumptions.
16 Ideally, one would want to estimate a and à. The estimation of a and à is taken up in our new Euler equation
test of financial integration. Obstfeld (1989) uses the following values for the parameter a to conswc[ quarterly
times series of ry, over the period 1962:[I-1985:II using Japan and Germany as the foreign countries and the US
as the domestic country: a~-0.5, 0.75, 1, 1.5, 2, 3, 5, 7, 12, 25. Note that since a ís assumed to be constant, or~-0.75,
a-1 and a~2 imply a constant risk premium.
" However, Obstfeld emphasizes the dramatically increasing correlation between German consumption growth
and world consumption growth. Therefore, one may argue that Germany does not appear to be a very representative
reference country to test for financial integration in Europe.
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Table 4.1 - Obstfeld's (1986,1989) Euler equation test of financial integration: 1963-1978
and 1979-1992'
~r - Yo}~2-~~i~r-t}vr
Counvy Yeaz of full 1963-1978 1979-1992
liberalízation of yo-0 T~~1'z-0 To-O T~-Yz-O
capital convols` t F(2,15) t F(2,13)
Ausvia- 1991 a-0.5 0.01 0.62 -2.79' 4.39r
Germany a-1.0 -0.20 0.80 -2.56' 2.27
a-2.0 -0.69 0.91 -1.76 0.08
Belgium- 1990 a-0.5 0.73 0.71 1.01 1.42
Germany a-1.0 0.19 1.55 0.77 1.97
a-2.0 -1.02 1.57 -2.06 0.41
Denmark- 1988 a~-0.5 0.66 0.42 0.96 0.32
Germany a-1.0 0.25 0.30 0.40 0.33
a-2.0 -0.86 0.01 -0.43 1.60
Finland- 1991 a-0.5 1.35 0.27 0.09 2.45
Germany a-1.0 0.81 0.11 -0.15 3.82r
a-2.0 -2.06 OJO 0.22 13.]6TM
France- 1993 a--0.5 1.59 0.97 1.77 8.94rr
Germany a-1.0 0.70 1.34 -0.46 5.39r
a-2.0 -2.92' 2.38 -0.58 S.OIr
Greece- 1994 a-0.5 1.16 1.44 1.78 - 0.15
Germany' a-1.0 0.41 0.82 0.01 0.17
a-2.0 0.79 2.95 1.55 0.55
Ireland- 1992 a-0.5 1.49 0.32 -0.03 3.89r
Germany a-1.0 1.59 0.25 -1.12 2.51
a-2.0 -1.80 2.31 -1.34 0.42
Italy- 1992 a-0.5 1.42 0.96 -0.94 2.44
Germany a-1.0 0.82 1.86 -2.69' 2.98
a-2.0 -2.95" 1.96 -1.38 4.13r
Netherlands- 1975 a-0.5 -0.97 0.14 2.65' 0.70
Germany a-1.0 -1.67 0.49 2.81' 0.51
a-2.0 -3.19" 1.63 2.21' 0.20
Portugal- 1993 a-0.5 0.76 4.77r 2.23' 7.91rr
Germany" a-1.0 O.12 0.06 -1.27 8.14rr
a-2.0 -2.52' 0.75 -2.77' S.37'
Spain- 1994 a-0.5 0.75 0.69 -0.23 0.36
Germany a-1.0 -0.22 0.72 -1.54 0.33
a-2.0 -2.12 0.74 -2.35' 0.95
Sweden- 1993 a-0.5 1.85 S.OOr 1.15 4.65r
Germany a-1.0 1.52 4.32r 0.09 3.19
a-2.0 0.06 2.12 -0.53 ] .57
United 1979 a-0.5 2.19' 0.09 -0.30 1.76
Kingdom- a-1.0 2.86' 1.14 -0.89 1.94
Germany a-2.0 -0.73 0.91 -1.51 4.llr




Calculated over the period 1963-1978 and 1979-1991 due to data availability.
Calculated over the period 1963-1978 and 1979-1990 due to data availability.
Yeaz of full liberalization of capital controls with respect to the home country (Restrictions on payments
for capital transactions t Sepazate exchange rate(s) for some or all capital transactions andlor some or all
invisibles). Full liberalization of capital controls with respect to Germany in 1973. See IMF, Annual Report
on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions (various issues).
Significantly different from zero at the 95~0 level of confidence (two-tailed t-test).
Significandy different from zero at the 99010 level of confidence (two-tailed t-test).
Significantly different from zero at the 95qo level of confidence (F-test).
Significantly different from zero at the 99010 level of confidence (F-test).
The estimation method for the results in the table was OLS. See Dougherty (1992, pp. 364-371) for the critical
values of the t- and F-distribution at the 9501~ and 99070 levels of confidence.
Source: Penn World Table (Mark 6).
As is clear, the interpretation of these results is complicated by few degrees of freedom.
Somewhat surprisingly, financial integration appears to have been stronger during the 1963-1978
period than during the 1979-1992 period. This is quite surprising, as many European countries
(including Getmany) had relatively more stringent capital controls during much of the 1963-1978
period (see IMF, Annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions and
Krugman and Obstfeld, 1994, Chapter 20) than during the 1979-1992 period. Hence, the non-
rejection of the null of financial integration in test I is most likely due to the fact that test I
has low power.
The second test is Obstfeld's (1994a, 1994b) Euler equation test of financial integration.
This test assumes trade in risk-free and risky assets. Table 4.2 summarizes simple cross-
correlation coefficients of per capita consumption growth rates on a country-by-country base.
Furthetmore, we report absolute t-statistics for the null hypothesis that there is no association
between consumption growth rates, that is, the null hypothesis of perfect capital immobility.
In contrast to tests I and III, test II considers all pairs of countries in the sample. The sample
period 1961-1992 is split into two subperiods: 1961-1978 and 1979-1992. To ensure
comparability, we calculate growth rates from per capita private consumption denominated in
US dollars. The bold figures on the diagonal are the averages of all correlations for each EU
country over the three sample pet7ods. The null hypothesis of perfect capital immobility over
the period 1961-1992 is rejected for: Austria-Belgium, Austria-Netherlands, Austria-Portugal,
Austria-Spain, Belgitun-France, Belgitun-Germany, Belgium-Italy, Belgium-Netherlands, Belgium-
Spain, Belgium-Sweden, Denmark-Finland, Denmark-France, Denmark-Germany, Denmark-
Netherlands, Denmark-Sweden, Finland-France, Finland-Germany, Finland-Sweden, Finland-
United Kingdom, France-Greece, France-Italy, France-Netherlands, France-Spain, France-Sweden,
Getmany-Ireland, Germany-Netherlands, Germany-Spain, Germany-Sweden, Greece-Netherlands,
Ireland-Netherlands, Italy-Netherlands, Italy-Spain, Italy-Sweden, Netherlands-Spain, Netherlands-
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Sweden, Portugal-Spain and Spain-Sweden. The null hypothesis of perfect capital immobility
over the period 1961-1978 is rejected for: Austria-Portugal, Denmark-Finland, Denmark-France,
Finland-France, France-Italy, France-Spain, Italy-Spain, Netherlands-Spain and Spain-Sweden.
Finally, the null hypothesis of perfect capital immobility over the period 1979-1992 is rejected
for: Belgium-Italy, Belgium-Netherlands, Finland-Sweden, Finland-United Kingdom, France-
Sweden, France-United Kingdom, Germany-Netherlands, Germany-Spain, Ireland-Netherlands,
Ireland-Spain, Netherlands-Spain, Portugal-Spain and Sweden-United Kingdom.
The number of rejections of the null hypothesis of perfect capital immobility over the period
1961-1992 of individual countries with respect to any country pair in ascending order are: United
Kingdom (lx), Greece (2x), Portugal (2x), Austria (4x), Denmark (Sx), Finland (Sx), Italy (Sx),
Belgium (7x), Germany (7x), France (8x), Sweden (8x), Spain (8x) and the Netherlands ( lOx).
The number of rejections of the null hypothesis of perfect capital immobility over the period
1961-1978 of individual countries with respect to any country pair in ascending order are:
Belgium (Ox), Germany (Ox), Greece (Ox), Ireland (Ox), United Kingdom (Ox), Austria (lx),
Netherlands (lx), Portugal (lx), Spain (lx), Denmark (2x), Finland (2x), Italy (2x), Sweden
(2x) and France (4x). The number of rejections of ihe null hypothesis of perfect capital
immobility over the period 1979-1992 of individual countries with respect to any country pair
in ascending order are: Austria (0), Denmark (Ox), Italy (lx), Portugal (lx), Belgium (2x), Finland
(2x), France (2x), Germany (2x), Ireland (2x), Spain (3x), Sweden (3x), United Kingdom (3x)
and the Netherlands (4x).
Finally, with the help of the bold figures on the diagonal we find significant rejections of
the null hypothesis of perfect capital immobility over the period 1961-1992 in: France, Germany,
Netherlands, Spain and Sweden. The main finding from test II is that cross-country consumption
correlations have typically been larger during the 1979-1992 period than during the 1961-1978
period, which might be viewed as an indication of closer financial integration in the second
half of the sample period. Clearly, this result may point at increased risk sharing through the
European financial markets. However, all correlation coefficients still are substantially below
unity. Low correlation coefficients may indicate imperfect financial market integration andlor
market incompleteness. Although simple correlation coefficients are never conclusive since
a third factor may be important, Table 4.2 may give valuable insights about differences in the
degree of capital mobility among EU countries and the scope for risk diversification.
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Table 4.2 - Obstfeld's (1994a,1994b) Euler equation test of financial integration: I: 1961-
1992, II: 1961-1978 and III: 1979-1992, respectively
m~(x,x~) - m~(x,x~)
US EL EN ER RE
US I 0.28 (lá7) 0.40 (2.35)' 0.09 (0.49) 0.22 (1.21) 0.34 (1.95) 0.34 (1.95) 0.24 (1.31)'
II 0.07 (0.27) 0.22 (0.87) 0.08 (0.31) 0.00 (0.00) .08 (0.31) .04 (0.16) 0.30 (1.22)
III 0.26 (0.89) 0.28 (0.97) 0.00 (0.00) 0.54 (2.13) 0.28 (0.97) 0.44 (1.63) 0.21 (0.71)'
EL I 0.36 (2.08) 0.04 (0.22) 0.26 (1.45) 0.50 (3.11)" 0.48 (2.95)' 0.15 (0.80)'
[I 0.18 (0.71) 0.11 (0.43) 0.23 (0.92) 0.21 (0.83) 0.19 (0.75) 0.03 (0.12)
III 0.32 (1.12) 0.11 (0.37) 0.21 (0.71) 0.42 (1.53) 0.53 (2.07) 0.12 (0.38)"
EN I 0.20 (1.10) 0.47 (2.87)' 0.51 (3.19)" 0.46 (2.79)' 0.12 (0.64)'
II 0.15 (OS9) 0.60 (2.90)' 0.57 (2.69)' 0.44 (1.90) 0.05 (0.19)
III 0.05 (0.17) 0.t5 (0.50) 0.19 (0.64) 0.28 (0.97) 0.08 (0.25)b
I 0.29 (1.63) 0.52 (3.28)" 0.36 (2.08)' 0.24 (1.31)'
II 0.26 (1.04) 0.67 (3.50)" 0.36 (1.49) 0.32 (1.31)
III 0.37 p.32) 0.54 (2.13) 0.33 (1.16) 0.13 (0.41)"
I 0.49 (3.03)' 0.56 (3.64) 0.52 (3.22)'"
II 0.33 (1.35) 0.34 (1.40) 0.35 (1.45)
III 0.33 (1.16) 0.22 (0.75) 0.30 (0.99)b
ER I 0.39 (2.28)' 0.23 (1.25)'
II 0.]7 (0.67) 0.37 (1.54)
III 0.40 (1.45) 0.45 (1.59)"

























RE TA T R PA WE
US I 0.01 (0.05) 0.24 (1.33) 0.40 (2.35)' 0.41 (2.34)`' 0.50 (3.11)" 0.30 (1.69) 0.17 (0.93)
II 0.41 (1.74) 0.04 (0.16) 0.06 (0.23) 0.51 (2.30)' 0.37 (1.54) 0.26 (1.04) 0.04 (0.16)
III 0.18 (0.61) 0.28 (0.97) 0.33 (1.16) 0.35 (1.12)" 0.34 (1.20) 0.03 (0.10) 0.54 (1.12)
EL I 0.27 (1.51) 0.53 (3.37)" 0.57 (3.74)" 0.36 (2.01)` 0.52 (3.28)" 0.38 (2.21)' 0.21 (1.16)
II 0.05 (0.19) 0.29 (1.17) 0.25 (1.00) 0.47 (2.06) 0.31 (1.26) 0.22 (0.87) 0.37 (1.54)
III 0.34 (1.20) 0.71 (3.34)" 0.60 (2.49)' 0.26 (0.81)' 0.52 (2.02) 0.31 (1.08) 0.18 (0.61)
EN I 0.01 (0.05) 0.14 (0.76) 0.37 (2.14)' 0.34 (1.88)` 0.31 (1.76) 0.41 (2.42)' 0.02 (0.11)
II 0.12 (0.47) 0.16 (0.63) 0.22 (0.87) 0.41 (1.74) 0.29 (1.17) 0.45 (1.95) 0.13 (0.5])
III 0.08 (0.27) 0.30 (1.04) 0.28 (0.97) 0.24 (0.74)' 0.02 (0.07) 0.22 (0.75) 0.27 (0.93)
I 0.01 (0.05) 0.24 (1.33) 0.17 (0.93) 0.07 (0.36)` 0.36 (2.08) 0.53 (3.37)" .45 (3.46)"
II 0.12 (0.47) 0.16 (0.63) 0.19 (0.75) 0.16 (0.63) 0.39 (1.64) 0.47 (2.06) .27 (1.09)
III 0.08 (0.27) 0.30 (1.04) 0.03 (0.10) 0.32 (1.01)' 0.24 (0.82) 0.64 (2.76)' .78 (4.13)"
I 0.28 (1.57) 0.60 (4.04)" 0.66 (4.73)" 0.01 (0.05)` 0.65 (4.61)" 0.55 (3.55)" 0.21 (1.16)
II 0.23 (0.92) 0.54 (2.48)' 0.40 (1.69) 0.12 (0.47) 0.51 (2.30)' 0.37 (1.54) 0.33 (1.35)
III 0.01 (0.03) 0.26 (0.89) 0.12 (0.40) 0.42 (1.39)' 0.39 (1.40) 0.56 (2.24)' 0.59 (2.42)'
ER I 0.43 (2.56)' 0.36 (2.08) 0.74 (5.92)" 0.07 (0.36)` 0.42 (2.49)' 0.39 (2.28)' 0.17 (0.93)
II 0.18 (0.71) 0.03 (0.12) 0.46 (2.01) 0.10 (0.39) 0.02 (0.08) 0.01 (0.04) 0.10 (0.39)
III 0.55 (2.18) 0.46 (1.72) 0.80 (4.42)" 0.46 (1.55)a 0.61 (2.55)' 0.51 (1.97) 0.44 (1.63)
RE I 0.10 (0.53)' 0.16 (0.86)' 0.41 (2.38)'' 0.18 (0.95)` 0.34 (1.91)' 0.23 (1.25)' 0.01 (0.05)'
II 0.01 (0.04) 0.16 (0.63) 0.36 (1.49) 0.19 (0.75) 0.18 (0.71) 0.22 (0.87) 0.29 (1.17)
III 0.04 (0.13)" 0.32 (1.07)" 0.05 (0.18)" 0.23 (0.71)a 0.13 (0.41)" 0.03 (0.09)b 0.17 (0.55)"
RE I 0.21 (1.16) 0.26 (1.45) 0.47 (2.87)' 0.21 (1.12)` 0.27 (1.51) 0.13 (0.71) 0.32 (1.82)
II 0.00 (0.00) 0.01 (0.04) 0.15 (0.59) 0.03 (0.12) 0.26 (1.04) 0.15 (0.59) 0.46 (2.01)
III 0.29 (1.01) 0.43 (1.58) 0.61 (2.55)' 0.58 (2.14)' 0.68 (3.08)' 0.17 (0.57) 0.28 (0.97)
A I 0.33 (1.88) 0.52 (3.28)" 0.16 (0.84)` 0.56 (3.64)" 0.42 (2.19)' 0.12 (0.65)
lI o.21 (0.83) 0.42 (1.79) 0.20 (0.79) 0.53 (2.42)' 0.26 (1.04) 0.05 (0.19)
III 0.25 (0.86) 0.28 (0.97) 0.11 (0.33)' 0.28 (0.97) 0.40 (1.45) 036 (1.28)
T I 0.43 (2S~' 0.18 (0.95)` 0.64 (4.49)" 0.48 (2.95)' 0.05 (0.27)
II OSS (1.00) 0.13 (0.51) 0.31 (1.26) 0.53 (2.42)' 0.10 (0.39)
III 0.34 (1.20) 0.47 (1.60)" 0.69 (3.16)" 0.16 (0.54) 0.10 (0.33)
R I 0.16 (0.87) 0.45 (2.62)`' 0.26 (1.40)` 0.14 (0.73)`
II 0.10 (0.39) 0.36 (1.49) 0.27 (].09) 0.02 (0.08)
III 0.35 (1.12) 0.87 (5.29)'" 0.31 (0.98)" 0.40 (1.16)'
PA I 0.44 ( 2.64)' 0.63 (4.37)" 0.11 (0.60)
II 0.29 (1.17) 0.73 (4.14)" 0.05 (0.19)
Iu 0.42 (1S3) 0.36 (1.28) 0.36 (1.28)
~ I 0.38 (2.21)' 0.28 (1.57)
II 0.28 (1.13) 0.02 (0.08)
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Correlations over the period 1961-199] due to data availability.
Correlations over the period 1979-1991 due to data availability.
Correlations over the period 1961-1990 due to data availability.
Correlations over the period 1979-1990 due to data availability.
Significantly different from zero at the 95~0 level of confidence (two-tailed test).
Significantly different from zero at the 99~I~ level of confidence (two-tailed test).
The absolute t-values for the sample correlation coefficient are in parentheses. The t-statistic for the correlation
coefficient r is calculated as follows: t-rxJ(n-211-r2) where n-2 are the degrees of freedom (see Dougherty, 1992,
p. 112).
Source: Penn World Table (Mark 6).
Test III focuses on the prediction that, in the presence of integrated financial markets, cross-
country differences in expected asset retums are linearly related to expected consumption growth
rates in these countries. The use of annualdata renders the lognormality of consumption growth
and rates of return (more) realistic. Moreover, the use of annual data avoids the problem of
seasonality in consumption. Representative short-term and long-term interest rates were obtained
from the OECD Main Economic Indicators. Representative stock market indices to calculate
rate of returns were also obtained from the OECD Main Economic Indicators. Unfortunately,
consistent long series of short-term interest rates (Greece and Portugal), long-tetm interest rates
(Greece, Portugal and Spain) and stock market indices (Portugal) were not available.
Subsequently, annual realized real interest rates and real stock returns were calculated using
the Penn World Table (Mark 6) implicit price deflator of private consumption. We calculate
growth rates from per capita private consumption denominated in national currency units using
the Penn World Table (Mark 6) exchanges rate with respect to the US dollar -- since rates of
return are also denominated in national currency units. So, home and foreign country retums
are priced according to their own national consumption behavior. To increase degrees of freedom,
the sample period of test III (1961-1992) differs from the sample periods of tests I and II.
Table 4.3 reports the results of our Euler equation test of iinancial integration for the EU
countries over the period 1961-1992 with Germany as the reference country. Ordinary Least
Squares (OLS) may not be a valid estimation technique of equation (25). This is due to the
fact that the error term ~,,, is correlated with the regressors 4c~„ and Oc~t,. Hence, OLS estimates
of a and a.' are inconsistent. However, the use of annual data renders the lognotmality assumption
of consumption growth and rates of return more realistic. Moreover, the degrees of freedom
for the empirical analysis are limited. To preserve degrees of freedom, we do not perfotm Two
Stage Least Squares (2SLS) estimation. Therefore, we present simple OLS estimates of equation
(25). Furthetmore, we use one-year lagged information.
Empirical Results
Table 4.3 - The new Euler equation test of financial integration: 1961-1992
r~.~-r~., - constant-aOC,.~ta'4C~;,-y~~C,t7,OC, tv,.~
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Austria Short-term bond market Long-term bond market' Stock market'
Constant -0.002 (0.004) -0.006 (0.003)' -0.02 (0.04)
4C,,, 0.06 (0.21) 0.15 (0.15) 2.32 (2.00)
~C;,, -0.09 (0.21) -0.1 S (0.16) -2.60 (2.07)
~C, -0.35 (0.20)' -0.32 (0.15)' 0.58 (1.91)
~C; 0.40 (0.20)' -0.33 (0.15)' -0.57 (1.98)
Á- 0.02 0.11 -0.12
LM,,R(I) 1.45 1.87 1.73
Belgium Short-term bond market Long-term bond market Stock market
Constant 0.005 (0.006) 0.002 (0.005) -0.02 (0.03)
OC,,, 0.77 (0.15)' 0.80 (0.12)' 2.25 (0.67)'
OC;,, -0.73 (0.16)' -0.78 (0.13)' -2.48 (0.71)'
OC, -0.002 (0.15) -0.04 (0.12) -0.61 (0.66)
4C; 0.03 (0.16) 0.09 (0.13) 0.17 (0.71)
Á2 0.48 0.61 0.25
LM,~( I) 14.68 11.47 0.77
Denmark Short-term bond market Long-term bond market Stock market
Constant 0.01 (0.01) 0.02 (0.01)' 0.04 (0.04)
4C,,, 0.92 (0.28)' 0.92 (0.23)' 1.16 (1.23)
~C;,, -0.91 (0.28)' -0.93 (0.23)' -0.44 (1.24)
OC, 0.29 (0.24) 0.10 (0.20) -1.37 (1.07)
~C; -0.30 (0.25) -0.19 (0.21) 1.01 (1.12)
itz 0.32 0.32 0.03
LM„a(1) 11.22 6.69 0.11
Finland Short-term bond market Long-term bond market' Stock market
Constant 0.007 (0.01) 0.01 (0.02) -0.08 (0.06)
~C,,, 0.71 (0.20)' 0.70 (0.30)' 1.16 (0.84)
~C;,, -0.86 (0.17)' -0.88 (0.23)' -1.26 (0.68)'
~C, -0.30 (0.19) -0.36 (0.26) 1.94 (0.80)'
~C; 0.36 (0.17)' 0.44 (0.22)' -2.10 (0.70)'
Á~ 0.48 0.48 0.25
LM,.;. : ~ ~.~? 1.82
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France Short-term bond market Long-term bond market Stock market
Constant 0.02 (0.02) 0.03 (0.02) 0.001 (0.07)
eC,~, -1.42 (0.8s) -1.4s (0.78)' 0.77 (2.87)
eC;t, -0.04 (0.11) -0.06 (0.10) -0.2s (0.36)
eC, 1.23 (0.83) 1.21 (0.77) 0.02 (2.82)
eC; 0.17 (0.11) 0.16 (0.10) -0.3s (0.38)
Á2 -0.003 0.01 -0.07
LM,~(1) 2.35 1.81 0.003
Greece Short-term bond market Long-term bond market Stock market
Constant - - 0.14 (0.1)
eC,,, - - -1.05 (1.00)
eC;,, - - -0.57 (0.90)
eC, - - 0.08 (0.9s)
ec; - - -o.7s (0.79)
Ít2 - - 0.24
LM,,R(1) - - 1.98
Ireland Short-term bond market' Long-term bond market' Stock market
Constant 0.03 (0.15) 0.01 (0.01) 0.07 (0.04)
eC,~, 0.60 (0.19)' 0.63 (0.14)' 0.83 (0.60)
eC;t, -0.71 (0.19)' -0.70 (0.14)' -1.2s (0.62)'
eC, -O.ls (0.19) -0.04 (0.14) -1.19 (O.s9)'
eC; 0.22 (0.19)' 0.09 (0.14) 0.51 (0.61)
it2 0.37 O.s6 0.19
LM„~(1) 1.73 1.28 1.20
Italy Short-term bond market Long-term bond market Stock market
Constant -0.01 (0.01) O.OOS (0.009) -0.04 (0.07)
eC,y, 0.66 (0.12)' 0.62 (0.10)' 1.58 (0.69)'
eC;,, -0.6s (0.14)` -0.60 (0.11)' -1.80 (0.7s)'
ec, 0.04 (0.12) -0.10 (0.10) -1.49 (0.69)'
eC; 0.01 (0.14) 0.18 (0.11) 1.21 (0.75)
it2 0.48 O.ss O.ls
LM,,R(1) 5.37 4.34 2.05
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Netherlands Short-term bond market Long-term bond market' Stock market
Constant -0.004 (0.005) 0.007 (0.004)' 0.02 (0.02)
eC,,, 0.18 (0.25) 0.12 (0.22) 0.20 (0.91)
eC;,, -0.15 (0.25) -0.07 (0.22) 0.11 (0.93)
eC, -0.43 (0.25)' -0.53 (0.23)' -2.22 (0.90)'
eC; 0.41 (0.25) 0.54 (0.23)' 1.95 (0.93)'
Á2 -0.03 0.26 0.18
LM,,R(1) 5.54 3.40 0.51
Spain Short-term bond market' Long-term bond market Stock market
Constant -0.02 (0.02) - 0.01 (0.07)
eC,,, 0.83 (0.24)' - 0.20 (0.77)
ec;,, -o.7s (o.2a)' - -0.17 (a7s)
ec, o.lo (o.z3) - -o.21(a7a)
eC; 0.03 (0.24) - -0.54 (0.78)
itz 0.41 - -0.06
LM,,R(1) 2.96 - 7.46
Sweden Short-term bond market Long-term bond market Stock market
Constant -0.009 (0.006) -0.005 (0.005) 0.001 (0.03)
eC,,, 0.72 (0.13)' 0.74 (o.l l)' 2.22 (0.69)'
eC;,, -0.83 (0.10)' -0.85 (0.08)' -1.38 (0.53)'
eC, 0.21 (0.13) 0.14 (o.ll) -0.02 (0.67)
eC; 0.03 (0.10) 0.01 (0.08) -0.89 (0.51)'
itz 0.76 0.81 0.29
LM„~(1) 5.43 5.16 0.02
United
Kingdom
Short-term bond market Long-term bond market Stock market
Constant -0.005 (0.006) -0.007 (0.006) 0.06 (0.04)
eC,,, 0.93 (0.09)' 0.93 (0.08)' 0.94 (O.SI)'
eC;,, -0.88 (0.07)' -0.88 (0.07)' -0.78 (0.43)
eC, 0.03 (0.08) 0.05 (0.08) -1.10 (0.49)'
eC; 0.02 (0.07) 0.01 (0.07) 0.58 (0.43)
itz 0.86 0.88 0.09
LM,,R(1) 1.29 0.70 0.34
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' Estima[ed over the period ]973-1992 due to data availability.
' Significantly different from zero for o~5~0 (one-tailed test).
Standard errors are indicated between parentheses. The estimation method for the results in the table was OLS.
RZ is the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom. LM,~(1) is the Lagrange Multiplier test
for fust-order serial correlation. The critical value for the LM test for first-order serial correlation is xZ(1)-3.84.
Source: Penn World Table (Mark 6) and OECD Main Economic Indicators.
Evidently, the pricing performance of the Euler equation with respect to the short-term bond,
the long-term bond and the stock market is reasonably sound, as is clear from the significant
coefficients for ~C,,, and OC;t, -- indicating a significant relationship between rates of return
and consumption growth. Perfect integration between the short-term bond markets is rejected
for the following country pairs: Austria-Germany, Finland-Germany, Ireland-Germany and
Netherlands-Germany. Perfect integration between the long-term bond markets is rejected for
the following country pairs: Austria-Germany and Finland-Germany. Perfect integration between
the stock mazkets is rejected for the following country pairs: Finland-Germany, Ireland-Germany
and Italy-Germany. For the other country paírs perfect financial integration cannot be rejected.
Some estimates for a and a~ may be inaccurate andlor have the wrong sign. Furthermore,
standazd errors are high. Consequently, the power of test III is low. This probably means that
for some pairs of countries, the assumption of CRRA utility function is not cotrect. Furthermore,
since rates of return and consumption growth are expressed in national currency units, real
exchange rate fluctuations c.q. deviations from ex ante relative purchasing power parity (PPP)
may frustrate the results. To solve for this problem one might be willing to express consumption
growth and rates of return in a common currency. Hence, the variance of the rates of return
may decline with the variance of exchange rate fluctuations. However, since complete hedging
of exchange rate risk is not possible -- partly due to the incomplete availability of hedge
instruments (e.g forward markets for long-term bond instruments) -- the whole problem cannot
be solved.
4.4 An Evaluation of Euler Equation Tests of Financial Integration
Despite the fact that several papers have tested consumption risk sharing with international
aggregate data (Bayoumi and MacDonald, 1995, Canova and Ravn, 1994, Kollmann, 1995 and
Ubide, 1995, among others), we are rather skeptical that this is fruitful approach to measure
the degree of fmancial integration. Rejection of the null hypothesis of perfect financial integration
can be attributed to any of the assumptions above (complete markets, aggregation, lack of
economic integration), not to mention econometric issues (lognormality assumption, endogeneity
etc.), and not just the integration of economies. Suppose there are common shocks hitting Europe
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as a whole at the same time but financial markets are autarkic. Then, consumption correlations
may be different from zero even if no risk sharing takes place (Canova and Ravn, 1994). With
other factors affecting the udlity function (e.g. non-traded goods), correlations may be low even
when there is perfect risk sharing in tradeable goods.
At the very best, Euler equation tests offer some additional information to the existing tests
of financial integration derived from interest parity conditions and saving-investment correlations.
We agree with Bayoumi and MacDonald (1995, pp. 555-556) who argue: "Focusing on
consumption has several atvactive features. The underlying theory is stronger than that for saving-
investment correlations. In addition, since consumption is the ultimate goal of economic activity,
it is a more fundamental test of the effects of financial integration on economic welfare than
either the saving-investment correlations or interest rate comparisons. Also, it appears unlikely
that macroeconomic policy is directed at private nondurable consumption pattems in the way
it may be at the current account." In addition, unlike arbitrage tests based upon closed, covered
or uncovered interest parity, Obstfeld's (1986, 1989, 1994a, 1994b) Euler equation tests do
not require comparisons between rates of return on what might be dissimilar assets -- since
it uses non-financial (real per capita private consumption) data. Thus, tests I and II avoid
methodological problems related to the definition and measurement of interest rates. In addition,
test I implicitly incorporates a test of ex ante uncovered interest parity which does not require
the assumption of a zero exchange risk premium. The derivation of Test I is based on ex ante
PPP which is often violated. Tests II and III implicitly incorporate tests of ex ante real interest
rate parity which does not require ex ante relative PPP is expected to hold (Bayoumi and
MacDonald, 1995, p. 556). Financial integration in tests II and III is fully compatible with limited
integration of economic activity. Finally, in test III the law of one price is invalidated.
4.5 Conclusions
Chapter 4 tested for the degree of financial integration using three Euler equation-based tests.
Since there is no single widely-accepted empirical measure for the degree of financial integration,
Euler equation tests may shed some light on the integration between European financial markets.
Two tests suggested by Obstfeld are applied and in addition we propose one new test. One
of the benefits expected to result from cross-border capital mobility is an improvement in
international risk sharing, specifically, improvements in consumption smoothing and risk
diversification. What do we learn from undertaking these tests?
1. Euler equation tests of financial integration essentially are benchmark tests of perfect
financial integration. Financial integration is a matter of degree, and the extreme cases
(perfect or no financial integration) aze only of theoretical interest. We aze pretty sure
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in advance that the hypotheses that are tested do not hold. There is not perfect financial
integration with respect to a risk-free asset (test I), and there is certainly not perfect
financial integration combined with a complete set ofmarkets in Arrow-Debreu securities
(test II). The tests will reject the hypotheses if they have sufficiently high power. However,
if the tests have low power, they may fail to reject the hypotheses. Moreover, the degrees
of freedom for the empirical analysis are limited. In either case, the information we obtain
is about the power of the tests, and not about the validity of the hypotheses. Nowadays,
one may argue that financial markets are integrated as an approxima[ion. A good test
will not reject the null hypothesis of perfect financial integration.
2. The positive correlation of consumer growth may, as the tests presume, follow from
financial integration. It may, however, also follow from countries being subject to common
shocks (for example, technology, oil price and policy shocks). Furthermore, the EU
countries are to a large extent integrated via trade, which imply large spillovers of shocks
among the countries. The information content of macroeconomic consumption data with
respect to financial market integration is low.
3. Cross-country consumption correlations have typically been larger during the 1979-1992
period than during the 1961-1978 period, which might be viewed as an indication of closer
financial integration in the second half of the sample period. Clearly, this result may point
at increased risk sharing through the European financial markets. However, all correlation
coefficients are substantially below unity and differ considerably. Low correlation
coefficients may indicate imperfect financial market integration andlor market
incompleteness. Concluding, the simple correlations coefficients in Table 4.2 indicate
that there is still significant room for risk diversification among EU countries.
The strong assumptions needed for the simple Euler equation tests suggest that the most suitable
way to test for the degree of financial market integration is to use covered and closed interest
parity conditions which do need less severe assumptions. Consequently, research in Chapters




We apply data from the latest Penn World Table (Mark 6). We use variable 3, RGDPL, real
GDP per capita, 1985 international prices; variable 4, C, real private consumption share of GDP,
1985 international prices; variable 14, PC, price level of private consumption; and variable XR,
exchange rate with US dollar (Penn World Table, Mark 6; see also Summers and Heston, 1991).
Per capita consumption was used to reduce the effect of differences in population growth on
consumption. All per capita private consumption data are in real terms and expressed in US
dollars.
PART II
THE DETERMINATION OF FINANCIAL INTEGRATION
Chapter 5
The Fundamental Determinants of
Financial Integration in the European Union
5.1 Introduction
This chapter focuses on the fundamental determinants of the degree of financial integration
-- or more precisely of the intensity of capital controls -- in the European Union (EU) over
the period 1974-1993.' The sample period starts with the fall of Bretton Woods system of fixed
exchange rates. Macroeconomic evidence seems to support the view that the integration between
European financial markets has increased in recent years (see Lemmen and Eijffinger, 1993,
Frankel, Phillips and Chinn, 1993 and Lemmen and Eijffinger, 1996). It fosters the impression
that remaining differences in nadonal economic and financial structures are unimportant.
Moreover, it may tend to overstate the pressure towards, and hence the speed of integration.
An obvious question, then, is what are the main determinants of financial integration. A thorough
understanding of the determinants of the intensity of capital controls may provide important
insight into the process of financial and monetary integration in Europe and may help in policy
formulation.2
We improve analysis s[arted by Epstein and Schor (1992) and Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-
Ferretti (1994) in a number of aspects. First, previous investigations of the determinants of capital
controls (Epstein and Schor, 1992, Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1994, Gruijters, 1995,
Milesi-Ferretti, 1995 and Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1995) typically constructed dummy variables
or capital contro] indices to measure the degree of financial integration. As we will argue, these
measures are problematic because they do not account for different intensities of capital controls.
We compute deviations from closed interest parity to measure the intensity of capital controls.
Resulting negative (positive) deviations from closed interest parity are associated with capital
export (import) restrictions. Secondly, Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) apply their
analysis to the financial markets of 20 OECD countries. Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) apply
their analysis to 61 developed and less-developed countries. In practice, integration attempts
across the world are more of a geographical nature. The EU financial markets can be seen as
an excellent sample to test for the fundamental determinants of financial integration because
they are in the process of institutional integration. Most legal bamers have been either removed
' The concepts of "financial integration" and "intensity of capital controls" are used interchangeable.
2 Lamfalussy (1990, p. 20) argues: "(...) in order to prevent the emergence of major exchange rate misalignments
policy action has to be directed towazds the causes of capital movements or, more precisely, towards what mazket
participants believe to be "fundamentals"." This argument is also demonstrated by the events during the exchange
crises in the European Monetazy System.
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or aze scheduled to be removed. Furthermore, the EU has adopted a suonger form of
harmonization for its financial services -- a policy of mutual recognition whereby member states
within the EU have agreed to allow financial intermediaries from other states to operate under
home country rules and supervision. Thirdly, Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Fercetti (1994) apply
Maximum Likelihood Estimation to estimate various logitlprobit models. We innovatively apply
a pooled cross-section time-series approach to identify the fundamental determinants of capital
controls. The pooled cross-section time-series model allows us to include those authors' political
variables along with other explanatory variables. Furthermore, several new explanatory variables
are included in our analysis: the unemployment rate, the productivity in the business sector,
the ratios of general government deficit, domestic credit, broad money and gross fixed capital
formation over gross domestic product (GDP) and the ratio of broad money over narrow money.
We find that realized inflation, government instability and gross fixed capital formation are
the fundamental determinants of financial integration in the EU.
Chapter 5 is organized as follows. Section 5.2 provides a meaningful measure of financial
integration, which is the dependent variable in our empirical analysis. As we will argue, the
price measure -- i.e. the closed interest rate differential -- is particularly suited to measure the
intensity of capital controls (lack of offshore interest rates in a number of countries forces us
to construct a synthetic approximation of closed interest differentials using forwazd exchange
rates). Section 5.3 identifies the fundamental determinants of capital controls. First, we briefly
summarize the rationales for capital controls. Subsequently, we link these rationales to several
analytical indicators. The empirical analysis is carried out for 11 EU countries over the period
1974-1993 for which relevant data are available. Finally, Section 5.4 concludes.
5.2 Alternative Measures of the Degree of F~nancial Integratiion
This section addresses the definition and measurement of the dependent variable: the degree
offinancial integration. First, we argue that the price measure is to be preferred to concentrating
on the volume of capital flows themselves. As markets become more integrated, asset prices
often adjust in anticipation ofcapital flows that would otherwise occur. Consequently, the volume
of capital flows is less suited to measure the degree of financial integration.3 In addition, the
price measure is also to be preferred to more legal oriented approaches of capital controls. Since
financial integration is essentially a legal concept, previous research on the determinants of
financial integration (Epstein and Schor, 1992, Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1994, Gruijters,
1995, Milesi-Ferretti, 1995 and Grilli and Milesi-Fetretti, 1995) typically constructed dummy
variables or capital control indices to measure the degree of financial integration. For example,
Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) use dummy variables -- taking the value 1 when capital
' Besides, long time-series data on the volume of gross capital flows are not available (see Kouri and Porter, 1974).
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controls are in place and 0 otherwise -- to measure capital controls. Unfortunately, dummy
variables cannot explain different degrees of intensity of capital controls over time (Epstein
and Schor, 1992, p. 143). The binary nature of dummy variables is not capable to capture the
actual intensity of capital controls. Epstein and Schor (1992) conswct an annual capital control
index compiled from the summary table at the end of the Intetnational Monetary Fund (IMF)'s
Annual Reports on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions. This index is composed
of resttictions on payments for capital transactions (i.e. capital controls) and the use of separate
exchange rate(s) for some or all capital transactions andlor some or all invisibles (i.e. exchange
controls). Both types of restrictions are given equal weight. If both restrictions are in place,
the index takes the value of 2, if one restriction is in place the index takes the value of 1, and
0 otherwise. Appendix S.B at the end of this chapter gives an idea of what this means for our
11 EU countries. Capital control indices are already more capable ofexplaining different degrees
of intensity of capital controls than dummy variables. Epstein and Schor (1992, p. 141), however,
argue that the IMF definitions do no include some indirect measures against capital flows which
might reasonably be considered capital controls (e.g. the interest equalization tax). Furthermore,
the IMF does not distinguish between restrictions to limit capital outflows and restrictions to
limit capital inflows (i.e. the direction of capital flows), and between restrictions on short-term
and restrictions on long-tetm capital flows (i.e. the maturity of capital flows). In our opinion,
these aspects are of crucial importance for policy analysis. Gruijters (1995, pp. 198-213) tries
to overcome these weaknesses and constructs two capital control indices to explain the intensity
of capital import restrictions and the intensity of capital export restrictions, respectively. The
indices are based upon a historical survey of direct and indirect capital control measures in
11 OECD countries. The measure implicitly embodies numerous types of restrictions, with some
being more important than others across different countries. However, the major shortcoming
endemic to all legal measures is the subjective element needed to construct them. Ample historical
evidence suggests that there have been significant discrepancies between the legal and actual
intensity of controls. Restrictions are not always binding (i.e. effective) or some indirect
restrictions are simply not taken into account.' As a result it may be a mistake to conclude
that the market is segmented. The private sector is extremely creative in finding ways to move
capital internationa11y.5 In countries with restrictions on capital mobility, the private sector
has typically resorted to leads and lags in average payments terms for exports and imports to
evade legal controls on capital flows.b Moreover, the Euro currency market has played an
' Clearly, evasion of controls increases over time as agents learn to set up escape routes, so the intensity of capital
controls may decline over time.
5 Jorion and Schwaztz (1986, p. 604) azgue: "Documenting barriers to investment is not sufficient to prove
segmentation, since prices aze determined by marginal investors who may find innovative ways to get around
controls."
6 7herefore, Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995) use a current account restrictions dummy
variable to proxy for the intensity of capital controls.
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important role in evading capital controls. So, one needs to go beyond legal restrictions in
assessing the extent of capital mobility.
The measure we use takes account of short-term financial integration because forward
exchange rates exist only for short horizons generally not exceeding one year.' Our measure
can be seen as a somewhat more continuous (and obviously more time-varying) measure for
capital control intensity than dummy variables and capital control indices. In the investigation
design, the underlying financial assets differ only with respect to currency of denomination
and country-specific regulation (e.g. capital controls and tax treatment), rather than with respect
to asset-specific types of risk (e.g. default risk and liquidity risk) or other risk characteristics.8
We argue that closed nominal interest rate differentials are most suited to capture differences
in the intensity of capital controls. Regulations vary in intensity and effect. The continuous
nature of our measure captures the actual intensity of capital controls. Our argument follows
from the decomposition of onshore covered nominal interest rate parity in Table 5.1. This may
be demonstrated by distinguishing between covered nominal interest parity in onshore markets
(for comparable assets in different political jurisdictions and restrictions on cross-border capital
flows) and covered nominal interest parity in offshore markets (for comparable assets in the
same political jurisdiction and no restrictions on cross-border capital flows). Each of the
components ~~nr, ~P~C1~ and ~e,~o provides information on the source of the onshore covered
nominal interest rate differential. ~p~~s,;~ measures the extent to which domestic controls are
the cause of a nonzero onshore covered nominal interest rate differential. Similarly, c~,arc;~,
measures the extent to which foreign controls contribute to a nonzero onshore covered nominal
interest rate differential. Finally, ~ei~o measures deviations from covered interest arbitrage in
offshore markets. We assume that interest azbitrage ensures that differences from covered interest
rate parity in offshore markets (~eiuo) are negligible. Since banks in Euro markets set Euro interest
rates of the domestic country (say the Euro Sterling rate) equal to foreign Euro interest rates
(say the Euro Deutsche Mark rate) adjusted for the forward premium (discount) on the foreign
currency, offshore covered nominal interest parity will always hold in Euro markets. Deviations
in the Euro market are largely due to technical factors and~or transactions costs (see Giavazzi
and Giovannini, 1989, p. 172).
' Although currency swaps allow us to calculate deviations from covered interest rate parity for longer horizons,
they aze not avaílable over a sufficiently long time horizon (see Popper, 1993).
e Preferably, one might also want to disentangle the effect of nonresident interest rate withholding ta~ration. Interest
withholding taxes importantly affect thepre-tax gross return demanded by international investors. Huizinga (1994)
adjusts the interest rate parity condition for the effect of nonresident interest withholding taxauon. Since the effects
of interest rate withholding taxation are difficult to grasp, we discuss Ihis aspect in Chapter 6.
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Table 5.1 - The decomposition of the onshore covered nominal interest rate differential
(1) Offshore covered nominal interest rate differential
ewo .EWO r.k
~Euro - ~r. ~k-~r.r.k -(Ir -Sr)
(2) Domestic onshore-offshore closed nominal interest rate differential
eWr,
~DomriNc - ~r.r.k-ir.t.k
(3) Foreign offshore-on.shore closed nominal interest rate differential
. Evro
~Foreign - kr.r~k -~r,r-k
(4)-(l)t(2}F(3) Onshore covered nominal interest rate differential
~-~ Donuiric t~ Forrign } w Evra -
{' r-k
~I.r.k-~r.r.k-~Jr -Sr) -
~~r.r.k-~ ~r.kl t ~l
~Evro r.k-Sr
))r.r.k -(Ir
Now, we may derive our measure for the intensity of capital controls. The domestic intensity of capital
con[rols may be approximated by the adjusted domestic covered nominal interest rate differential
A, .Euro F r.k
~Dorncrnc - ~ - ~Fmdan - ~Dome.rtic } w Ewo - ~r.t.k-~r.r.k -(Ji -Sr)
while the foreign íntensity of capital controls may be approximated by the adjusted foreign covered nominal
interest rate differential
E.ro . F r.k
~ Fwágn -~ -~ Dornesric -~ Forá;n t~ Euro - ~ r. r. k - kr, r.k - (J r - Sr )
where banks ensure that offshore covered nominal interest rate parity holds continuously. That is, we may
write
Ewo .Euro r.k )
kr.r.k - kr.r.} }(I~ -Sr
and
.eWr, eWr. { r.k
~rJ.k - kr.r.k-(Jr -Sr)
130 The Fundamental Determinants of Financial Integration in the European Union
Symbols:
t,.,.k - domestic onshore nominal interest rate at time t on a k-period bond held between time t and tfk
eWo




forward exchange rate at time t for the delivery of foreign currency at time ttk
spot exchange rate at time t(defined as units of domestic currency per unit of foreign currency)
holding period of the underlying financial ínstrument
denotes a foreign variable
Sources: Goldsbrough and Teja (1991) and authors' own summazy of the literature.
Under this assumption, the domestic onshore-offshore interest rate differential may be
approximated by the adjusted domestic covered nominal interest rate differential. Consequently,
the domestic intensity of capital controls may either be measured by the domestic onshore-
offshore closed nominal interest rate differential
m Euro
TDomestic - tt,t~k-1t.Nk
or by the adjusted domestic covered nominal interest rate differential
~Euro p tfk
~Domestlc - tt,trk-tt.t.k -(Jt -St)
(1)
(2)
Domestic capital controls will be an important reason for significant deviations from onshore
closed interest parity.9 Since offshore covered nominal interest rate parity is zero by assumption,
it follows that any differential between the domestic rate and the Euro rate on a comparable
asset is likely to reflect domestic capital controls.'o Closed and adjusted covered nominal interest
rate differentials have been widely used to measure the intensity of capital controls. The closed
and adjusted covered nominal interest differentials -- we will refer to as country risk premia
-- primarily reflect the joint influence of existing and expected capital controls (i.e. political
risks) (Aliber, 1973, p. 1453). They indicate agents' ability to move financial assets across
national borders. Nevertheless, care must be exercised in taking the closed interest rate
differentials as an indication of the intensity of capital controls, since differences in asset-specific
' More precisely, capital convols that are economically significant -- thus lying outside a small band of differentials
created by transaction costs.
'o This reasoning applies to both direct or quantitative measures (consisting of outright restrictions or prohibitions
of certain capital transactions) and ind"uect or cost measures (effecting the operations of the banking and nonbanking
sector). Of course, with indirect capital controls cross-border capital flows are still possible. Numerous qualitative
studies exist that describe the introduction and workings of capital control measures.
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types of risk cannot be completely excluded."
Annual series of closed interest rate parity for Germany, France, Netherlands and the United






Unfortunately, Euro interest rates are not availahle for Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland,
Italy, Spain and Sweden. Therefore, for these countries we calculate annual series of adjusted
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which is equivalent to the closed interest rate differential under the assumption of covered interest
rate parity in offshore markets. Three-month Euro DM interest rates are used to calculate the
adjusted domestic covered nominal interest rate differentials. Furthetmore, we use own cross-rate
calculations of spot and forward exchange rates of EU countries vis-à-vis the DM based upon
end-of-period spot and forward exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar. Henceforth, when we
speak about closed interest differentials we also mean adjusted covered interest rate differentials.
Appendix S.C plots the year-by-year average deviations from the price measure over the
period 1974-1993. Unfortunately, we had to take a shorter sample period for Italy (1977-1993)
due to the lack of forward exchange rate data. Clearly, Appendix 5.C shows a declining pattern
of closed interest differentials, with alternating periods of reladvely high and low capital control
intensity. Why do governments regulate financial markets? The next section identifies the main
detenninants of capital controls.
5.3 Empirical Results and Interpretation
This section identifies empirically the fundamental determinants of financial integration in the
EU. Furthermore, we take an eclectic approach to identify the fundamental determinants of
financial integration in the EU. Before turning to the estimation results, we will briefly describe
the main rationales for capital controls. In addition, we offer some analytical indicators for the
" The price measure may be more informative about country-specific regulation using treasury bill rates with
the same default risks. Unfortunately, treasury bill rates are unavailable for all EU countries considered, or the
depth of tbe treasury bill market is low (see Cumby and Obstfeld, 1984, p. 132 and Appendix S.A).
'Z Data for Germany refer to the Federal Republic of Germany before [he unification of Germany.
132 The Fundamental Determinants of Financial Integration in the European Union
relevant determinants of capital controls." The following explanations have been given in
the literature for the introduction of capital controls:"
(1) Monetary determinants of capital controls
Possible candidate determinants of capital controls with respect to monetary policy are realized
inflation (INF), domestic credit (CRED) and broad money (M2).15 In integrated financial markets
monetary policy cannot control interest rates and exchange rates simultaneously, without the
use of another instrument -- capital controls. Controls on capital inflows are intended to keep
a strong currency from becoming stronger. Controls on capital outflows are intended to support
a weak currency. The imposition of capital controls allows the authorities to pursue "inconsistent"
monetary policies for a while.1ó Consequently, high (low) levels of INF, CRED and M2 may
indicate the increased presence of capital export (import) controls.
(2) Fiscal determinants of capital controls
We conjecture that the ratio of general government deficits to GDP (DEF) may be a relevant
indicator for the intensity of capital controls. Capital controls may help to smooth andlor delay
necessary internal adjustments to outside pressures. Governments with large budget deficits
relative to GDP are expected to impose more capital export restrictions to preserve the tax base.
(3) Political determinants of capital controls
Possible political detetminants of capital controls are the proxy for the political leaning of the
government (LEF~ and the proxy for the political instability ofcountries (SIGGOV). Left-wing
governments are hypothesized to favor the taxation of capital income over that of labor income.
They are tempted to introduce capital controls to prevent capital export to maintain a large
domestic tax base for capital levies (Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Fetretti, 1994). We introduce
the dtunmy variable LEFT, taking the value 1 when a left-wing govemment is in place and
"These analytical indicators aze paztly jusufied by previous findings of Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994).
" Several authors have dealt with the issue of the rationales for capital controls (see, for example, Cairncross,
1973, OECD, 1980, 1990b, Bank for International Settlements,1990, Goldstein, Mathieson and Lane, 1991, Bacchetta,
1993, Bank for International Settlements, 1994 and Mathieson and Rojas-Suarez,1993,1994). See also Knot (1995)
on the issue of the fundamental determinants of interest differentials in the EMS.
15 Since related attributes such as the inflation tax and seigniorage revenue are strongly posiuvely correlated with
the inflation rate, they aze not included in the analysis. Similazly, the depreciation of the exchange rate is not included
in t)]e analysis since it is highly positively correlated with the inflation rate. In addiuon, the depreciation of the
exchange rate is less well suited since it also involves foreign policy behavior.
16 The OECD (1990a, p. 23) azgues: "Thus, exchange controls have been often viewed as a means whereby the
authorities may seek to insulate, at least temporarily, domesuc credit ezpansion from monetary developments abroad
and increase the autonomy with which the supply of money can be steered to influence domestic objectives." See
also the articles of Eichengreen, Tobin and Wyplosz (1995, pp. 162-172), Gazber and Taylor (1995, pp. 173-180)
and Kenen (1995, pp. I81-192) written for the January 1995 Economic Journal Policy Forum on "Sand in the
Wheels of International Financé'.
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the value 0 otherwise (see Appendix 5.A). Our dummy variable LEFT corresponds to the one
constructed by Milesi-Ferretti (1995) and Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1995)." However, note
that left-wing governments may conduct perfectly right-wing policies. FuRher, note that the
dummy variable LEFT does not distinguish between weakly and strongly left governments.
Both weakly and strongly left govetnments take the value 1 in the dummy variable LEFT. The
construction of a strongly LEFT dummy variable would have led to too many zero entries. Of
course, future research should constroct an index variable to account for different intensities
of left-wing governments. Furthermore, we expect political unstable countries to have more
capita] export restrictions. We proxy the political instability of countries with the frequency
of significant govemment changes (SIGGOV) as constmcted by De Haan and Van 't Hag (1995)
(see Appendix S.A).18 Inflation tax and seigniorage revenue are positively related to the
instability of the government. Countries with more unstable governments rely more on inflation
tax and seigniorage revenue as opposed to income taxation as source of revenue (Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tabellini, 1991 and Cukietrnan, Edwards and Tabellini, 1992). Consequently,
the inflation tax and seigniorage revenue argument for capital export controls is also captured
by the political instability variable.19
(4) Institutional determinants of capital controls
Possible institutional determinants of capital controls are the proxy for the independence of
the central bank (ES) and the proxy for the flexibility of the exchange rate arrangement (EXR).
The incentive of the government to impose capital controls depends on the degree of control
the govemment has over monetary policy. The control the government acquires over monetary
policy depends (among other things) on the degree of independence of the central bank. We
employ the Eijffinger-Schaling index (ES) of central bank independence, since it is available
for all EU countries considered (see Appendix S.A).ZO For the Eijffinger-Schaling index, the
following rule applies: the higher the score ranging from 1 to 5, the more independent the central
bank Thus, we hypothesize the less independent the central bank ihe more capital export controls
" Alesina, C.rilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) construct the dummy variable RADM taking the value -1 when a left-wing
government is in power and tl when a right-wing government is in power.
'g Of course, future research may want to address other indicators for political instability such as MAJOR (i.e.
a majority government is in power) and DURA (i.e. the average number of years in power of the executive during
[he sample period) (see Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1994). Other political instability variables proposed
by Milesi-Ferretti (1995 ) such as COUP (i.e. the number of successful coups during the sample period) and NODEM
(i.e. the government is non~emocratic) are less relevant in the EU. Siermann (1996) constructs an excellent data-set
of indicators to proxy for the democratic chazacter of a country and its level of political instability.
" Tite Grilli, Masciandazo and Tabellini (1991) index of significant government changes gives similaz results.
However, this index is not available for Finland and Sweden.
~ Cukierman's legal index (LVAU) of central bank independence which is also available for all EU countries
in our sample gives similaz results. The Grilli, Masciandazo and Tabellini (1991) total (economic and political)
index of central bank independence also gives similaz results. However, this index is not available for all EU
countries. The same holds for the Alesina (1988, 1989) legal indices of central bank independence.
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aze expected to be in place. Ensuing, we argue that countries participating in less flexible
exchange rate arrangements are more inclined to use either capital import or capital export
controls. Of course, the ultimate objective of capital controls further depends on the direction
of capital flows. To that end, we construct an index variable EXR of exchange rate flexibility
taking the value of 2 during periods of minimal flexibility, i.e. the exchange rate flexibility
is limited in terms of a cooperative arrangement under mutual intervention arrangements (the
"snake" or EMS), 1 during periods of intetmediate flexibility (i.e. the exchange rate is maintained
within relatively narrow margins in terms of a single currency (DM or US dollar) or a composite
of currencies (ECU)), and the value of0 during periods of maximal flexibility (i.e. more flexible
arrangements) (see Appendix S.A). Our index variable EXR differs from the dummy variable
EXR constructed by Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) where periods of minimal and
intermediate flexibility take the value 1 and periods with maximal flexibility take the value
0.
(S) Structural determinants of capital controls
Relevant financial structure arguments for capital controls are the ratio of general government
debt to GDP (DEBT) and the ratio of broad money (M2) over narrow money (M ])(M2M 1).
Relevant economic structure arguments for capital controls are the ratio of current account balance
to GDP (CA), the unemployment rate (UN), the productivity in the business sector (PROD),
the ratio of gross fixed capital formation to GDP (GCF) and the openness of the economy
(OPEN). Some structural determinants of capital controls may actually apply more to long-term
capital flows. So, in the empirical analysis we should find them to be less significant.
The structure and regulation of the domestic financial system is at the heart of the use of
capital conuols. The rationale for capital conuols and regulation of domestic financial markets
basically results from the desire to avoid systemic risk. Governments with large proportions
of gross debt relative to GDP (DEBT) are expected to impose more capital export controls.
In addition, we hypothesize that countries with less-developed financial markets typically impose
more capital export controls. Less-developed financial mazkets are characterized by relatively
low ratios of broad money (M2) over narrow money (Ml) (M2M1); that is, the development
of more sophisticated deposit instruments is relatively low.Z'
Countries typically have implemented capital controls measures to facilitate the financing
of current account deficits (CA). We expect countries with large current account deficits
(surpluses) to impose capital export (import) restrictions. Note however, that countries generally
show asymmetric behavior with respect to tazgeting the current account: capital export restrictions
21 Unfortunately, it is rather difficult to find relevant indicators of financial market structure. Due to data availability,
we had to employ rather crude measures of financial market structure. Of course, there are more relevant indicators
such as the market share of the five largest banks, or the number of bank branches per 100,00o inhabitants. Goodhart
(1993), King and Levine (1993), Mooslechner (1994) and Cottarelli and Kourelis (1994) examine many other aspects
of financial market structure.
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with current account deficits, no capital import restrictions with current account surpluses.
Another argument for capital controls is derived from possible differences between private and
social returns. This argument has been used particularly in relation to direct foreign investment.
The OECD (1990b, p. 26) argues: "Whereas a private investor will invest abroad if the after-tax
retum from foreign assets is higher than the domestic retum, the social retum to the home country
of the investment may be less than that of a domestic investment since the employment,
production and tax-revenue benefits accrue to the host country." Capital controls can be used
to retain domestic savings at home by reducing the return on foreign asseits and by limiting
access to foreign assets. Thus, capital export controls may help to raise investment in the domestic
economy and, hence, economic growth. A relevant indicator for the private return is the
productivity in the business sector (PROD). The productivity in the business sector reflects
the attractiveness of domestic financial markets as the potendal location of foreign capital. It
provides an indication of the direction of capital flows and, hence, for the objective of capital
controls. Low productivity of the business sector may be an influential argument for restricting
capital exports. A relevant indicator for investment is the ratio of gross fixed capital formation
over GDP (GCF). The lower (higher) GCF, the lower (higher) collateral for the loan, the higher
(lower) the interest rate, the less (more) capital export restrictions are expected to be in place.
With relatively closed financial markets, domestic investors are obliged to invest in the domestic
economy. The unemployment rate (UN) may be a relevant indicator of social costs. With
relatively high unemployment rates more capital export restrictions are expected to be in place.
Another relevant indicator of capital controls may follow from the openness of the economy
(OPEN). With high openness capital controls are less effective, so they are less likely imposed.
On the other hand, one may argue, with high openness capital controls may shield the economy
from foreign competition, so they are more likely imposed. So, the correct argument still has
to be decided upon.
Now, we tum to the estimation of the model. Using a pooled cross-section time-series
regression model, the following general specification for closed interest differentials can be
postulated. The expected signs of the parameters are shown in parentheses under the variables.
The subscript i represents the countries in our sample (i-1,..,N) and the subscript t is the time
subscript (t-1,..,T).
( i- i E"'a )~ ~- f[ C, INF, CRED, M2, DEF, LEFT, SIGGOV, ES , EXR, DEBT , M2M1, ..
(-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (-) (t) (?) (-) (t)
..,CA,UN,PROD,GCF,OPEN]„te~ ~ (5)
(t) (-) (t) (-) (?)




closed nominal interest rate differential
constant term
inflation rate
total domestic credit to the economy as percentage of GDP
broad money as percentage of GDP
general government deficit as percentage of GDP
proxy for the political leaning of the government
proxy for government instability
Eijffinger-Schaling index of ceniral bank independence
proxy for the flexibility of the exchange rate arrangement
general government gross debt as percentage of GDP
ratio of broad money over narrow money
current account balance as percentage of GDP
unemployment rate
productivity in the business sector
gross fixed capital formation as percentage of GDP
openness of the economy
a normally distributed error term with zero mean and constant variance (e-N(0,~~)

















The intention was to use publicly available data sources (see Appendix S.A). The frequency
of the data was dictated by the absence of higher frequency data on important macroeconomic
determinants of financial integration and by the fact that we want to evaluate long-term trends
in financial integration. To overcome problems of multicollinearity, we apply a"bottom-up"
approach. First, we start with the inclusion of monetary policy determinants of capital controls.
Then, we add fiscal policy determinants and test whether the explanatory power of the regression
improves significantly (Wald-test), and so forth. We average the country time-series for five-year
periods (1974-1978, 1979-1983, 1984-1988, 1989-1993) to avoid multicollinearity problems
endemic to such time-series. Furthermore, it removes the problem of cyclical biases in some
of the right-hand variables (for example, the cyclical variations in government deficits). The
sample contains 43 observations (one observation is lost due to the lack of forward exchange
rate data for Italy over the period 1974-1976). The Ordinary Least Squares results aze reported
in Table 5.2. Furthermore, Table 5.2 also reports various diagnostic tests. In each case the models
pass the diagnostic tests. Which determinants do best in explaining closed interest differentials?
From Table 5.2 it can be immediately seen that only three variables are significantly related
to the intensity of capital controls: the realized inflation rate (INF), the frequency of significant
government changes (SIGGOV) and gross fixed capital formation (GCF). The other variables
are not found to be significant.
The regressions show that the realized inflation rate (INF) significantly explains the presence
of capital export restriction in the EU (regression (1)). By now, considerable agreement exists
across studies (Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti, 1994 and Milesi-Fen etti, 1995) that inflation
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critically rationalizes the presence of capital export controls (compare the magnitude of the
estimated coefficients). Giavazzi and Giovannini (1989) have argued that in the beginning of
the EMS the maintenance of capital controls was an essential feature of the functioning of the
EMS. In integrated financial markets monetary policy cannot control interest rates and exchange
rates simultaneously, without the use of another instrument -- capital controls. If the authorities
of weak currency countries wish to avoid or delay the realignment they will be obliged to raise
the domestic interest rates to make investors indifferent to the choice between holding domestic
and foreign assets. However, high interest rates are frequently undesirable for domestic reasons
(economic growth, debt burden). Restrictions on capital export, then, may (temporarily) sustain
the pressure for the domestic interest rate to rise. Capital controls (temporarily) prevent or
discourage speculative capital outflows. Foreigners engaged in speculative transactions will
now turn to the offshore markets, creating large offshore-onshore interest rate differentials (see
Wyplosz, 1988, p. 95).
In regression (6) strong evidence is found for the intensity capital controls to depend negatively
(i.e. capital export controls are more likely) on the instability of the government as measured
by the frequency of significant government changes (SIGGOV). In the years 1992 and 1993
relatively large closed interest differentials occurred in Denmark, Italy, Spain, Sweden and the
United Kingdom despite complete removal of capital controls in the EMS countries as from
1 July 1990. With respect to Spain these deviations probably reflected the temporarily
reintroduction of capital controls while with respect to the other countries political risks such
as fear of renewed introduction of capital controls have contributed to such deviations.
Left-wing governments (LEFT) are found to impose more capital export controls (regression
(5)). However, analogous to Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994) and Milesi-Ferretti (1995)
the relationship between LEFT and the proxy for the intensity of capital controls is not significant.
No evidence is found for justifying an important role for fiscal (DEF) and institutional
determinants (ES and EXR) of capital controls. Probably, realized inflation and government
instability may perfectly account for this result. Countries with high inflation rates and unstable
governments are often associated with high government deficit and debt ratios. Furthermore,
countries with high inflation rates and unstable governments are known to have less independent
central banks, and to have more frequent exchange rate changes (devaluations).
Equation (14) in Table 5.2 gives a satisfactory explanation of closed interest differentials
in the EU. In particular, realized inflation, government instability and gross fixed capital formation
(a proxy for investment) are shown to have a strong and significant influence on closed interest
differentials in the EU. The coefficient with respect to gross fixed capital formation (GCF) is
correctly signed and moderately significant. Importantly, this variable was not included in
previous research by Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994). Capital export controls increase
the domestic supply of capital and consequently lower the domestic interest rate.
Table 5.2 - The fundamental determinants of capital controls in the EU: Empirical results
( i- i E"ro )~ - j~C, INF, CRED, M2, DEF,LEFT, SIGGOV, ES, EXR, DEBT, M2M1, CA, UN, PROD, GCF, OPEN ~~ ~ t e, ~
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15)
C 1.42 1.76 1.27 1.19 1.52 2.00 2.08 2.00 1.46 2.89 2.06 1.62 -1.87 4.31 4.70
(3.76) (1.72) (1.32) (2.80) (3.35) (4.38) (2.33) (3.25) (2.40) (3.96) (4.51) (0.48) (0.59) (3.07) (2.87)
INF -0.31' -0.32' -0.31' -0.31' -0.31' -0.31' -0.31' -0.31' -0.29' -0.33' -0.34' -0.30' -0.24' -0.28' -0.29'









S[GGOV -0.24' -0.24' -0.24' -0.30' -0.27' -0.22' -0.25' -0.26' -0.21' -0.19



















S.E. 1.24 1.25 1.25 1.23 1.25 1.19 1.20 1.20 1.18 1.17 1.18 1.19 1.18 I.16 1.17
ARCH(1) 0.02 0.006 0.04 0.19 0.02 0.007 0.01 0.007 0.03 0.09 0.11 0.0004 0.0004 0.30 0.38
(0.87) (0.93) (0.85) (0.67) (0.89) (0.93) (0.92) (0.93) (0.86) (0.76) (0.74) (0.98) (0.98) (0.58) (0.54)
RZ 0.49 0.48 0.48 0.50 0.48 0.53 0.52 0.52 0.54 0.55 0.54 0.53 0.54 0.55 0.55
N 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43 43
Notes: S.E. is the standard error of the regression, ARCH(1) is the Engle (1982) Lagrange Multiplier test for first order Autoregressive Conditional Heteroskedasticity
(xZ(1) distribution, probability value between pazentheses), R2 is the coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom, N is the number of usable observations
and ' indicates that lhe coefficient is signiticantly different from zero at the 95qa level of confidence (one-tailed test).
Absolute t-statistics are indicated between parentheses.
Source: See Appendix S.A.
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Finally, we should mention some critical measurement issues. First, the relationship between
the intensity of capital conuols and its explanatory variables is often subject to uncertainty.
The finding of no significant association with the intensity ofcapital conuols may simply reflect
the crudeness of the measured dependent and independent variables andlor the loss of information
due to the use of five-year averages. Secondly, conuols on capital outflows may also reduce
capital inflows, as foreign investors worry about their ability to uansfer income outside the
country. Furthermore, a country may imposes both capital import as well as capital export
restrictions. These aspects of capital conuols are difficult to grasp. Lastly, future research may
want to consider closed interest parity for long-term bonds (calculated with the help of interest
rate swaps) as it is unclear if the results go through in financial assets with maturities of say
more than 1 year (see Chapter 6).
5.4 Conclusions
The estimates show that realized inflation, government instability and gross fixed capital
formation can provide a reasonable explanation ofclosed interest differentials in the EU. Realized
inflation clearly tends to exert the strongest influence on closed interest differentials, followed
by government instability and gross fixed capital formation. Apparently, the most important
implication of increased financial integration is that it forces a greater degree of interest rate
parity across countries, and that it reduces the scope for independent monetary policy. After
allowing for realized inflation, remaining differentials from closed interest parity may be
explained by political risks imposed by the international financial community on particular
countries. These political risks are basically attributed to political instability approximated by
the number of significant government changes.
Furthermore, we would like to emphasize that government deficits, current account deficits
and the productivity in the business sector are correctly signed but insignificantly related to
closed interest differentials. Therefore, the adverse effect of inconsistent monetary and fiscal
policies with concomitant large govemment deficits, current account deficits and low productivity
in the business sector may be of some importance in explaining the intensity of capital conuols
in the long run.
In accordance with Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Fenetti (1994) we find capital export conuols
to be more likely in countries with high intlation rates and significant government changes.
In conuast with Alesina, Grilli and Milesi-Ferretti (1994), we also find gross fixed capital
formation to be a relevant determinant of capital conuol intensity. Capital export conuols increase
the domestic supply of capital and consequently lower the domestic interest rate. Furthermore,
this chapter emphasizes the importance of closed interest differentials to measure the intensity
of capital conuols which enables us to distinguish between restrictions to limit capital outflows
and restrictions to limit capital inflows (i.e. the direction of capital flows). Finally, we should
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highlight the impact of (differences in) national economic and financial structures on financial
integration. With capital controls increasingly being eliminated, we expect the underlying
characteristics of economic and especially financial market structure to become increasingly
important for the determination of closed nominal interest rate differentials in the future.
Monetary and fiscal policy in the EU are expected to become increasingly dependent on varying
economic and financial structures, rather than on financial integration.






Germany, France, Netherlands, United
Euro
E~'r. r.3 -1 r. r.3 ]; Kingdom.Year j.~
~Dnme~nc - 12
Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, Italy,;.~z
E [ir r.j-i,.~3 -(Irr-'-sr)], Spain, Sweden.
Yca' j.i~ -Dome~ric 12
Representative three-month domestic money market interest rates
Finding consistent compazable interest rate data for the EU countries under consideration is far from easy.
To the extent possible, given data availability over long sample periods, we tried to use publicly available
represen[ative three-month money market interest rates (monthly series). The integration of one segment of
the money market, that is taking one asset among many, may give a misleading impression of the overall
short- term mobility of capital. This problem may partly be overcome by the use of representative short-term
interest rates. Quoting the OECD (1990c, p. 45): "[...] the aim has not necessarily been to take the same rate
for all countries, but to choose the rates which are the most typical or the most revealing, or again, those
which may be described as the 'reference' rates. In drawing up the following norms, while attention has, of
course, been given to ensuring as much international compazability as possible, it has nevertheless been
necessary to have regard for the fact that the methods of calculation used by countries to some extent reflect
the institutional features of their financial markets."
Country Period Description Source
Austria January 1974- 3-month vibor OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly,
December 1993 Part I
Belgium ]anuary ]974- 3-month treasury bills OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly,
December 1993 Part I
Denmark January 1974- Central bank deposit certificates OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly,
December 1975 Part I
January 1976- 3-month interbank rate OECD, Main Economic Indicators
December 1993
Finland January 1974- Average cost of central bank financing OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly,
April 1987 Part 1
May 1987- 3-month helibor OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly,
December 1993 Part 1
France January 1974- 3-month pibor OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly,
December 1993 Part I
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Germany January 1974- 3-month fibor OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly,
December 1993 Part I
Italy ]anuazy 1974- 3-month treasury bills OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly,
December 1993 Part I
Nether- January 1974- 3-month loans to local authorities OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly,
lands December 1985 Part I
January 1986- 3-month aibor OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly,
December 1993 Part 1
Spain Januazy 1974- Short-term credits up to 3 months OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly,
December 1976 Part I
January 1977- 3-month interbank loans OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly,
December 1993 Pazt I
Sweden January 1974- 3-month treasury bills OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly,
December 1981 Part I
January 1982- 3-month discount notes OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly,
December 1993 Part I
United Januazy 1974- 3-month interbank rate OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly,
Kingdom December 1993 Part I
Representative three-month Euro money market interest rates
Representative three-month Euro money mazket interest rates aze available for the following EU countries:
Germany, France, Netherlands and the United Kingdom (monthly series). Three-month Euro DM interest
rates aze used to calculate the adjusted domestic covered nominal interest rate differentials.
Source: OECD, Financial Statistics Monthly, Pazt I.
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Three-month forward exchange rates vis-à-vis the DM
The following are our own cross-rate calculations of forward exchange rates of EU currencies vis-à-vis the
DM based upon end-of-period three-month forward exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollaz (monthly series).
The forward exchange rates are expressed as premiums (t) and discounts (-) on the forward value of the
currency relative to its spot price. Defining the spot rate as currency units per US dollaz, the formula for the
forward premium on the currency in percent per annum is:
(S,-F,"')x4x100
S~ -
The annualized forwazd premium or discount is based on a 360-day year, and the three-month forward rate
is the rate for 90 days, yielding the factor 4 Ihat is employed in the formula. Since direct DM forwazd (and
spot) exchange rates are not available for all EU countries considered andlor over a sufficiently long period,
we used cross-rate calculatíons of forward and spot exchange rates of EU currencies vis-à-vis the DM based
upon forward exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar. Concerning these cross-rate calculations, we aUeady
presume in the investigation design perfect capital mobility. However, this is only possible on the basis of
the assumption of perfect arbitrage between markets of foreign exchange. Due to transactions costs in
triangular arbitrage, cross-rate calculations do not exactly correspond to direct quotations. In constructing
DM forwazd and spot exchange rates, dollar cross-rate calculations are preferred because of the reserve
currency status of the dollar, the role of the dollar as the world's major intervention cttrrency and the scale
and efficiency of the US financial markets. Forward exchange rates for Italy are only available from January
1977 onwards.
Source: II~4F (1985), International Financial Statistics Supplement on Exchange Rates and II~4F, International
Financial Statistics, líne 60f.
Spot exchange rates vis-à-vis the DM
Own cross-rate calculations of spot exchange rates of EU countries vis-à-vis the DM based upon end-of-
period spot exchange rates vis-à-vis the US dollar (monthly series).





CA Cunent account balance as percentage of GDP OECD, National Accounts, Main Aggrega[es,
Volume I, 1960-1993
CRED Total domestic credit to the economy as per- IMF, IFS Yearbook 1994, líne 32
centage of GDP
DEBT General government gross debt as percentage of OECD Economic Outlook, No. 55
GDP
EXR Variable indicating exchange rate flexibility, IIvIF, Exchange Restrictions, Annual Report,
2 minimal flexibility, 1 intermediate flexibility 1974-1978. IMF, Exchange Arrangements and
and 0 maximal flexibility Exchange Restrictions, Annual Report, 1979-
1993
ES Eijffinger-Schaling index of central bank Eijffinger and Schaling (1993), Eijffinger and
independence (ranges from 1 mínimal indepen- Van Keulen (1995)
dence to 5 maximal independence)
DEF General government financial balance (govern- OECD Economic Outlook, No. 55
ment net lending) as percentage of GDP
GCF Gross fixed capital formation as percentage of IMF, IFS Yeazbook 1994, line 93e
GDP
GDP Gross domestic product OECD, National Accounts, Main Aggregates,
Volume I, 1960-1993
M1 Money as percentage of GDP IMF, IFS Yeazbook 1994, line 34
M2 Money plus quasi-money as percentage of GDP IIvIF, IFS Yeazbook 1994, lines 34 (money) and
35 (quasi-money)
M2M1 Money plus quasi-money over money IMF, IFS Yeazbook 1994, lines 34 (money) and
35 (quasi-money)
INF Rate of change in the consumer price index IIvIF, International Financial Statistics, line 64
(1990-100)
LEFT Dummy variable, taking the value 1 when a Banks (1993), Political Handbook of the World:
left-wing government is in place and the value 1993, CSA Publications, State Universíty of
0 otherwise New York, Binghamton, New York
OPEN Openness of the economy - export of goods and OECD, National Accounts, Main Aggregates,
servicestimports of goods and services over Volume I, 1960-1993
GDP
PROD Index of productivity in the business sector OECD Economic Outlook, No. 55
(1987-100)
SIG- Total number of significant government chang- De Haan and Van 't Hag (1995)
GOV es, measure for political instability
UN Unemployment rate OECD Economic Outlook, No. 55
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ES 3 3 4 3 2 5 2 4 1 2 2
Source: Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) and Eijffinger and Van Keulen (1995).
De Haan-Van 't Hag index of significant government changes (SIGGOV)
Austria Belgium Den- Fin- France Germany Italy Nether- Spain Swe- United
mazk land lands den Kingdom
SIG- 2 4 1 3 4 1 6 3 1 2 0
GOV
Source: De Haan and Van 't Hag (1995).
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Exchange Rate Arrangements (EXR): minimal flexibility (2), èntermediate Jlezibility (1) and maximal
flexibility (0)
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EXR AUS BEL DEN FIN FRA GER ITA NET SPA SWE UK TOTAL
1974 1 2 2 1 0 2 0 2 2 2 0 14
1975 1 2 2 1 0 2 0 2 1 2 0 13
1976 1 2 2 I 2 2 0 2 1 2 0 15
1977 1 2 2 1 0 2 0 2 1 2 0 13
1978 1 2 2 1 2 2 0 2 1 1 0 14
1979 I 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1980 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1981 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1982 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1983 ] Z 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1984 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1985 1 Z 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 IS
1986 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1987 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1988 1 2 2 I 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1989 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 0 1 0 15
1990 1 2 2 ] 2 2 2 2 1 1 0 16
1991 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 18
1992 1 2 2 1 2 2 2 2 1 1 2 18
1993 1 2 2 0 2 2 0 2 1 0 0 12
TOTAL 20 40 40 19 34 40 28 40 10 23 4
Source: Index constructed with the help of Il~, Exchange Restrictions, Annual Repon, 1974-1978 and IMF,
Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, Annual Report, 1979-1993.
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Political leaning of the gavernment (LEFT): IeJi-wing government ( 1), right-wing government (0)
LEFT AUS BEL DEN FIN FRA GER ITA NET SPA SWE UK TOTAL
1974 ] 0 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 8
1975 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 7
1976 1 0 I 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 7
1977 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 0 0 1 6
1978 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 5
1979 1 0 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 1 6
1980 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 0 0 0 0 6
1981 1 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 0 0 7
1982 1 0 1 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 0 8
1983 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
1984 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
1985 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
1986 1 0 0 I 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
1987 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 5
1988 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 5
1989 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6
1990 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6
1991 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6
1992 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6
1993 1 1 0 0 1 0 0 1 1 1 0 6
TOTAL 20 8 9 14 12 9 8 11 12 15 6
Source: Dummy vaziable constructed with the help of Banks (ed.) (1993), Political Handbook of the World:
1993, CSA Publications, State University of New York, Binghamton, New York.
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Appendix S.B
Legal measures of capital controls
Dummy variable ojseparate restríctions on payments jor capital transactions.~ if these restrictions are in place,
the variable takes the value of 1, and 0 otherwise
CONTROLI AUS BEL DEN FIN FRA GER ITA NET SPA SWE UK TOTAL
1974 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 I 9
1975 l 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 9
1976 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 9
1977 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 9
1978 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 8
1979 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 I ] 8
1980 1 0 1 1 1 0 I 0 1 1 0 7
1981 1 0 1 I 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 7
1982 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 7
1983 1 0 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 7
1984 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 6
1985 1 0 1 1 I 0 0 0 1 1 0 6
1986 1 0 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 6
1987 I 0 ] ] 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 7
1988 1 0 1 1 I 0 1 0 1 1 0 7
1989 1 0 0 1 I 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
1990 1 0 0 l 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
1991 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
1992 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 4
1993 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 5
~~rf~~ral. ~ ]x o 1, ~ ]a zn n 1- - ,~ zo r;
Source: International Monetary Fund, Exchange Restrictions, 1974-1978 and International Monetary Fund, Exchange
Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions, Annual Reports, 1979-1993.
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Dummy variable of separate exchange rate(s)jor some or all capital transactions andlor some or all invisibles:
ifthese restrictions are in place, the variable takes the value oJ1, and 0 otherwise.
CONTROL 2 AUS BEL DEN FIN FRA GER ITA NET SPA SWE UK TOTAL
1974 0 1 0 0 1 0 1 1 0 0 1 5
1975 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3
1976 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3
1977 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 ] 3
1978 0 l 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 1 3
1979 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
1980 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
1981 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
1982 0 1 0 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0 2
1983 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1984 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1985 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1986 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1987 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1988 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1989 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1990 0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
1991 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1992 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
1993 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
TOTAL 0 17 0 0 1 0 9 1 0 0 5
Source: International Monetary Fund, Exchange Restrictions,1974-1978 and International Monetary Fund, Exchange
Anangements and Exchange Restrictions, Annual Reports, 1979-1993.
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lndex of restrictions on payments jor capital transactions and separate exchange rate(s)for some or all capital
transactions andlor some or all invisibles: Jj óoth restrictions are in place, the index takes the value 2, if one
restriction is in place the index takes the value of 1, and 0 otherwise.
INDEX AUS BEL DEN FIN FRA GER ITA NET SPA SWE UK TOTAL
1974 1 1 1 1 2 0 2 2 1 1 2 14
1975 1 I 1 1 ] 0 2 1 I 1 2 12
1976 1 1 1 1 I 0 2 1 1 1 2 12
1977 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 2 12
1978 l 1 1 1 1 0 2 1 1 1 2 l]
1979 1 ] 1 ] 1 0 2 0 1 1 1 l0
1980 1 ] 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 9
1981 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 1 1 0 9
1982 1 1 1 1 1 0 2 0 l 1 0 9
1983 1 1 ] 1 1 0 I 0 l 1 0 8
1984 1 1 I 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 7
1985 l 1 1 ] 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 7
1986 1 1 1 1 1 0 0 0 1 1 0 7
1987 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 8
1988 1 1 1 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 8
1989 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 7
1990 1 1 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 7
1991 1 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 6
1992 0 0 0 0 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 4
1993 0 0 0 1 1 0 1 0 1 1 0 5
TOTAL 18 17 15 19 21 0 26 6 20 20 ll
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Chapter 6
Short-Term and Long-Term Government Debt
and Nonresident Interest Withholding Taxes
6.1 Introduction
Many industrialized countries continue to levy nonresident interest withholding taxes on interest
accruing to foreign residents. The large variation in countries' withholding tax regimes in terms
of rates and application, however, suggests that countries disagree what role these taxes play
or should play. To inform the debate, this chapter examines how interest withholding taxes,
insofar as they apply to govemment debt, affect government debt yields for the industrialized
countries. The basic question is to what extent a withholding tax is compounded into higher
pre-tax interest rates on short-term 3-month Treasury bills or T-bills and on long-term 5-year
government bonds. From the estimated mark-up, we can immediately infer to what extent the
nonresident withholding tax is in fact borne by the debt-issuing treasury rather than by the lender
or the lender's treasury. A priori, the relationship between nonresident withholding taxes and
interest rates can be expected to ref]ect, first, whether these taxes are easily evaded by way
of a third country, tax-exempt financial inten~nediaries or by coupon washing techniques. Second,
the interest rate mark-up importantly depends on whether the lender expects to receive a foreign
tax credit to offset the withholding tax. At one extreme, no mark-up should occur if a risk-neutral
investor receives a fully offsetting tax credit, while a full mark-up is consistent with the absence
of any tax credit. Given these complications, empirical estimation of the extent of mark-up
is called for to provide insights into the economic working and incidence of nonresident interest
withholding taxation.
The nonresident withholding tax regime tends to be a patchwork of rates and regulations.
Tax treaties may stipulate different rates for different interest receiving countries, while there
may be a host of exemptions based on the type of debt instrument, its maturity, and the status
of interest payor or payee.' Many countries exempt government debt from nonresident
withholding taxation altogether. Exceptions to this rule among the industrialized countries include
Australia, Italy, Japan, Spain and Switzerland. This chapter focuses on government debt markets,
as they are well-defined, relatively liquid and as it is of prime interest to see how withholding
taxes affect the tax-inclusive government cost of borrowing.
Previously, Brean (1984) has documented a downward effect of the 1975 elimination of interest
withholding taxes on interest rates for Canadian medium- and long-term corporate borrowings
from foreign sources. Along similar lines, Náhrbaf3 and Raab (1990) find that the yield on
' See Gustavsson (1990) and KPMG (1988) for surveys.
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German corporate bonds fully reflects the 10 per cent withholding tax rate in force in early
1989.2 Developing country commercial bank credit terms in the 1970s also reflect nonresident
withholding taxes, as shown in Huizinga (1996). Net-of-tax interest rates charged to developing
country borrowers are shown to be negatively related to withholding taxes as applied to foreign
batilc interest. As a related matter, Demirgu~-Kunt and Huizinga (1995) examine the impact
of dividend and capital gains withholding taxes as imposed by developing countries on their
pre-tax equity returns. Only withholding taxes on capital gains appear to have a discernible
impact on pre-tax equity returns. This is consistent with the rather limited creditability of
nonresident capital gains withholding taxes in the U.S. and other capital exporting countries.'
This chapter examines the link between interest rates and withholding taxes separately for
3-month T-bills and 5-year government bonds, while the international investors in government
debt are taken to be either American or Japanese. With T-bill yields, we in fact estimate a
covered interest parity reladonship adjusted for the withholding-tax mark-up.' T-bills have
the advantage that they are almost free of default risk. To check whether the results also apply
to longer-term debt, we further examine a closed interest parity relationship linking the
government bond yield to comparable offshore swap interest rates in the same currency - but
not subject to withholding taxation. The swap rate reflects the interest rate on a benchmark
bond designated by major securities houses as such, and therefore rather liquid and trading at
a premium.5
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.2 derives the estimating
equations from underlying interest arbitrage relationships. Section 6.3 presents the empirical
results for the T-bill and 5-year government bond markets in two separate subsections. While
the evidence differs somewhat across samples and time periods, overall it is supportive of the
view that withholding taxes are compounded one-for-one into higher pre-tax government yields.
Z In January 1989 [he German government introduced a withholding tax of lOqo for all German domestic instruments
held by residents and nonresidents. The tax was first announced in October 1987 and this resulted in massive capital
outflows. On July 1, 1989, just six months after its inception, the withholding tax was removed (Deutsche
Bundesbank, 1994).
3 In the domestic tax azea, Poterba (1986) and Feenberg and Poterba (1991) examine the implied mazginal tax
rates and revenue losses in the market for tax exempt bonds in the United States.
` Several reasons for deviations from covered interest pazity other than plain credit risk have been noted in the
literature. See Officer and Willett (1970) for an early survey. Aliber (1973) specifically considers political risk,
while Frenkel and Levich (1975, 1977) and Clinton (1988) focus on transaction costs. Taylor (1987, 1989) further
points out the role of data imperfections, and Dooley and Isard (1980), Otani and Tiwari (1981) and Ito (1986)
consider capital controls.
5 Formally, an interest swap is an contractua! agreement whereby two parties exchange a series of cash flows
determined by two different interest rates on the same notional principal for a defined period of time. There is
no exchange of principal at inception or conclusion of the swap. Interest rate swaps can be viewed as portfolios
of forward contracts on interest rates. At each setdement date, the two parties have an implicit forward contract
on interest rates. The interest swap market is a highly competitive market. For a description of interest rate swaps,
see Hul] (1993) and Smithson, Smith and Wilford (1995).
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As indicated, this is consistent with the view that international investors (such as American
and Japanese pension funds) cannot obtain any offsetting foreign tax credits or that there is
wide-spread domestic tax evasion. Section 6.4 evaluates the results and concludes.
6.2 The Estimating Equations
As indicated, the scope for nonresident interest withholding taxation to affect the covered interest
parity c.q. the closed interest parity relationshíp depends on the particular financial instruments
that are considered. In this chapter, we focus on the source-based interest withholding taxation
of 3-month T-bills and 5-year government bonds. The impact of interest withholding taxation
on financial returns, generally, depends on the tax treatment of foreign source interest income
by the intemational investor's domestic tax authority as well as on the withholding tax regime.
This section indicates how the covered and closed interest parity conditions can be adjusted
for the presence of source-based interest withholding taxation.b
In the later empirical work, the investors in intemational government debts are taken to be
American or Japanese. Both the U.S. and Japan generally provide their residents with a foreign
tax credit for nonresident interest withholding taxes paid. In both countries, foreign tax credits
are nevertheless limited to the domestic tax liability on foreign source income. If the foreign
tax credit limitarion is binding, then the investor is said to be in an excess credit position. There
are some differences, however, in the precise calculation of the foreign tax credit limitation.
Japan, for example, allows the foreign tax credit to be calculated on the basis of worldwide
foreign source income, and unused foreign tax credits can be carried forward for three years.
In the 1986 Tax Reform Act, the U.S. has introduced an alternative basket approach to determi-
ning allowable foreign tax-credits. Specifically, a separate income basket or category was created
for foreign-source interest income that is taxed at a withholding tax rate equal to or greater
than 5 per cent. The available foreign tax credit is determined separately for each basket of
income. Within each separate income basket, unused foreign tax credits can be carried forward
five years and back for two years. This legislation effectively has limited the creditability of
high nonresident interest withholding taxes.
The top corporate and personal income tax rates in Japan and the U.S. exceed the wíthholding
tax rates, if any, imposed on nonresident Japanese and U.S. investors by the countries in this
study. This suggests that it is unlikely that international portfolio investors will be in an excess
credit position. This reasoning is faulty, however, as income taxes are applied to net-of-expense
interest income rather than to gross interest receipts. Allowable expenses associated with a
6 With the help of forward rates and swaps both asymmetric tax treatments (i.e. tax provisions that treat government
debt differently in one market than another) and government regulations (i.e. barriers to the government debt market)
are ezploitable.
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portfolio investment typically include the cost of funds necessary to finance the investment.
As a result, an investor's net-of-expense foreign-source income may be very low, and the investor
can be in an excess credit position. Clearly, tax-exempt institutional investors, like pension funds,
are always in an excess credit position, if they any pay nonresident interest withholding taxes.
Let ti; , be the interest withholding tax rate imposed by govemment i on international investors
at time t, and let T be the investor's marginal home country income tax rate applied to all income,
including foreign exchange gains, if the investor pays any domestic tax on foreign source income.
An international investor that is in an excess credit position faces a marginal tax rate on foreign
source income of zero. Let Y be the probability that the international investor can obtain a tax-
credit ex post. Uncertainty regarding the availability of foreign tax credits can, for instance,
be due to the international investor's uncertain returns on financial assets other than government
debt.
First, let us consider the tax-adjusted covered interest parity condition for a U.S. (or Japanese)
investor that can invest in U.S. and non-U.S. T-bills. Let i, and i;', be the U.S. and foreign
country i's T-bill rates at time t, respectively. The investor can borrow freely in dollars against
the U.S. T-bill interest rate. The costs of such borrowings are deductible from the investor's
domestic taxable income. In particular, domestic interest expenses incurred to finance foreign
financial assets are deductible from the investor's foreign source taxable income. Further, any
exchange risk can be eliminated by way of forward exchange contracts. Let F~ ~ and S~ ~ be
the forward and spot exchange rates, defined as amounts of foreign currency i per U.S. dollar.
Both U.S. and non-U.S. T-bills are assumed to carry some sovereign risk. In particular, let 9
be the expected credit loss per dollar invested in U.S. T-bills and 6; be the expected credit
loss per dollar invested in foreign T-bills issued by country i. In case of debt default both
principal and interest are assumed to be lost, but the investor is allowed to write off the full
principal investment against taxable income. A risk-neutral international investor that can freely
borrow to finance any T-bill investment will then be indifferent about doing so if,
~1 t(Y (1 -ti) t(1 -Y)]i~~(1 - 6) tYti 9 -
Y 1 t(1 - ti)((1 t i~.~) Scr -1 ] t(1 -Y) I1 f i~.~(1 -2;"r)1 5
~.~ (1 -8; ) f 1'2 9' (1)
~. ~ ~. ~
Equation (1) reflects that with probability Y the investor faces a positive domestic income tax
rate, ti, on foreign source income. The last terms on both sides of (1) are the expected values
of the loss offset provision in case of debt default. In equation (1), we assume that the events
9, 6' and y are independent. Now define p~ ~ to be the percentage depreciation of the U.S. dollar
vis-à-vis foreign country i's currency implicit in the forward exchange rate as follows,
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F~.~ - 1p~,~ -
S,. r
(2)
Substituting for ~''` from (2) into (1) and setting the cross terms i;', p~ ~, 9,' p~ ~, 6; i;', and
~, ~
A i~ to zero, we get after rearranging,
(1-1'ti)(P~,~}i;",-i~) - ( 1 -Y2)(A; -8) t(1 -Y)2w~i~~~ (3)
After dividing by (1-yT ) , we now can obtain the following tax-adjusted covered interest parity
condition,
f "f~.~ - ~ ~T~.~i~s~ (4)
where
1-Y
f;.~ - P~,~} i~'~- iJ, ê ; - 6; - e, p- 1- y2
The variable f ~ in (4) is the part of country i's T-bill yield in excess of covered interest parity.
The variable !~; simply is the expected credit loss of investment in country i's T-bills relative
to U.S. T-bills. The parameter (3 further indicates how much the foreign ( non-U.S.) interest
rate,i;;,, rises if the withholding tax payment, T; , i;~,, is increased by unity for given values
of i;, p; ~ and [~;. The pazameter (3, which satisfies 0 5 p 5 1, thus is naturally interpreted
as the shaze of the withholding tax borne by the foreign government itself, while 1-(i is the
shaze of the withholding tax borne by the investor's home country Treasury. The incidence
pazameter, ~i, is negatively related to the probability, Y, that the potential foreign tax credit is
realized ex post if T ~ 1. At the same time, the expression for (3 reveals that it is positively
related to the income tax rate T, if 0 ~ Y ~ 1. To see why, note that the pre-tax foreign interest
rate, i;'~, has to rise to compensate the international investor following an increase in the
withholding tax rate, ti;',. The foreign interest payment, i;';, is subject to the investor's domestic
income taxation. The foreign interest rate, i;';, thus has to rise more, the lazger the income tax
rate, T. The share of the incidence of the foreign withholding tax borne by the investor's national
Treasury thus decreases with the income tax rate, 2.
To obtain an alternative specification, we can divide both sides of equation (4) by the foreign
interest rate, i;'„ to give the following tax-inclusive covered interest parity relationship,
Ji,t - ~; t F' ~i t (5)







In (5), the interpretation of ~3 remains unchanged. In deriving equations (4) and (5), we have
assumed that the investor reports his foreign source interest income to the domestic tax authority.
Alternatively, the investor evades domestic taxes on foreign investment income. In that instance,
we effectively have ~( - ti- 0, which implies that a in (4) and ( 5) equals 1. In case of tax
evasion, the T-bill interest rate, i;'~, thus rises one-for-one with the withholding tax liability,
w.
Tr.~ i~~~.
Next, let us consider the tax-adjusted closed interest parity condition for an investor who
can invest in national 5-year govemment bonds and, altematively, in offshore 5-year swap
instruments in the same currency. Setting p; r - 0 in (4) and substituting the foreign-currency
swap rate i~ ~ for the U.S. T-bill rate i~, we get,
g~.~ - ~~ } p ti~.~ i~~~ (6)
where
g,.~ - i;l~ - i;.~
The variable g; ~ thus is the excess of country i's 5-year govemment bond yield, i;'~, over the
corresponding swap interest rate, i; ~, while the variable E~; now reflects the expected credit
loss per dollaz invested in 5-yeaz government bonds relative to the corresponding swap instrument.








In practice, deviations from the tax-adjusted arbitrage relationships (4) and (6) and the tax-
inclusive arbitrage relationships (5) and (7) occur for a variety of reasons, including data
imperfections and transaction costs. As a result, a random component can be appended to any
of these four relationships to give rise to an estimating equation.
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6.3 Data and Empirical Results
Of the industrialized countries considered, only Australia, Germany, Italy, Japan, Spain and
Switzerland have imposed interest withholding taxes on U.S. residents. The withholding tax
rate data is mostly available on an annual basis (see Appendix 6.A for all data sources), although
any within-year tax rate changes are dated as accurately as possible. Australia, specifically,
imposes a 10 per cent withholding tax applicable to American investors ever since 1980. Germany
had a withholding tax of 10 per cent from January 1989 until July 1989. Italy increased its
withholding tax on U.S. investors from zero to 6.25 per cent in September 1986 and subsequently
to 12.5 per cent in October 1988. Japan and Switzerland have maintained constant withholding
tax rates of 5 and 10 per cent, respectively, on Ametican investors since 1980. Spain raised
its withholding tax on government debt from 20 to 25 per cent in July 1989. All of these
countries apply a roughly similar withholding tax regime to nonresident Japanese investors.
Of the countries in the sample, Italy and Spain and to a lesser extent Belgium, France and Sweden
have imposed capital controls in the eighties. These capital controls, however, in no instance
prohibited the foreign ownership of domestic government debt securities. Below we consider
how the withholding tax regime has affected yields in, first, the national T-bill markets and,
second, the 5-year government bond markets.
6.3.1 Withholding Taxes and 3-month T-bills
The T-bill interest rate data set consists of monthly observations from January ]980 to December
1994 for twelve industrialized countries: Australia, Belgium, Canada, France, Germany, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States.' The
maturity of all T-bills is 3 months. The countries in the data set vary widely among themselves
and over time in their interest withholding tax regime.
As can be seen from Garbade (1982) and OECD (1990c), national T-bill markets differ widely
in, for instance, market institutions and pricing conventions. The market for U.S.-Treasury debt
is arguably the deepest in the world, with a near continuum of Treasury maturities and very
narrow bid-ask spreads. T-bills are issued in weekly batches by tender. Contrary to the U.S.,
there is no active secondary market for T-bills in Germany. T-bills payable within three months
are used as collateral for Lombard loans. Similarly, in Japan, a liquid secondary market in T-bills
has yet to emerge. Gensaki bonds, which are repurchase agreements covering three-month
transactions, are collateralized by govemment bonds or T-bills. Essentially, the gensaki market
is a somewhat restricted private market. The Bank Nationale de Belgique subscribes to three-
month Treasury certificates at par, in practice in so far as it can transfer them onto the market.
In Canada, investment dealers, the chartered banks and the Bank of Canada submit tenders to
' T-bills are promises of the Treasury to pay a stipulated amount on a stated maturity (Garbade, 1982).
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the Ministry of Finance for 3-month T-bills to be issued. T-bills are sold at discount. In France,
13-week T-bills are an important element of the money market. T-bills are available to all
economic agents and are sold in so-called Dutch auctions. T-bills in Italy are the government's
most important source of short-term finance. They are issued by auction, in which the Banca
d'Italia participates in the same way as other authorized dealers. Until recently, nearly a113-month
Treasury paper in the Netherlands was held by monetary institutions that use it as an interest-
bearing and pledgeable asset to meet the liquidity requirements imposed by De Nederlandsche
Bank. The banks had practically no Treasury paper freely available for sale on the market.
Secondary market dealíngs were rare, and secondary market rates were merely indicative.x T-bills
in the United Kingdom are offered for tender each weak. In Sweden, Treasury discount notes
are the main instrument for government short-term borrowing. Switzerland possesses only the
embryo of a domestic money market. The Banque Nationale Suisse, may discount bills of
exchange and cheques, "rescriptions" issued by the Confederation (T-bills) and by the cantons
and communes, though is not obliged to. Finally, in Australia Treasury notes are issued by the
Commonwealth government. They are issued at a discount by periodic tender and are redeemable
at par 13 weeks from the date of issue.
Next, we turn to the results of estimating (4) for the pooled cross-country, time series data
set using ordinary least squares (OLS), as reported in Table 6.1. The regressions in Table 6.1
include eleven country dummy variables, ~~, and the nonresident withholding tax imposed on
either U.S. or Japanese investors times foreign country i's interest rate, i.e.i5.,98o-r~a ' i`
Or ti~~ ~g8o-1994 ~ t'. A constant term is omitted. Newey-West (1987) standard errors are also
reported to account for possible heteroscedasticity and autocorrelation resulting from overlapping
3-month interest rate observations. The Newey-West (1987) standard errors differ relatively
little from the OLS standard errors, with relatively minor implications for significance levels.9
The regressions 1 and 5 reflect the basic tax-adjusted covered interest parity condition in
(4) for U.S. and Japanese nonresident investors, respectively. The coefficient (3 is estimated
at 1.206 for U.S. investors (in regression 1) and at 1.233 for Japanese investors (in regression
5). In either regressions, the a's are statistically significantly different from zero, but not from
unity. A country dummy can be interpreted as sovereign default risk relative to the U.S.. This
suggests that there is a relatively large default risk for Belgian, Canadian and Swedish debts.
In regressions 2 and 6, two control variables, the ratio of non-U.S. debt to GDP less the ratio
of U.S. debt to GDP, DEBT-DEBTUS, and the non-U.S inflation less U.S. intlation, INF-INFus~
are added to the basic regressions.
e Note that since January 1, 1994 so-called Dutch Treasury Certificates (DTC's) exist to finance temporary cash
deficits of the government (Goudswaard, De Haan, De Haan and Oort, 1996, p. 33).
' The Newey-West (1987) cotrection is based on Baztlett weights and second order lags.
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Tabte 6.1 - Tax-adjusted covered interest parity for 3-month Treasury bills
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
1.206 1.048
tW.,9so-,v~ ~ i ' (4.8R) (3.77)
[3.04] [2.211
1.223 1.088
tjap.l980-19Pe ~ ~ ~ (4.11) (3.23)
[2.70] [2.03J
DEBT-DEBT~,S 0.011 0.006 0.010 0.0005
(1.46) (0.73) (1.18) (0.05)
(0.76] [0.37] [0.64] [0.02]
INF-INF„S 0.042 0.029 0.041 0.034
(1.56) (1.02) (1.41) (].14)
[0.78J [0.48] [0.72] [0.53J
D, Australia -0.023 -0.015 -0.025 -0.018 -0.023 -0.016 -0.026 -0.023
(6.72) (2.20) (7.13) (2.62) (5.86) (2.16) (6.28) (2.73)
[4.461 [1.06] [4.92] [1.23] [3.98] [1.08] [4.40] [1.25]
D, Belgium 0.008 0.006 0.008 0.008 0.008 0.007 0.008 0.013
(4.45) (0.96) (4.46) (1.33) (4.29) (1.11) (4.30) (1.91)
[6.79] [0.73] [6.78] [1.01] [6.79] [0.86] [6.78] [1.43]
D, Canada 0.010 0.013 0.010 0.012 0.010 0.013 0.010 0.014
(4.99) (3.39) (5.01) (3.05) (4.82) (3.18) (4.83) (3.25)
[9.15] [2.34J [9.14] [1.95] [9.15] [2.16] [9.14] [2.08]
D, France 0.007 0.014 0.007 0.011 0.007 0.013 0.007 0.011
(2.53) (2.85) (2.54) (2.25) (2.44) (2.61) (2.44) (2.10)
[2.67] [1.52] [2.67] [1.12] [2.67] [1.401 [2.67] [1.01]
D, Germany -0.007 -0.0009 -0.007 -0.003 -0.007 -0.001 -0.007 -0.003
(3.85) (0.22) (3.83) (0.67) (3.72) (0.25) (3.70) (0.57)
[4.82] [0.11] [4.80] [0.33] [4.82] [0.13] [4.80] [0.27]
D, Italy -0.021 -0.019 -0.021 -0.019 -0.020 -0.017 -0.020 -0.016
(8.51) (4.18) (8.14) (4.05) (7.86) (3.55) (7.78) (3.29)
[3.91] [2.28] [3.66] [2.19J (3.SOJ [2.01] [3.70] [1.82]
D, Japan 0.002 0.006 0.0007 0.002
(0.89) (1.51) (0.29) (0.51)
[0.80] [0.91] [0.28] [0.30]
D, Netherlands 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.009 0.007 0.010 0.007 0.011
(2.96) (2.49) (2.97) (2.22) (2.86) (2.36) (2.86) (2.47)
[1.95] [1.47] [1.94J [1.24] [1.95] [1.39] [1.94] [1.41]
D, Sweden 0.008 0.013 0.008 0.011 0.008 0.013 0.008 0.013
(3.82) (3.06) (3.83) (2.62) (3.69) (2.85) (3.70) (2.73)
[2.62] [1.69] [2.61] [1.36] [2.62] [1.58] [2.61] [1.42]
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D, Switzerland 0.004 0.014 0.004 0.009 0.00] 0.011 0.00002 -O.OOS
(2.16) (2.49) (1.97) (1.58) (0.47) (1.65) (0.008) (O.S6)
[2.79] [1.17] [2.64] [0.71] [0.46] [0.80] [0.008] [0.25]
D, United 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.008 0.004 0.010 0.004 0.009
Kingdom (2.35) (2.53) (2.35) (1.97) (2.26) (2.32) (2.27) (1.96)
[1.31] [1.02] [1.31] [0.76] [1.31] [0.96J [1.3]] [0.76]
2.089 2.S8S
TW.IDBO-IDa, ' i ' (5.85) (4.23)
(5.21] [3.22]
1.463 1.715
~w,1D83-7983 ' 1. (3'70) (2'19)
[3.32] [3.37J
1.233 1.339
2w,1D86-ID88 ' ~ ~ (3.56) (3.26)
[2.84] [2.56]
0.723 0.659
Z~,.,DaDaDD, ' i ' (2.SS) (2.17)
[1.84] [1.44]
1.514 1.461
tiW.IDDa-IDD. ' i ~ (4.06) (3.66)
[2.6Sj [2.33]
2.077 0.276
T;ay.IDeo-IDa: ' i ~ (4.85) (3.64)
[4.38] [2.37]
1.497 O.1S1
Tjop,1D83-1D85 ' 1 . (3.24) (2.16)
[2.82J [1.77J
1.256 0.178
2jay,J986-lDBB ' t ~ (3.16) (3.45)
[2.58] [2.30]
O.8S1 0.110




2j~.lDD:-IDD. ' i ~ (3.81) (3.29)
(2.67J [1.94]
R' 0.11 0.11 0.10 0.11 0.10 0.10 0.10 0.10
1826 1742 1826 1742 1646 1562 1646 1562
Note: The dependent vatiable is the retum on the non-U.S. T-bill in excess of covered interest parity (j ,). Absolute
t-statistics based on OLS aze in pazentheses and based on Newey-West ( 1987) aze in squaze brackets. R2 is the
coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom N is the number of usable observations.
Source: See Appendix 6.A.
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These control variables can be seen as somewhat more specific (and obviously more time-varying)
indicators of country risk than country dummies.The coefficient ~i is now estimated at 1.048
for the U.S. investor (in regression 2) and at 1.088 for the Japanese (in regression 6). Again,
the estimates of (3 remain statistically indifferent from unity. The regressions do not explicitly
controls for the possible role of capital export restrictions in detetmining government debt yields
in the absence of the requisite data.'o The estimated positive p coefficients thus in principle
can be biased insofar as nonresident withholding tax rates are cotrelated with capital export
restrictions. Note that a country such as Italy imposes positive nonresident withholding tax rates,
and has also restricted capital exports (of course, these restrictions have been eliminated in 1990).
Withholding taxes tend to increase pre-tax interest rates, while capital export restrictions have
the opposite effect. A failure to control for capital export restrictions in the regressions thus
cannot explain positive (3 coefficients insofar as withholding taxes and capital export restrictions
have been positively related.
In regressions 3 and 7, separate (3 coefficients are estimated for 5 consecutive three-year
intervals in the basic equation (4) for U.S. and Japanese investors, respectively. In both
regressions, the (3 estimate for the 1980-1982 interval is significantly different from zero and
from unity, while the p estimates for the intervals 1983-1985, 1986-1988, 1989-1991 and 1992-
1994 are significantly different from zero, but not from unity. Also note that in practice not
all the estimates of Q are within the zero-one range. Regressions 4 and 8, finally, add the two
debt and inflation control variables to regressions 3 and 7. Otherwise, regressions 4 and 8
correspond closely to regressions 3 and 7.
The regressions reported in Table 6.2 are based on the tax-inclusive covered interest parity
specification in equation (5)." Otherwise, the regressions are fully analogous to those reported
in Table 6.1.12 The basic regressions 1 and 5 now reveal estimates for the coefficient (3 that
are both not statistically different from zero and from unity. The estimated parameters for the
country dummies are larger than in Table 6.1, as they now are roughly interpreted as the expected
credit loss (relative to the U.S.) as a share of the foreign country i's interest rate. Similar results
are obtained if control variables are included in regressions 2 and 6. Regressions 3-7 and 4-8
show, however, that the (3 estimates are roughly in the neighborhood of unity for the intervals
1980-1982, 1983-1985, and 1986-1988, while they are close to zero in the subsequent intervals
1989-1991 and 1992-1994. This pattetn of results is consistent with the view that key intemational
investors did not receive offsetting foreign tax credits in the period 1980-1988, while such tax
credits were available in the latter period 1989-1994.
'o See Lemmen and Eijffinger (1996b) for an empirical analysis of the determinants of capital controls in member
states of the European Union.
" Note that the tax-inclusive specification excludes the possibility of spurious correlation.
'Z Remember that (1) the US interest rate is included in the Japanese regressions, and (2) the mazket value of potential
tax credits is related to the withholding tax rates in both countries.
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Table 6.2 - Tax-inclusive covered interest parity for 3-month Treasury bills







DEBT-DEBT~S 0.266 0.139 0.202 0.055
(2.85) (1.44) (2.13) (0.53)
[2.13] [1.05] [L60] [0.38]
INF-INFUS 0.359 0.117 0.383 0.083
(1.16) (0.35) (1.16) (0.23)
[0.87] [0.24] [0.85] [0.16]
D, Australia -0.138 -0.033 -0.222 -0.136 -0.141 -0.057 -0.213 -0.176
(3.26) (0.40) (5.07) (1.60) (2.88) (0.64) (4.19) (1.87)
[2.52] (0.28] [3.69] [1.06] [2.18] [0.44] [3.08] [1.22J
D, Belgium 0.090 -0.055 0.090 0.004 0.090 -0.005 0.090 0.061
(3.98) (0.77) (4.04) (0.06) (3.98) (0.07) (4.02) (0.80)
[8.58J [0.77] [8.57] [0.06] [8.S8J [0.08] [8.57] (0.811
D, Canada 0.086 0.087 0.086 0.077 0.086 0.102 0.086 0.088
(3.83) (1.93) (3.88) (1.62) (3.82) (2.14) (3.86) (1.77)
[10.03] [].94] [10.02J [1.49] [10.03] [2.07J []0.02] [1.60]
D, France 0.077 0.160 0.077 O.I11 0.077 0.154 0.077 0.096
(2.53) (2.88) (2.56) (1.90) (2.52) (2.69) (2.55) (1.56)
[2.58J [2.19] (2.58] [1.35] (2.58] [1.991 [2.58] [1.07]
D, Germany -0.151 -0.081 -0.150 -0.123 -0.151 -0.084 -0.151 -0. ] 35
(6.72) (1.65) (6.76) (2.33) (6.71) (1.62) (6.74) (2.44)
[5.57] [1.21] [5.56] (1.60J [5.57] (1.16] [5.56] [1.63]
D, Italy -0.130 -0.162 -0.138 -0.164 -0.128 0.139 -0.133 -0.139
(4.04) (3.04) (4.32) (2.98) (3.99) (2.50) (4.18) (2.46)
[2.68] [2.61J [2.85] [2.52] (2.63] [2.15] [2.75] [2.11]
D, Japan 0.122 0.161 0.037 0.051
(2.89) (2.73) (0.85) (0.78)
[2.27] [2.18] [0.70] [0.60]
D, Netherlands 0.115 0.115 0.115 0.105 0.115 0.129 0.115 0.1 ]6
(4.39) (2.42) (4.45) (2.11) (4.39) (2.60) (4.43) (2.26)
[2.32J [1.62] [2.32] [1.38] [2.321 [].75] [2.32] [1.48]
D, Sweden 0.066 0.091 0.066 0.069 0.066 0.101 0.066 0.072
(2.72) (1.90) (2.75) (1.35) (2.71) (1.99) (2.74) (1.36)
[2.38] [1.49] [2.38J [1.00] [2.38J [1.53] [2.37] [0.98]
D, Switzerland 0.158 0.317 0.116 0.191 0.138 0.292 0.067 0.112
(5.52) (4.48) (3.99) (2.48) (2.81) (3.27) (13 1) (1.08)
[4.36] [3.05] [3.38] [1.63] [2.13J [2.22] [1.05] [0.71J
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D, United 0.033 0.089 0.033 0.053 0.033 0.090 0.033 0.046
Kingdom (1.46) (1.87) (1.48) (1.04) (1.46) (1.81) (1.47) (0.86)



































R1 0.11 0.12 0.13 0.15 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.13
N 1826 1742 1826 1742 1646 1562 1646 1562
Note: The dependent variable is the retum on the non-U.S. T-bill in excess of covered interest parity per dollaz invested
in the foreign country i's asset (j;J,). Absolute t-statistics based on OLS aze in parentheses and based on Newey-
West (1987) are in square brackets. R2 is the coefficient of detemtination adjusted for degrees of freedom N
is the number of usable observations.
Source: See Appendix 6.A.
Overall, the evidence suggests that withholding on national T-bills were fully reflected in pre-tax
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yields, at least until 1988. Perhaps this is to be expected, as large institutional investors such
as pension funds are tax-exempt in both the United States and Japan, and thus cannot receive
foreign tax credits to offset foreign-source interest withholding taxation. As national T-bill
markets differ markedly in scope and organization, it is interesting to check to what extent these
conclusions continue to hold for longer-term government debt markets. To this end, we next
examine the relationship between interest withholding taxation and yields in the 5-year
government debt markets.
6.3.2 Withholding Taxes and 5-year Government Bonds
Long-term government bonds are perhaps closer substitutes in investor portfolios than national
T-bills, in part because national central banks are less active in long-term government debt
markets than in T-bill markets. It interesting to test the relationship between withholding taxes
and yields separately for the long-term government debt market, not the least because long-term
government debt markets tend to be far more liquid than, say, corporate debt markets. Also,
maturity per se can have an independent effect on the extent to which interest withholding taxes
are marked-up into higher pre-tax yields. This, for instance, is shown to be case in the commercial
bank credit market to developing countries in the 1970s by Huizinga (1996). The evidence there
suggests that pre-tax interest rates are marked-up less for short-term bank loans than for longer
term bank loans on account of foreign-source interest withholding taxes. A reason for this
'withholding tax yield-curve effect' may be that banks on short notice know whether they can
realize the foreign tax credits associated with any loans. They therefore value foreign tax credits
associated with short-term loans relatively highly giving rise to a smaller mark-up into higher
pre-tax yields for short-term credits. A second reason for a'withholding tax yield-curve effect'
may be that there is always some uncertainty about domestic tax regime changes insofar as
existing financial instruments are not subject to grandfather clauses in case of policy changes.
Of course, the government debt market is far more liquid than the secondary market for third
world debt has even been, and a priori any maturity effect is expected to be weaker.The data
set now consists of monthly 5-year govemment bond yields and comparable offshore swap rates
in the same currency for the period from April 1987 to December 1995. The data is for thirteen
industrialized countries: Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Germany, Italy, Japan, Netherlands,
Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom and the United States. Again, Newey-West
(1987) corrected standard errors are also reported to account for possible heteroscedasticity
and autocorrelation resulting from the overlapping sample problem." Table 6.3 first reports
regressions based on the tax-adjusted closed interest parity condition in equation (6).
" The Newey-West (1987) correction is based on Bartlett weights and fifty-nine order lags.
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Table 6.3 - Tax-adjusted closed interest parity for 5-year government bonds
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1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8
-0.024 0.136
T~,.,9ai-,99s ' i' (0.37) (1.99)
[0.16] [o.75J
-0.200 -0.019
~ÍaG.1987-1995 ~ i . (1.93) (0.18)
[0.53] [0.06J
EBT 0.011 0.012 0.0] 1 0.009
(6.39) (6.25) (5.60) (4.43)
[1.89] [1.83J [1.84] [1.50]
, Belgium -0.002 -0.018 -0.002 -0.018 -0.002 -0.016 -0.002 -0.015
(4.91) (7.05) (4.95) (6.87) (4.82) (6.23) (4.90) (5.01)
[2.68J [2.O8j (2.68] [2.01] [2.68J [2.04] [2.68] [1.69]
, Canada -0.004 -0.015 0.004 -0.015 -0.004 -0.014 -0.004 -0.013
(7.88) (8.34) (7.94) (8.11) (7.73) (7.46) (7.86) (6.17)
[19.30] [2.56] 19.27] [2.45] [19.30] [2.54] 19.28] [2.15]
, Denmark -0.004 -0.012 -0.004 -0.013 -0.004 -0.012 -0.004 -0.011
(9.60) (9.39) (9.68) (9.12) (9.43) (8.48) (9.58) (7.14)
[12.93] [2.93] 12.91] [2.80] [12.93] [2.93] 12.92] [2.51]
, France -0.004 -0.010 -0.003 -0.010 -0.004 -0.010 -0.004 -0.009
(11.29) (10.10) 11.38) (9.80) (I1.08) (9.15) 11.27) (7.76)
[8.34] [3.17] [8.33] [3.02] [8.34J [3.17] [8.33] [2.73]
, Germany -0.004 -0.009 -0.003 -0.009 -0.004 -0.009 -0.003 -0.008
(13.60) (10.10) 13.00) (9.62) (13.01) (9.04) 12.82) (7.55)
[8.54J [3.24] [7.35] [3.17] [7.29] [3.36J [7.01J [2.93]
, Italy 0.005 -0.011 0.003 -0.012 0.007 -0.008 0.003 -0.008
(4.80) (4.02) (2.31) (4.34) (5.42) (2.59) (1.73) (2.79)
[2.07J [L 29J [0.87] [1.37] [1.54] [1.15] (0.55] [1.19J
,Japan -0.005 -0.014 -0.005 -0.015
(11.01) (9.28) ]0.98) (9.33)
[6.11] [2.93] [4.98] [2.92]
, Netherlands -0.004 -0.013 -0.004 -0.014 -0.004 -0.013 -0.004 -0.012
(12.17) (9.33) 12.27) (9.03) (11.95) (8.39) 12.15) (7.00)
[27.23] [2.85] 27.191 [2.72J [27.23] [2.84] 27.20] [2.43]
, Spain -0.003 -0.014 -0.007 -0.015 -0.001 -0.010 -0.005 -0.011
(1.59) (5.62) (2.81) (5.64) (1.14) (5.09) (3.65) (5.69)
[0.69] [2.lOJ [1.03] [1.94] [0.33] [2.55] [1.17] [2.57]
, Sweden -0.008 -0.017 -0.008 -0.017 -0.008 -0.016 -0.008 -0.015
(20.68) (]1.82) 20.84) (11.40) (20.29) 10.74) 20.63) (9.14)
[13.12] [3.66J 13.10] [3.46] [13.12] [3.68] 13.10] [3.17]
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, Switzerland -0.008 -0.010 -0.008 -0.010 -0.007 -0.010 -0.008 -0.010
(24.54) (21.16) 23.71) (21.01) (1L51) 12.60) 12.14) 12.80)
[4.15] [5.06] [4.49] [5.29] [2.67] [4.61] [3.80] [5.36]
, United -0.005 -0.010 -0.005 -0.010 -0.005 -0.010 -0.005 -0.009
Kingdom (19.77) (12.45) 19.92) (12.02) (19.40) 11.36) 19.73) (9.74)
[5.07J [3.53] [5.07] [3.38] (5.07] [3.48] [5.07] [3.07]
, Uni[ed States -0.010 -0.016 -0.010 -0.016
(33.10) 13.86) 33.65) 11.96)
[12.82] [4.73] 12.80] [4.20]
-0.386 -0.234
TW ,19H7-7989 . t ~ (3.02) (1.84)
[1.33] [1.07]
0.090 0.173
tim.,9vo-199z ' i' (1.18) (2.30)
[0.42] [0.83]
0.122 0.144











tijav.1993-,~s ' 1 ~ (1.59) (1.26)
[0.53] (0.40]
-Z 0.78 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.83 0.83
779 779 779 779 787 787 787 787
Note: The dependent vaziable is the return on the 5-year benchmark govemment bond index in excess of the swap
rate (g~ ~). Absolute t-statistics based on OLS aze in pazentheses and based on Newey-West (1987) aze in squaze
brackets. R2 is [he coefficient of determination adjusted for degrees of freedom. N is the number of usable
observations.
Source: See Appendix 6.A
The basic regressions 1 and 5 yield estimates of the coefficient (i that are close to zero and
statistically insignificant for the U.S. and Japanese investor cases. In contrast, regressions 6
finds a positive and slightly significant p estimate for the U.S. case." Next, regressions 3-7
and regressions 4-8 test whether the mark-up of withholding taxation includes separate p estimates
" The inflation rate is less well suited since it also involves foreign policy behavior.
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for three consecutive 3-year intervals to see whether the a estimate changes over time. The
results suggest that the impact of nonresident withholding taxation on pre-tax yields on 5-year
government bonds increases somewhat over time, although most of the individual (i estimates
are significantly indifferent from zero. To conclude, Table 6.4 reports regressions based on
the tax-inclusive closed interest parity specification in equation (7).
Table 6.4 - Tax-inclusive closed interest parity for 5-year government bonds







DEBT -0.024 -0.025 0.039 -0.073
(0.92) (0.82) (1.51) (2.66)
[0.25] [0.30] [0.45] (1.05)
D, Bel- -0.027 0.006 -0.027 0.007 -0.027 -0.082 -0.027 0.073
gium (4.83) (0.16) (5.01) (0.17) (5.22) (2.24) (5.74) (1.92)
[2.66] [0.05] [2.65] [0.06] [2.66] [0.67] [2.65] [0.75]
D, Cana- -0.052 -0.029 -0.052 -0.029 -0.052 -0.090 -0.052 0.017
da (6.89) (1.11) (7.16) (0.96) (7.45) (3.48) (8.20) (0.64)
[13.43] [0.32] [13.41] [0.36] [13.43] [1.08] [13.41] [0.26]
D, Den- -0.060 -0.043 -0.060 -0.043 -0.060 -0.087 -0.060 -0.010
mark (8.41) (2.22) (8.74) (1.96) (9.09) (4.56) (10.01) (0.50)
[15.35] [0.65] (15.33] (0.74] [15.35] [1.44] [15.33] [0.20]
D, France -0.055 -0.043 -0.055 -0.042 -0.055 -0.076 -0.055 -0.017
(9.72) (2.83) (10.09) (2.51) (10.50) (5.17) (11.56) (1.11)
[ 14.04] [0.83] [ 14.02] [0.94] [ 14.04] [ 1.64] [ 14.02] [0.45 j
D, Ger- -0.053 -0.042 -0.053 -0.041 -0.053 -0.073 -0.053 -0.018
many (12.59) (3.05) (13.07) (2.69) (13.61) (5.45) (14.97) (1.27)
[6.36] [0.89] [6.36] [1.04] [6.36] [1.76] [6.36] [0.55]
D, Italy 0.038 0.068 -0.094 -0.065 0.038 -0.010 -0.065 0.021
(1.65) (1.70) (3.32) (1.46) (2.19) (0.29) (3.65) (0.57)
(3.78] [0.57] [1.31] [0.46] [4.56] [0.10] [3.11] [0.26]
D,)apan -0.124 -0.104 -0.225 -0.206
(6.76) (3.68) (10.13) (6.50)
[5.41] [1.31] [3.39] [2.01]
D, Nether- -0.065 -0.046 -0.065 -0.046 -0.065 -0.095 -0.065 -0.009
lands (11.45) (2.19) (11.89) (1.91) (12.37) (4.59) (13.62) (0.40)
[25.74] [0.61] [25.71] [0.70] [25.74) [1.41] [25.71] [0.16]
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D, Spain -0.031 -0.014 -0.295 -0.281 -0.032 -0.057 -0.134 -0.090
(0.70) (0.28) (5.30) (4.85) (1.86) (2.38) (7.55) (3.77)
[1.48] [0.19] [2.04] [1.67] [3.62j [1.04] [6.16] [2.17]
D, Swe- -0.087 0.068 -0.087 -0.067 -0.087 -0.117 -0.087 -0.030
den (14.21) (3.16) (14.76) (2.78) (15.36) (SS8) (16.91) (1.36)
[15.41] [0.91] [15.39] [1.05] [15.41] [1.75] [15.40] [0.55]
D, Swit- -0.152 -0.147 -0.192 -0.187 -0.152 -0.161 -0.226 -0.212
zerland (15.42) (13.12) (17.65) (15.49) (8.99) (8.99) (13.65) (12.19)
[4.63] [3.78] [6.04] [4.75] [4.52] [4.19] [19.46] [15.10]
D, United -0.055 -0.044 -0.055 -0.044 -0.055 -0.072 -0.055 -0.023
Kingdom (13.34) (3.61) (13.86) (3.19) (14.42) (6.01) (15.87) (1.84)
[8.33] [1.02] [8.32] [1.16] [8.33] [1.80] [8.32] [0.69]
D, United -0.149 -0.173 -0.149 -0.105
States (34.96) (10.57) (38.48) (6.13)




















R~ 0.79 0.79 0.80 0.80 0.83 0.83 0.86 0.86
N 779 779 779 779 787 787 787 787
Note: The dependen[ vaziable is Ihe return on [he 5-year benchmark government bond index in excess of the swap
rate (g;,). Absolute t-sta[istics based on OLS aze in pazentheses and based on Newey-West (1987) are in squaze
brackets. RZ is the coefficient of determination adjus[ed for degrees of freedom. N is the number of usable
observations.
Source: See Appendix 6.A
The estimates of the p coefficient for the basic regressions 1 and 5 are close to zero and not
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significantly different from zero. In regressions 3-7 and 4-8, however, the ~i estimates are close
to unity for the intervals 1990-1992 and 1993-1995, which suggests that the foreign pre-tax
interest rates rise one-for-one by the interest tax withheld.
6.4 Evaluation and Conclusion
This chapter has tested to what extent national T-bill and 5-year govemment bond yields reflect
the nonresident withholding tax regime. Where the estimates of the incidence parameter, (i,
are statistically different from zero, they tend to be in the neighborhood of unity in Tables 1-4.
Overall, we therefore conclude that at least during certain periods both T-bill and 5-year bond
yields fully reflect the withholding tax regime. This conclusion suggests that key international
investors receive few, if any, offsetting foreign tax-credits from their domestic tax authorities.
This is to be expected as the marginal international investors are generally tax-exempt institutional
investors such as pension funds. As a result, the net-of-tax government cost of funds may be
invariant to the withholding tax rate. Nonresident withholding taxes thus appear to have few,
if any, international redistributive implications.'S At the same time, the international tax system
de facto appears to be source-based, although most countries de jure tax their residents' income
on a worldwide basis with offsetting tax credits for foreign source income taxes.
While nonresident withholding taxes may have little impact on net-of-tax interest rates, they
of course increase pre-tax interest rates. This increase in interest rates also benefits domestic
holders of government debt that are not subject to nonresident withholding taxes. Nonresident
withholding taxes thus have potentially important national redistributive implications. To the
extent that domestic owners of government debt benefit from higher interest rates, the overall
effect of nonresident withholding taxes on the government budget may be negative. The domestic
demand for government debt thus poses an constraint on the efficacy of nonresident withholding
taxes as a tool to generate net government revenues. Important in this regard is the extent to
which higher pre-tax government yields cause a shift in ownership from foreign to domestic
investors in government debt. In practice, governments appear to have an incentive to separate
the domestic and foreign demands for their securities. Capital controls, which are now out of
vogue, are one way to achieve this. Alternatively, governments can issue debts denominated
in domestic and foreign cunencies in an attempt to achieve market separation.
The insight that nonresident withholding taxes on the public debt may raise little government
revenue may be a stimulus for countries to agree to hatmonize the international withholding
tax system.1ó By acting together, countries may in fact restore the efficacy of interest
's Nonresident withholding taxes represent to some extent a direct transfer of resources from the lender's ta~r authority
to the borrowing government.
16 While debt pricing depends on the marginal investor in government debt, the net revenue implicaáons of
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withholding taxes to generate net tax revenues. In 1989, the European Commission proposed
the introduction of a minimum withholding tax of ISq~ on foreign interest income. This proposal
was an essential complement to the achievement of a free movement of capital. Capital flows
were liberalized in the European Union by July 1, 1990 (with the exceptions of Greece, Ireland,
Portugal and Spain). The final elimination of restrictions on short-term capital flows, which
may be most tax-sensitive, followed the earlier liberalization of long-term capital flows. The
liberalization ofcourse implies that capital now can flow freely from countries with source-level
interest taxation to countries without any such taxation." Despite the obvious benefits of
concerted European action, the minimum withholding tax proposal was rejected over concerns
about its effects for Europe's financial centres.'g The European debate on withholding tax
policy stresses that a common withholding tax policy ideally also involves the non-European
industrialized countries and financial ccntres.
nonresident withholding taxes also depend on inframarginal holders of this debt.
" Levich (1989) presents ttuee variables which will play a crucial role in the development of Euro mazkets in
the neaz future. ~hese aze (1) reserve requirements on bank deposits, (2) taxation of residents and nonresidents
on interest income, dividends and capital gains, and (3) disclosure of interest and dividends to tax authorities.






Country Period Description Source
Australia January 1980-December 3-month T-bill rate in percentage per DATASTREAM, National
1994 year (end-of-period) Government Series
Belgium January 1980-Decemher 3-month T-bill rate in percentages per DATASTREAM, National
1994 year (end-of-period) Government Series
Canada Januazy 1980-December 3-month T-bill rate in percentages per DATASTREAM, National
1994 year (end-of-period) Government Series
France December 1986-December Bons du uesor, marché secondaire, 3 Banque de France
1994 mois, dernière cotation (Pin de mois)
Germany January 1980-December 3-month T-bill rate in percentages per DATASTREAM, National
1994 year (end-of-period) Government Series
Italy January 1980-December 3-month T-bill rate in percentages per DATASTREAM, Nauonal
1994 year (end-of-period) Government Series
Japan January 1980-December 3-month gensaki rate in percentages Bank of Japan
1994 per year, i.e. repurchase agreement
rate using long-term bonds and more
recently using T-bills as collateral
(end-of-period)
Nether- January 1980-January 3-month T-bill rate in percentages per DATASTREAM, National
lands 1991 yeaz (end-of-period) Government Series
Sweden Januazy 1981-December 3-month T-bill rate in percentages per Sveriges Riksbank
1994 year (end-of-period)
Switzer- January 1980-December 3-month Eidgnássische Geldmarkt- Schweizerische National Bank
land 1994 buchforderungen in percentages per
year (yield of last issue in month)
United January ]980-December 3-month T-bill rate in percentages per DATASTREAM, National
Kingdom 1994 year (end-of-period) Government Series
United Januazy 1980-December 3-month T-bill rate in percentages per DATASTREAM, National
States 1994 yeaz (end-of-period) Government Series
Chapter 7
Summary and Conclusions
This study examined the measurement and determinadon of financial integration in the European
Union (EU). Chapter 1 argued that the concept of financial integration is difficult to define.
Financial integration is associated with the equalization of returns of similar financial assets
across markets so that the law of one price holds. Although the law of one price definition of
financial integration is theoretically preferable, the measurement of financial integration often
relied on broader concepts. We briefly summarize the results of the three most influential methods
to measure the degree of financial integration.
What can we learn from interest parity conditions?
Our results for covered interest parity (CTP) in Chapter 2 indicate an increasing degree of money
mazket integration in Europe as measured by the CIP condition. The size and variability of
mean (absolute) country premia declined significantly after the Basle-Nyborg agreement of
September 1987. Perfect capital mobility of type I(CIP integration) can be said to exist between
eight European countries and Germany. Portugal and Greece are the exceptions to the rule and
are not (yet) completely integrated with Germany. In addition, the initial low degree of CIP
integration urged countries like Greece, France, Italy, Portugal and Spain to catch up with the
rest of the European countries during the 1980s. We also found that CIP deviations aze much
smaller than deviations from ex post UIP and ex post RIP. Ex post UIP and RIP generally do
not hold, although uncovered and real interest differentials fell in the countries participating
in the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM) before the first EMS crisis. Subsequently, we concluded
that it is rather difficult to draw firm conclusions regarding the integration of money markets
with the help of the ex ante UIP and ex ante RIP conditions. Ex ante UIP incorporates
expectations regarding future exchange rate changes, which are hard to predict. Tests of UIP
suffer from the need to make an assumption about these unobservable expectations resulting
in tests of joint hypotheses. Peso problems may also have resulted in rejeccion of ex ante UIP.
Contrary to the CIP condition, the UIP condition can only give an indirect indication of financial
integration.
Even more difficulties arise with the RIP condition as a measure for financial integration.
Ex ante RIP only has an indirect impact on capital flows via its influence on exchange rate
expectations. Ifex ante purchasing power parity (PPP) holds, different inflationary expectations
are validated by an appropriate exchange rate adjustment. However, despite European inflation
convergence and the exchange rate stabilizing effect of the Exchange Rate Mechanism (ERM),
exchange rate uncertainry remains. With incomplete goods and factor market integration, exchange
rate uncertainues translate in large real exchange rate movements (deviations from ex ante PPP).
Subsequently, this requires changes in exchange rate parities to eliminate undesirable real
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exchange rate movements.
In most EU countries, the greater integration of financial markets seriously reduced the ability
to conduct independent monetary policy. With relatively fixed exchange rates (as is in the EMS),
the freedom of capíta] movements promotes low-risk interest arbitrage when interest rates differ
across countries. In the limiting case -- with perfect financial integration -- movements ofcapital
induce interest rates to be maintained at parity level across countries. This means that, for
example, a reduction of domestic interest rates resulting from an expansionary monetary policy
induces capital to flow out of the country, thereby offsetting the monetary expansion and
provoking a rise in domestic interest rates back to the parity level.
The reason for which interest parity conditions may not hold may also result from the great
diversity of assets. Such diversity in terms of quality of debtor, size, depth and segmentation
of markets makes it more difficult to find really comparable assets. The concept of financial
integration is less meaningful when applied at a level of aggregation that includes all categories
of capital. Capital mobility may be short-teml financial instruments such as treasury bills, time
deposits, certificates of deposits and commercial papers or long-term iinancial assets such as
government and corporate bonds, or it may be portfolio equity investment and direct investment.
Capital mobility is best viewed, at least empirically, by focussing on specific assets with similar
characteristics. As we have seen in Chapter 6, concentrating on specific assets (3-month Treasury
bills and 5-year government bonds) may be more informative.
Research of the extent of financial integration is often confined to short-term assets since
forward exchange markets for longer maturities aze either unavailable or very thin. However,
in Chapter 6, we innovatively apply interest rate swaps to examine closed interest parity for
long-term bonds. In Chapter 6 we saw that the pricing in 5-year government bond mazkets is
highly efficient, while pricing in 3-month treasury bill markets is still inefficient. Nevertheless,
we expect the breadth and depth of treasury bill markets to increase with the transition to
European Monetary Union (EMU).
What can we learn from saving-investment correlations?
Chapter 3, applying an error-correction model of saving-investment correlations, concluded
that the apparent decline of short-term saving-investment correlations indicates that an increasing
shaze of total savings and investment is held in intemationally traded securities. Not only arbitrage
from the wholesale markets but also from retail financial markets may have contributed to this
result. Cleazly, the F-H criterion is more concemed with this latter segment whereas interest
parity conditions aze more concemed with the former segment. Individuals and small investors,
regardless of the country of origin, now have access to the same information with respect to
foreign assets as a result of tremendous improvement in computer and telecommunication
technology.
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What can we learn from consumption correlations?
Can countries borrow against future income? Some countries may prefer current consumption
to future consumption, while other countries prefer future consumption to current consumption.
Chapter 4 found that there is still significant room for risk diversification among EU countries.
Per capita consumption growth correlations across European countries are far below unity and
differ considerably. However, cross-country consumption correlations have typically been larger
during the 1979-1992 period than during the 1961-1978 period, which might be viewed as an
indication of closer financial integration in the second half of the sample period. Consumption
now inereasingly depends both on current and future income (the cross-country permanent income
hypothesis).
The result of above developments has been an enormous increase of expectations-driven short-
term capital flows. Expectations of interest rate changes, inflationary and exchange rate
expectations are important in determining the direction and extent of these capital flows and
consequently the country and exchange risk premia imposed by the international financial
community on particular countries.
Financial integration and country risks
Country risks may include capital controls and also include common events such as changes
in taxation and changes in government. The international financial community punishes
governments applying the wrong mix of macroeconomic policies. As we have seen in Chapter
5, country risk premia depend on a small number of "fundamentals", including (realized) inflation,
government instability and gross fixed capital formation. Furthermore, risks concerned with
elections, government changes and bank failures may affect country risk premia. Capital flows
inereasingly depend on varying national economic and financial market structures.
T'he history of high inflation in Finland, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom typically
have made these countries more dependent on short-term financing at variable interest rates,
and thus more sensitive to shifts in short-term nominal interest rates. Also cultural and political
factors have led to differences in financial structure. In this respect, the average debt maturity
of the domestic sectors is of crucial importance. Large proportions of short-dated liabilities
of domestic sectors (e.g. government debt) are a potential threat to the viability of the financial
system. The resulting short-termism of many borrowers and investors frustrates medium- and
long-term oriented monetary and fiscal policies. Although, short-term oriented policies may
be optimal in countries like Finland, Italy, Sweden and the United Kingdom, they are not in
other EU countries (e.g. Austria, Germany, France, the Netherlands). However, due to strong
financial linkages, this group has become highly sensitive to events and policy actions of the
previous group. Given the strong differences in national economic and financial structures, and
given the fact that existing structures change gradually, and with capital controls coming down,
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these differences will decisively affect the direction of capital flows within the EU -- the more
so because not all country specific risks can be diversified away. Countries may be confronted
with higher financing costs of their investments and debts. Investors simply ask compensation
for holding the assets of these countries. On the other hand, countries like Finland, Italy, Sweden
and the United Kingdom can benefit from the stability of the other group. More research is
needed to examine the impact ofdifferences in national economic and financial market structure
on cross-border capital flows.
Financial integration and exchange rate risk
Exchange rate risks (unexpected exchange rate changes) provide an important obstacle to deeper
financial integration in the EU since not all exchange risk can be hedged. The risk of an
appreciation of the home currency relative to all other foreign currencies would be a risk common
to all foreign investment and cannot be diversified away. Moreover, with markets being more
integrated, the scope for further risk diversification may decline. Consequently, unhedged
exchange rate risks continue to affect foreign investment decisions. We have seen in Chapter
2 that exchange rate uncertainties lead to differences in uncovered returns between markets.
Exchange rate uncertainty undoubtedly will be a major determinant of European capital flows.
Financial integration and regulatory arhitrage
Financial integration will lead to regulatory arbitrage (see Chapter 6). If regulations are excessive,
market participants will simply go to less restrictive jurisdictions. On the other hand, financial
institutions probably also value their access to lender of last resort facilities, the opportunity
to be headquartered in a stable political climate, availability ofqualified personnel, and so forth.
Therefore, financial institutions find it in their interest to pay some regulatory tax. Future research
of financial integration should focus on remaining factors which influence the free movement
of capital within the EU. Research should identify these factors, and subsequently quantify their
importance. Particularly, fiscal factors such as withholding taxes on dividend and interest, capital
gains taxes, reserve requirements, deposit insurance schemes and capital adequacy standards
are important regulations which might affect the extent and direction of capital flows.
Interestingly, one may want to analyze the incentives for evasion and the international
redistributive implications of these fiscal regulations. Again, empirical estimation is called for
to determine who precisely bears the burden of these regulations. Changes in these factors may
have profound implications for the development of Europe's iinancial centres. Finally, despite
the world wide trend of financial integration, we have argued that financial integration in fact
is taken place regionally. The integration of countries' financial markets within a region, may
well go hand in hand with discrimination of investments of countries outside the region. The
recent movement towards EMU may lead to new explicit and implicit barriers for those countries
which do not enter EMU.
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Samenvatting (Summary in Dutch)
Naast een toenemende financiële integratie op mondiale schaal is er in een nog sterkere mate
sprake van financiële integratie op regionale schaal. De integratie tussen de lidstaten van de
Europese Unie (EU) kan als belangrijkste exponent van dit regionale integratie streven worden
beschouwd. Dit proefschrift concentreert zich dan ook met name op de integratie tussen de
financiële markten van de lidstaten van de EU. Tot voor kort was er nog betrekkelijk weinig
onderzoek verricht naar financiële integratie in Europa, terwijl de vrijheid van kapitaal juist
belangrijke consequenties kan hebben voor de vorming van een Economische en Monetaire
Unie (EMU) in Europa. Immers kapitaalmobiliteit grijpt in op alle relaties waarbij direct of
indirect financiële markten betrokken zijn. Denk hierbij bijvoorbeeld aan de implementatie van
het monetaire en budgettaire beleid, het portefeuillegedrag van beleggers en de financiering
van ondernemingen. Het is daarom essentieel om de mate van financiële integratie te meten
en de belangrijkste determinanten ervan te bepalen.
Het proefschrift bestaat uit twee delen. In deel I wordt met behulp van drie maatstaven de
mate van integratie tussen de nationale financiële markten in de EU gemeten. Deze drie
maatstaven zijn achtereenvolgens rentepariteitscondities (hoofdstuk 2), de correlatie tussen
besparingen en investeringen (hoofdstuk 3) en de correlatie tussen de groei van consumptie
in binnen- en buitenland (hoofdstuk 4). Vervolgens wordt in deel II ingegaan op de fundamentele
determinanten van financiële integratie (hoofdstuk 5) en het effect van bronbelasting voor niet-
ingezetenen op het rendement op schatkistpapier en lange schuldtitels van de overheid (hoofdstuk
6). Dus dit proefschrift tracht allereerst een antwoord te vinden op de vraag of de deregulering
van nationale fmanciële markten en de liberalisering van het grensoverschrijdend kapitaalverkeer
heeft geresulteerd in een hogere mate van financiële integratie en tracht daama een antwoord
te vinden op de vraag welke factoren daaraan hebben bijgedragen.
Hoofdstuk 1 besteedt veel aandacht aan de definiëring van fmanciële integratie. Wij definiëren
financiële integratie als de mate waarin de opbrengstvoeten van binnen- en buitenlandse
schuldtitels gedenomineerd in dezelfde valuta aan elkaar gelijk zijn dan wel aan elkaar gelijk
worden. De vraag welke maatstaf bij deze definitie het beste aansluit wordt in hoofdstukken
2 tot en met 4 beantwoord. De conclusies met betrekking tot de mate van financiële integratie
blijken sterk afhankelijk te zijn van de veronderstellingen die aan iedere maatstaf ten grondslag
liggen.
Hoofdstuk 2 kwantificeert in navolging van Frankel and MacArthur (1988) de gemiddelde
(absolute) afwijkingen van gedekte, ongedekte en reële rentepariteit tussen de verschillende
Europese landen en Duitsland. De gedekte rentepariteitsconditie en de gesloten rentepariteitscon-
ditie zijn de meest zuivere maatstaven voor financiële integratie. De noodzaak om
wisselkoersverwachtingen (bij ongedekte rentepariteit) en inflatieverwachtingen (bij reële
rentepariteit) te benaderen, maken ongedekte en reële rentepariteit minder geschikt om de mate
van financiële integratie te meten. Met behulp van ongedekte en reële rentepariteit krijgen we
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slechts een indirecte indicatie voor de mate van financiële integratie. Uit het onderzoek van
gedekte rentepariteit komt naar voren dat zowel de omvang als de variabiliteit van
landenrisicopremies van EU landen ten opzichte van Duitsland na het Bazel-Nyborg akkoord
van september 1987 aanzienlijk zijn afgenomen. Alleen Griekenland en Portugal blijken (nog)
niet volledig geïntegreerd te zijn met Duitsland gedurende de periode oktober 1987 en augustus
1992. Voorts blijken afwijkingen van gedekte rentepariteit lager uit te vallen dan die van
ongedekte en reële rentepariteit. Een belangrijk obstakel voor verdere en diepere integratie van
financiële markten in Europa vormt het wisselkoersrisico. Wisselkoersonzekerheden blijven
een belangrijke detenninant van kapitaalstromen in Europa, mede ook door het feit dat niet
alle wisselkoersrisico's kunnen worden weggediversificeerd. Uit hoofdstuk 2 blijkt dat dit
wisselkoersrisico nog aanzienlijk is. Tenslotte blijken landen met een iniáële achterstand in
de mate van integratie volgens de gedekte rentepariteisconditie deze achterstand versneld in
te halen.
Hoofdstuk 3 beschouwt het Feldstein-Horioka criterium (1980) en formuleert een fouten-
correctie model van besparingen en investeringen. Dit fouten-correctie model onderkent het
verschil tussen korte en lange termijn correlaties van besparingen en investeringen. Naar
verwach[ing ligt de lange termijn correlatie in de buurt van één in geval van een netto
kapitaalmobiliteit van nul, daar op lange termijn besparingen en investeringen gelijk aan elkaar
dienen te zijn opdat de lopende rekening in evenwicht is. Hoofdstuk 3 concludeert dat een steeds
groter deel van de totale besparingen en investeringen worden belegd c.q. geïnvesteerd in
internationaal verhandelbare schuldtitels. Dit betekent dat de korte termijn correlaties tussen
besparingen en investeringen zijn afgenomen. De lange termijn correlaties die door Feldstein
en Horioka werden bestudeerd liggen inderdaad bij één. Voorts wordt de definitie van financiële
integratie geconfronteerd met de veronderstellingen die ten grondslag liggen aan het Feldstein-
Horioka criterium. Het Feldstein-Horioka criterium meet meer dan financiële integratie alleen.
In hoofdstuk 4 worden op basis van zogenaamde Euler vergelijkingen drie toetsen voor
fmanciële integratie afgeleid. Hoofdstuk 4 concludeert dat de correlatiecoëfficiënten tussen binnen-
en buitenlandse consumptiegroei sterk verschillen en beduidend lager zijn dan één. Dit zou
er op kunnen wijzen dat financiële markten binnen Europa niet perfect geïntegreerd dan wel
niet compleet zijn. Er is nog voldoende ruimte voor risicodiversificatie. Echter de vele
veronderstellingen die nodig zijn om deze tcetsen te implementeren, maken consumptiecorrelaties
minder geschikt om de mate van financiële integratie te meten. Daarnaast blijkt uit eigen
empirisch onderzoek dat deze toetsen vaak niet voldoende kracht bezitten om de mate van
financiële integratie te meten.
Hoofdstuk 5 bespreekt de fundamentele determinanten van iinanciële integratie c.q. de
intensiteit van kapitaalrestricties. De literatuur wordt hierbij op twee manieren aangevuld. Ten
eerste, meten we de intensiteit van kapitaalrestricties met behulp van een gesloten rentepariteits-
conditie dan wel een aangepaste gedekte rentepariteitsconditie. Ten tweede, gebruikt hoofdstuk
5 een meer eclectische benadering waarbij in de specificaties voor de regressievergelijkingen
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rekening wordt gehouden met uiteenlopende detenninanten van financiële integratie. Daarbij
wordt ook gebruik gemaakt van inzichten uit de (positieve) politieke economie. We onderzoeken
een uitgebreid databestand van monetaire, fiscale, politieke, institutionele en structurele
determinanten van kapitaalrestricties. De belangrijkste determinanten van de intensiteit van
kapitaalrestricties zijn de (gerealiseerde) inflatie, de instabiliteit van de regering en de omvang
van de binnenlandse investeringen. Naarmate de inflatie, de instabiliteit van de regering en de
binnenlandse investeringen hoger (lager) zijn, is de intensiteit van kapitaalexportrestricties hoger
(lager).
Als gevolg van de twee wisselkoerscrises binnen het Europese Monetaire Stelsel (EMS) was
er een tijdelijke opleving van het landenrisico in enkele Europese landen. Deze opleving werd
veroorzaakt door een toegenomen politiekrisico (Denemarken, Italië, Zweden en het Verenigd
Koninkrijk) dan wel een hernieuwde invoering van kapitaalrestricties (Spanje). Door de langdurige
historie van hoge inflatie in landen zoals Finland, Italië, Zweden en het Verenigd Koninkrijk
zijn deze landen exua gevoelig voor veranderingen in korte rentes. Evenzeer zijn landen met
relatief veel kortlopende schuld extra gevoelig voor korte renteaanpassingen. Door de toegenomen
integratie van financiële markten zijn ook de landen met een langere beleidshorizon (bijvoorbeeld
Duitsland, Frankrijk en Nederland) niet ongevoelig voor gebeurtenissen en beleidswijzigingen
in de voorgaande groep. Met de afschaffing van restricties op het grensoverschrijdend
kapitaalverkeer zijn verschillen in economische en financiële structuur bepalend voor de omvang
van het landenrisico, mede doordat niet alle landenrisico's kunnen worden weggediversificeerd.
Hoofdstuk 6 analyseert het effect van bronbelasting voor niet-ingezetenen op het rendement
op schatkistpapier en lange schuldtitels van de overheid. Daartoe wordt zowel de gedekte en
gesloten rentepariteitsconditie aangepast voor de heffing van bronbelasting voor niet-ingezetenen.
Om gesloten rentepariteit voor lange schuldtitels te berekenen wordt bovendien gebruik gemaakt
van renteswaps. De beschikbaarheid van renteswaps maakt het mogelijk om gesloten rentepariteit
voor een schuldtitels met een tijdshorizon langer dan één jaaz te berekenen. Dit onderzoek maakt
gebruik van een eigen inventarisatie van bronbelastingtarieven. Met name buitenlandse beleggers
in vijfjarige overheidsobligaties eisen een volledige vergoeding voor de hen opgelegde
bronbelasting in het buitenland aangezien deze buitenlandse belasting niet in mindering kan
worden gebracht op de binnenlandse belastingen. De opslag voor bronbelasting is echter niet
volledig voor driemaands schatkistpapier. De nationale markten voor schatkistpapier van de
verschillende Europese landen kunnen nog als gesegmenteerd gekarakteriseerd worden als gevolg
van verschillen in regelgeving, instituties en conventies. De integratie van financiële markten
heeft de druk op overheden om de regulering van financiële kapitaalstromen te harmoniseren
vergroot. Beleggers zullen als gevolg van excessieve regulering minder in het buitenland beleggen
dan wel een hoger rendement eisen op hun buitenlandse beleggingen.
Hoofdstuk 7 besluit het proefschrift met een samenvatting van de belangrijkste conclusies
uit de voorafgaande hoofdstukken en geeft enkele suggesties voor toekomstig onderzoek.
Toekomstig onderzoek dient met name in te gaan op het effect van fiscale factoren. Belangrijke
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fiscale factoren zijn bijvoorbeeld de heffing van bronbelasting op rente en dividend, belasting
op vermogenswinsten, kasreserveverplichtingen, depositoverzekeringen en solvabiliteitsvereisten.
Empirisch onderzoek dient de effecten van deze factoren op rendementen te kwantificeren, de
prikkels voor ontduiking te analyseren, en de intemationale verdelingseffecten ervan te bepalen.
Veranderingen in deze factoren kunnen diepgaande gevolgen hebben voor de ontwikkeling van
Europese financiële centra. De vomling van een EMU in Europa vergroot mogelijk de expliciete
en impliciete belemmeringen voor de landen die niet deelnemen aan EMU.
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